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Abstract
My dissertation is comprised of three chapters. In this first chapter, I study the effect of social
connections on mutual fund investors’ information production and accuracy of their signals.
While connected investors have access to information in their social network (information
diffusion effect), social connections also reduce their incentives to acquire costly information,
since they can free ride on connected peers (“free riding on friends" effect). I find this negative
“free riding on friends" effect of social connections dominates information diffusion effect in the
mutual fund industry, using fund managers’ connections built upon their prior career experiences.
First, I find that connected funds are more likely to hold the same stocks and to trade in the
same direction, relative to unconnected funds. Second, I find that funds with lower network
centrality earn higher alphas, even after controlling for other fund and manager characteristics.
A one-standard-deviation increase in eigenvector centrality predicts a decrease of 29-37 basis
points in annualized fund alphas. Third, when I define a stock-level variable PMC (Peripheral
minus Central) as the difference in average portfolio weights between peripheral funds and
central funds, I find that stocks with higher PMC have significantly higher abnormal stock
returns. A one-standard-deviation increase in PMC predicts an increase of 1.48%-1.52% in
the next quarter risk-adjusted returns (annualized). Finally, I find that PMC predicts firms’
future earnings surprises.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur, Yingzhen Li, and Jie Xie, we
propose a “noisy signaling" hypotheses of open market share repurchase (OMSR) programs,
where the equity market equilibrium that prevails after OMSR program announcements is a
partial pooling rather than a fully separating equilibrium. We argue that two complementary
mechanisms, namely, actual share repurchases by firms and information production by institu-
tions, serve to reduce the residual equity market information asymmetry facing firms subsequent
to OMSR program announcements. We test the implications of this noisy signaling hypothesis
using transaction-level data on trading by institutions and by a subsample of identified hedge
funds, and find strong support for the above hypothesis.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur, and Jiekun Huang, we analyze
how the geographical locations of institutions affect their investments in IPOs and various
characteristics of the IPOs that they invest in. We argue that institutions geographically close to
each other may free-ride on each other’s information when evaluating IPOs, resulting in IPOs
dominated by geographically clustered institutions reflecting less accurate information signals
compared to those dominated by geographically dispersed institutions. We find that the equity
holdings of institutions in IPOs are influenced more by the investments made by neighboring
institutions. We show that an increase in the geographical dispersion of the institutions investing
in an IPO is associated with higher IPO price revisions, higher firm valuations at offering and
secondary market, larger IPO initial returns, greater long-run post-IPO stock returns lower
information asymmetry facing an IPO firm in the equity market. Finally, the predictive power of
institutional trading post-IPO for subsequent long-run stock returns and earnings surprises for
the first fiscal-year end after the IPO is greater for geographically isolated institutions compared
to those that are geographically clustered.
Chapter 1
Social Connections and Information
Production: Evidence from Mutual Fund
Portfolios and Performance
1.1 Introduction
Communication based on social connections among investors is an important part of investment
processes in financial markets. Casual observation suggests that investors frequently share and
communicate their investment ideas and strategies, even among professional money managers who
might be competitors for returns and flows.1 Shiller and Pound (1989) present survey evidence
that both institutional and individual investors may be influenced by peer communications. Due
to similar “word-of-mouth" effects, geographically proximate investors are more likely to exhibit
similar trading behaviors compared to geographically distant investors (e.g. Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2005); Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015)).
1Stein (2008) rationalizes this phenomenon that the truthful information exchange among competitors exists
because of the complementarity in their information structure. Another reason for information sharing is to attract
additional arbitrage capital to successfully correct mispricing. For empirical evidence, see Gray, Crawford, and Kern
(2012).
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Despite the growing evidence that investors invest similarly with their socially connected peers,
there is relatively little analysis linking social connections to investors’ investment performance.
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing new evidence on the link between
social connections and investment performance using data on mutual fund holdings and returns.
The mutual fund industry is an ideal setting to study the social connections between investors due
to the rich amount of background information available on mutual fund managers from regulatory
filings.
Theoretically, the effect of social connections on investors’ performance remains ambiguous.
At first glance, better connected investors may have access to better and more precise information,
since they have a higher chance of receiving more valuable signals (information diffusion effect).
This is, however, not necessarily the case when information production by investors is endogenous.
Han and Yang (2013) analyze a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) style economy with the addition of a
social network. Investors have three sources of information: the market price; costly information
production; and communication with other traders through a social network. They argue that under
endogenous information production, social connections may reduce investors ex-ante incentive to
acquire costly signals, since they can free-ride on “connected" peers (“free riding on friends" effect).
Due to this “free riding on friends" effect, better connected investors, in the aggregate, may hold
less precise information, compared to less connected investors. Given the two opposing effects
of social connections on the precision of information held by investors, whether better connected
investors will have better or worse investment performance, is an empirical question.2
To answer this question, I begin by asking whether social connections have an effect on the
portfolio holdings and trades of mutual funds. I use data on the career paths of managers within the
2Although I motivate this paper using the costly information production and the “free riding on friends" effect
through social connections, there may be other reasons why social connections can have a negative effect on investment
performance. For example, in the social psychology literature, social connections may induce “groupthink" phenomenon
that individuals’ “striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of action"
(Janis (1982)), and hence independent critical thinking will be replaced by “groupthink", resulting in irrational and
inefficient decision-making. In the behavior economics literature, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) theoretically
analyze that individuals are subject to persuasion bias, in a social network, that they fail to account for possible repetition
in the information they receive through social connections.
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mutual fund industry to construct my proxy for social connections between mutual funds. I identify
two fund managers as “connected" today if they both work as portfolio managers in the same fund
family at a particular time point in the past.3 Since I conduct the empirical analysis at the fund level,
I further define a pair of funds as “connected" if they have at least one pair of “connected" portfolio
managers. I construct measures of pairwise overlap in holdings and trades for all fund pairs, and
test whether the overlap is greater when a pair of funds is connected. Remarkably, the portfolio
overlap for a pair of connected funds is 18% higher in my baseline model than that of a pair of
unconnected funds, even after controlling for funds’ geographical locations, family memberships,
size, and investment styles. The effect is economically significant and of similar magnitude for
overlap in stock purchases and sales.
While I use career experiences to proxy for the social connection between fund managers,
this connection variable may be correlated with other “unobserved" manager characteristics (e.g.
ethnicity, political affiliation). If these “unobserved" characteristics of fund managers drive both
the formation of managers’ social connections and their portfolio choices, then the similarity in
portfolio choices between connected mutual funds is not driven by social interactions, but rather
by these “unobserved" manager characteristics.4 To rule out this alternative hypothesis, I build
a “future" version of social connections between mutual funds based on the future connections
of current portfolio fund managers. Assuming these “unobserved" manager characteristics are
persistent across time, then I should expect a pair of mutual funds exhibit similar portfolio choices
even before they become connected, and the “future" connection variable be correlated with current
overlap in portfolio holdings and trades. However, in this falsification test, I do not find that “future"
social connections have a statistically significant effect on funds’ portfolio holdings and trades.
3Empirically, various proxies for social connections has been studied in the literature. For education links, see
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Shue (2013); for employment connections, see Gerritzen, Jackwerth, and Plazzi
(2016) and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012); for geographical proximity, see Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015),
Hvide and Östberg (2015) and Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2007). In my study, I am focused on a particular dimension of
social connections, past career experience in the mutual fund industry, as the “free riding on friends" incentive may be
particularly strong when a pair of managers share the experience of managing money in the same fund family.
4Separating out this “correlated effects" from the “social effects" is empirically challenging, and has long been
recognized as the “reflection problem" in the economics literature (e.g., Manski (1993)).
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Given the evidence that social connections influence mutual fund portfolio holdings and trades,
I next study the effect of social connections on the investment performance of mutual funds. To
quantitatively measure the connectedness of different funds, I adopt the network centrality measures
developed in the social network analysis literature.5 I find that eigenvector centrality negatively
predicts future fund returns and alphas. A one-standard-deviation increase in fund eigenvector
centrality predicts a decrease of 29-37 basis points in annualized fund returns. The predictive
power of eigenvector centrality measure for fund returns holds before and after expenses, and is
robust to controlling for a set of observable fund characteristics including fund size, management
team size, family size, net flow, fund age, and fund turnover. Further, the predictive power of fund
centrality measure survives controlling for manager characteristics measuring their ability (e.g.
managers’ undergraduate institution SAT scores and whether managers have an MBA degree, as
studied in Chevalier and Ellison (1999)), suggesting that the above finding is not driven by less
connected mutual funds hiring managers with better ability or education. Using family fixed effects
model, I find both “within-family" estimator and “between-family" estimators are economically
and statistically significant, suggesting that: 1) social connections affect average returns of mutual
fund families, as fund families internalize social connections of their portfolio managers when
making information production decisions; 2) managers’ social connections affect individual fund
returns even across funds with common family-level information production. Further, I find the
relationship between centrality and fund returns is not driven by geographical locations of mutual
funds. To summarize, these results suggest that while both effects of social connections, information
diffusion effect and “free riding on friends" effect, are at play, “free riding on friends" effect plays
the dominant role in this particular setting and in aggregate, more social connections lead to less
independent information production by fund managers and worse fund returns and alphas.
An alternative explanation is that the network centrality measures are correlated with past
performance of its manager(s) through managerial turnovers, such that the finding of an inverse
5Specifically, I compute three measures of network centrality (degree, eigenvector, and closeness). I use eigenvector
centrality primarily in my empirical analysis, and use other two measures of centrality as robustness checks.
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relationship between network centrality measures and fund future performance is driven by the
persistence of bad performance of “Frequent Job Switchers". I address this concern using three
different empirical tests. First, I control for manager tenure (in the fund family) and I do not find
any impact on the predictive power of centrality measures for fund returns. Second, I construct
several variables, which summarize a fund manager’s alpha generation during his entire career in
the mutual fund industry, to proxy for the fund manager’s “skill". While I find these “skill" variables
have significant predictive power for fund returns, the predictive power of centrality for fund returns
is not affected. Third, I decompose fund centrality measures (degree centrality and eigenvector
centrality) into an “In" and an “Out" component based on the direction of social connections. The
direction of connection is determined by whether the manager joins a new fund family (“Out"
connection) or whether another manager joins from a different fund family (“In" connection).
“Frequent Job Switchers" are likely to have more “Out" connections than “In" connections, while
managers with a long tenure in the family are likely to have more “In" connections than “Out"
connections. Interestingly, centrality measures based on both “In" and “Out" connections exhibit
predictive power for future fund returns, suggesting that the negative relationship between fund
centrality measures and future fund performance is not solely driven by fund managers who are
frequent job switchers.
Further, I investigate whether the information channel is driving the outperformance of less
connected funds, compared to better connected funds. Using the eigenvector centrality measure
defined above, I classify funds into central investors (those with above median eigenvector cen-
trality) and peripheral investors (those with below median eigenvector centrality). To test whether
peripheral investors hold an information advantage over central investors, I explore the information
content contained in their portfolio holdings. Specifically, I construct a stock-level measure, PMC
(Peripheral minus Central), defined as the difference in the average portfolio weights between
peripheral investors and central investors. I find that PMC measure is a strong predictor for
abnormal stock returns. A one-standard-deviation increase in PMC measure predicts an increase of
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1.48%-1.52% (annualized) in next quarter risk-adjusted returns. The predictive power of the PMC
measure persists up to three quarters after the focal date. Furthermore, I find that my PMC measure
is a strong predictor for firm’s earnings surprises. A one-standard-deviation increase in PMC
measure predicts an increase of 20 basis points in SUE (Standardized Earnings Surprises) in quarter
t+ 1 and 19 basis points in SUE in quarter t+ 2. The predictive power of PMC measure for both
future abnormal stock returns and earnings surprises is consistent with that peripheral investors
hold more precise information signals. The predictive power of PMC for earnings surprises also
suggests that at least a portion of the information advantage enjoyed by peripheral investors is
related to their ability to better forecast earnings over and above the market prevailing consensus.
Last, I also investigate whether social connections have an effect on the flow-performance
relationship. I find that investors’ response to lagged fund performance is much stronger for
peripheral funds, compared to central funds. This result is robust to using lagged raw returns or
lagged Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alphas. This result also holds after controlling for the effect
of fund age on the flow-performance relationship.6 This finding is consistent with peripheral fund
managers being more likely to produce independent information, and as a result, investors in mutual
funds being better able to learn the stock-picking abilities of these managers, since past performance
of peripheral fund managers is a stronger signal for their stock picking skills, compared to that of
central fund managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related literature. In
Section 1.3, I describe the data and the construction of the mutual fund sample used in my empirical
analysis. In Section 1.4, I study whether social connections have an effect on the portfolio holdings
and trades for mutual funds. In Section 1.5, I make use of network centrality measures based on
the social connections between mutual funds, and study the relationship between fund centrality
measures and fund performance. In Section 1.6, I construct my PMC measure based on mutual
fund holdings, and I study whether this PMC measure has predictive power for future abnormal
6Chevalier and Ellison (1997) document that flows for younger funds are more sensitive to past performance than
older funds.
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stock returns and earnings surprises. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Relation to the Existing Literature and Contribution
The findings of this paper relate to several strands of literature. First, I contribute to the growing
evidence that social connections among investors affect their portfolio choices. Hong, Kubik, and
Stein (2005) show that mutual fund managers in a given city tend to have more similar trading
behavior than those in different cities. Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015) further show that fund
managers reside in the same neighborhood exchange private information, and are more likely to
hold similar stocks and make the same-direction trades. Gerritzen, Jackwerth, and Plazzi (2016)
find that employment in the same industry or in the same firm, among hedge fund managers, lead to
more similar investment behavior in terms of systematic risk and abnormal performance. Hvide and
Östberg (2015), using Norwegian individual investors’ data, find that stock investment decisions
of individuals are positively correlated with those of coworkers. Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2007)
find that households’ stock purchase in an industry is correlated with neighbors’ purchase of stocks
from that industry, and they attribute that correlation partly to word-of-mouth communication.
Second, this paper contributes to studying the effect of social connections on the investment
performance. Hvide and Östberg (2015) do not find that social connections improve individual
investors’ welfare, but instead find evidence of investment mistakes propagating through social
connections. However, there are several papers that document a diffusion effect of private infor-
mation through social connections, and show that it is positive for investment performance. Using
account-level trade data from Istanbul Stock Exchange, Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz, and Bildik (2014)
show that central investors earn higher returns and trade earlier during informational events than
peripheral investors. In the mutual funds setting, Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015) find valuable
information is transmitted among fund managers living in the same neighborhood, and they show
stocks purchased by neighboring managers outperform stocks sold by neighboring managers. In
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the hedge fund setting, Gerritzen, Jackwerth, and Plazzi (2016) find that more connected hedge
funds perform better, and prior experience in pension funds and banks aids performance. A more
recent paper by Rossi, Blake, Timmermann, Tonks, and Wermers (2016), using connections among
managers in UK’s defined-benefit pension fund market, show that managers with high centrality
in the network have better risk-adjusted returns.7 In this paper, I show that in addition to the
information diffusion effect, which is positive for investment performance, social connections can
potentially have a negative effect on fund managers’ incentives to produce independent information,
and in my setting, this negative disincentive effect on information production dominates the positive
information diffusion effect, which leads to worse returns for better connected mutual funds.
This paper is also broadly related to the study of social connections in other financial market
settings. Social connections have been shown to be beneficial to firms and investors if they facilitate
information sharing. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) show that mutual fund managers have
education links with corporate board members gain significant information advantage. Engelberg,
Gao, and Parsons (2012) find that firms that have social connections with their banks obtain loans
with lower interest rates and fewer covenants. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) find that better-
networked VC investors experience better fund performance. Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that social
connections between board directors of target and acquirer firms lead to better merger performance.
Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Yang (2014) find that acquirers with investment banker directors earn higher
announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums, and exhibit superior long-run performance.
Stuart and Yim (2010) find that companies whose directors with private equity deal exposure (gained
from interlocking directorships) are more likely to receive private equity offers. Engelberg, Gao, and
Parsons (2013) find that CEOs with social connections to outsiders bring valuable information into
the firm through these connections, and receive higher compensation. Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan,
7Rossi, Blake, Timmermann, Tonks, and Wermers (2016) define connections among managers through their
connections to the investment consultants hired by defined-benefit pensions funds in UK. They acknowledge that the
positive relationship between connectedness and fund performance might be driven by that “investment consultants
may choose particular fund managers because they like that manager’s investment style and believe it fits well with a
particular sponsor’s overall set of managers", instead of an information diffusion effect.
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and Tehranian (2016) show that higher centrality of lead IPO underwriter in the underwriter network
is associated with higher ability to induce a larger number of institutions to pay attention to the firm
it takes public and to disseminate and extract information about the IPO firm from these institutions.
Finally, social connections have also been shown to have a potential negative effect on firms or
investors. For example, Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that CEO-director connections weaken board
monitoring and reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to
substitute for board oversight. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that board directors who are socially
connected to the CEO are less efficient in monitoring and discipline the CEO. Ishii and Xuan
(2014) find that social connections between target and acquirer firms lead to poorer decision making
and lower value creation for shareholders overall. Gompers, Mukharlyamov, and Xuan (2016)
show that venture capitalists who share similar background are more likely to syndicate with each
other and this homophily reduces the probability of investment success. Shue (2013) exploits
the random assignment of MBA students to sessions at Harvard Business School and finds that
executive compensation and acquisition strategy are significantly more similar among graduates
from the same MBA session than among graduates from different sessions, and this may potentially
lower firm productivity. Kuhnen (2009) finds that both “improved monitoring" and “increased
potential for collusion" exist in the social connection between mutual fund advisors and boards.
Duchin and Sosyura (2013) document that the social connections between CEOs and divisional
managers increase (decrease) investment efficiency and firm value when information asymmetry is
high (corporate governance is weak). In this paper, the negative effect of social connections arises
not from weakened monitoring, but rather from weakened incentives for fund managers to produce
independent information and inefficient contracting between fund managers and shareholders.
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1.3 Data and Sample Construction
I obtain information on fund managers from Morningstar, who reports the name of each manager
for a fund, their start and end dates with the fund, and information about the manager’s educational
background. I limit the sample to actively managed U.S. equity funds with Morningstar category in
the 3 by 3 size/value grid (large growth, large blend, large value, medium growth, medium blend,
medium value, small growth, small blend, small value). I remove index funds since their behavior is
mechanically determined and is less likely to be influenced by information sharing through social
connections.8
I obtain mutual fund monthly returns from the CRSP survivor-bias-free mutual fund database
(matched using ticker symbol, cusip or fund name). I aggregate funds across fund classes into
portfolios using Mutual Fund Links (MFLINKs) variable (WFICN). The number of funds in the
sample grows from 1096 in January 1996 to 1709 in December 2010, with an average of 1824 funds
per month. Additionally, I obtain holdings from Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund
database, which contains the quarter-end holdings reported by US based mutual funds in mandatory
SEC filings. I restrict holdings to common stocks traded in NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX.
My goal is to identify pairs of managers who are connected socially and are more likely to
engage in social communication regarding investment ideas. I do so by looking at their previous
working experience in the mutual fund industry. I define indicator variable Connectedi,j,t, which
equals to one if fund managers i and j worked in the same fund family as portfolio managers
any time prior to the focal date. While I define here social connections using fund managers’
prior working experience, I am aware there are alternative definitions of social connections in the
literature (e.g. educational link in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), geographical proximity in
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) and Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015)). Compared to other proxies
of social connection using education background or geographical proximity, the experience of
8I remove index funds by searching for the words “index", “idx", “S&P", “Dow Jones", and “NASDAQ" in the
CRSP fund name.
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managing money in the same mutual fund family builds stronger social ties among fund managers,
and increases probability of sharing and communicating investment ideas among themselves.
1.4 Social Connections and Mutual Fund Portfolios
1.4.1 Measuring overlap
Following Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015), I measure the portfolio overlap in holdings
between fund i and j during quarter t as
PortOverlapi,j,t =
∑
k∈Ht
min{wi,k,t, wj,k,t} (1.1)
where wi,k,t is fund i’s portfolio weight in stock k at the end of calendar quarter t, and Ht is the set
of all stocks held by funds i and j as reported at the end of calendar quarter t.
I also measure the overlap in stock purchases and sales between mutual funds. I define
BuyOverlapi,j,t =
∑
k∈Tt min{I+i,k,t, I+j,k,t}
min{∑k∈Tt I+i,k,t,∑k∈Tt I+j,k,t} (1.2)
SellOverlapi,j,t =
∑
k∈Tt min{I−i,k,t, I−j,k,t}
min{∑k∈Tt I−i,k,t,∑k∈Tt I−j,k,t} (1.3)
where I+i,k,t is an indicator variable which equals to one if fund i increases its holding in stock k
between quarter t− 1 and t, and zero otherwise. I−i,k,t equals to one if fund i decreases its holding
in stock k between quarter t− 1 and t, and zero otherwise. Tt is the union of all stock traded by
funds i and j.
1.4.2 Summary Statistics of Fund Pairs
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of Connectedi,j,t, PortOverlapi,j,t, BuyOverlapi,j,t,
SellOverlapi,j,t, and other control variables used in my analysis. SameCityi,j,t is a dummy
variable which equals to one if funds i and j are headquartered in the same city (using the mutual
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fund company address); SameFamilyi,j,t equals to one if funds i and j are affiliated with the
same mutual fund family; CommonManageri,j,t equals to one if funds i and j have at least one
portfolio manager in common; MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t equals to one if at least one pair
of portfolio managers from funds i and j managing at least one other fund together at quarter t.
SameMSGridi,j,t equals to one if both funds i and j belong to the same Morningstar size and
value/growth grid. I also include as control variables a set of dummies that equal to one if funds i
and j match on Morningstar size or value/growth categories (For example, BothV aluei,j,t equals to
one if both funds in the pair are classified as Value fund by Morningstar; BothLargeCapi,j,t equals
to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Large-Cap fund by Morningstar). I also include the
absolute value of the difference between the total net asset (TNA)-based quintiles of funds i and j
(TNAQuinDiffi,j,t) and the average TNA-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t).
Table 1.1 tabulates the summary statistics for both connected fund pairs (Connectedi,j,t = 1)
and unconnected fund pairs (Connectedi,j,t = 0). Unconditionally, I find that connected fund pairs
have 2.02% higher overlap in portfolio holdings, 2.49% higher overlap in stock purchases, and 2.45%
higher overlap in stock sales, compared to unconnected fund pairs. However, connected fund pairs
are more likely to be located in the same city or be affiliated with the same fund family. Connected
fund pairs are also more likely to have common fund manager or have the a pair of managers
managing the same fund together. These confounding factors all contribute to the abnormal overlap
in portfolio holdings and stock trades for connected fund pairs, hence I will carefully control for
these variables in my multivariate analysis.
1.4.3 Overlap in Holdings and Trades
To test the hypothesis that connected mutual funds are more likely to make similar investments,
I estimate the following regression
PortOverlapi,j,t = α + βConnectedi,j,t + δSameCityi,j,t + Γ
′Controlsi,j,t + i,j,t (1.4)
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My main variable of interest, Connectedi,j,t, is a dummy variable that equals to one if at least one
pair of portfolio managers from funds i and j work as portfolio managers in the same fund at certain
time point before quarter t. I conduct the analysis at the fund level (Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker
(2015)) rather than at the stock level (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005)) as the latter approach involves
billions of observations and the analysis is not computationally feasible. Controlsi,j,t includes a
list of controls discussed in the previous section.
Table 1.2 shows the coefficient estimates and t-statistics for various specifications of equation
1.4. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the fund level for each fund in the pair. The coefficient
for Connectedi,j,t is 1.03 in model (1) after controlling for a list of fund characteristics, implying
additional 1.03% portfolio overlap for connected fund pairs, compared to unconnected fund pairs.
To put this number into perspective, the same-city effect documented in Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2005) is estimated to be 54 basis points (coefficient for SameCityi,j,t). In model (2), I exclude
fund pairs which have at least one common portfolio manager; in model (4), I exclude fund pairs
from the same family. The coefficient for Connectedi,j,t is of similar statistical significance and
economic magnitude in both cases. In column (6), I include only fund pairs when both the funds
have only one portfolio manager. Compared to the team-managed mutual funds, single-manager
funds are more likely to be influence by the social network of its sole portfolio manager. The
empirical results in column (6) confirm my hypothesis. The coefficient for Connectedi,j,t is 1.94,
about 90% higher than the case where both types of funds are included in the sample.
In addition, I find that a pair of funds from the same family tends to hold similar stocks
(documented in Elton, Gruber, and Green (2007)), and this effect is estimated to be 1.59% in my
base model (1). In model (3), I limit the sample to pairs of funds from different families, and I
find that the coefficient for CommonManageri,j,t is 9.69, reflecting the effect of a sub-advisor
relationship on portfolio holdings. Specifically, a fund, sub-advised by a fund manager from a
different family, is likely to have 9.69% more overlap in the portfolio holdings with another fund
managed by the same manager than otherwise. Not surprisingly, the variables matching on the
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Morningstar size and value/growth categories have significant power for explaining the commonality
between mutual fund holdings. Meanwhile, funds similar in size (TNAQuinDiffi,j,t) and large-
sized funds (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t) tend to have more common holdings.
I next investigate whether fund pairs managed by socially connected portfolio managers are
more likely to make similar trades than those managed by portfolio managers not socially connected.
I use the BuyOverlapi,j,t and SellOverlapi,j,t measure defined earlier as the dependent variables
and re-estimate the regression in equation 1.4. In Table 1.3, I estimate the regressions using three
different specifications for both purchases and sales: the sample excluding fund pairs with common
managers, the sample excluding fund pairs within the same fund family, and fund pairs where both
funds are managed by a single manager.
The results are similar to the case of overlap in portfolio holdings. Socially connected mutual
funds are more likely to make purchases and sales simultaneously (within the same quarter). In
my baseline model (1) and (4), a pair of connected funds have 1.47% more overlap in purchases
and 1.47% more overlap in stock sales than otherwise. In model (3) and (6), I found the effect of
social connections is higher for stock sales than stock purchase. One possible explanation is that a
negative signal shared by other fund managers may be more credible and the fund manager is more
likely to trade on this negative signal within the same quarter.
1.4.4 Alternative Hypothesis: Manager Preferences
It is possible that some of the correlation I uncover between my portfolio overlap measures and
the social connections between portfolio managers may be driven by unobserved characteristics of
these managers(e.g. ethnicity, political affiliation), rather than by social connections. Indeed, the
formation of social connections, as well as portfolio choices, could both be driven by a common set
of unobserved manager characteristics.
I test this alternative hypothesis by exploiting the dynamics of social network of the portfolio
managers over time. In this analysis, I limit the sample to fund pairs when both funds are managed
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by a single manager. I construct a new connection variable, MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t, which
equals to one if portfolio managers from fund i and j established a connection in the future.
Assuming managers’ preferences are stable over time, I expect MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t to be
correlated with portfolio overlap between mutual funds, since the underlying unobserved manager
characteristics drive both MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t and portfolio overlap measures. I put both
Connectedi,j,t and MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t as independent variables in the regression and run a
horse-race test.
Table 1.4 presents the results for this test. In columns (1), the dependent variable is the overlap
in holdings; in columns (2) and (3), the the dependent variable is the overlap in purchases and
sales, respectively. Overall speaking, Connectedi,j,t retains its explanatory power, in terms of the
economic magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates, for various specifica-
tions of the overlap measure. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimate for MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t is
small and insignificant when dependent variable is overlap in stock purchases, and the coefficient
estimate for MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t is negative when the dependent variable is the overlap in
stock holdings or stock sells. In conclusion, the results reported in Table 1.4 provide evidence
against the hypothesis that the abnormal overlap in portfolio and trades between connected mutual
funds is driven by unobserved managers’ preferences.
1.5 Social Connections and Mutual Fund Performance
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) show that active mutual fund managers possess superior
private information regarding the stock they buy and sell. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find that
highly skilled managers rely less on public information in their portfolio allocations. The origin of
private information is multi-fold9. In the previous section, I show that social connections have an
9Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for local firms.
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) show that mutual fund managers place larger bets on connected firms and perform
significantly better on these holdings relative to their nonconnected holdings.
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effect on the portfolio holdings and trades of mutual funds. However, it remains unclear ex-ante
whether better connected mutual funds will have better or worse returns. On the one hand, better
connected funds will have access to more signals, including their own signal and signals shared
by their connected peers, and hold more precise information in aggregate. On the other hand,
information production is costly, social connections may reduce funds’ ex-ante incentives to devote
more resources to produce more precise signals, since they can instead free-ride on their connected
peers. In this section, I study whether social connections have an effect on mutual fund performance,
and specifically whether that effect is positive or negative.
1.5.1 Mutual Fund Centrality
To quantify each fund’s social connections, I make use of the centrality measures first developed
in social network analysis.10 I compute common measures of centrality, including degree, eigen-
vector and closeness centrality, for my sample funds in monthly frequency. The degree centrality
is defined as the number of links incident upon a node. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the
influence of a node in a network. It assigns relative scores to all nodes in the network based on the
concept that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question
than equal connections to low-scoring nodes; The farness of a node is defined as the sum of its
distances from all other nodes, and the closeness centrality is defined as the reciprocal of the farness.
Empirically, all three measures of centrality are highly correlated.
I now discuss the potential concerns related to the definition of social connection I have chosen.
First, I am aware that social connections based on prior careers may only constitute a subset of the
entire space of social connections between fund managers. However, focusing on this particular
type of social connections biases my tests against finding a significant relationship between the
fund centrality measures and fund performance. Second, using prior career experiences does not
10Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz, and Bildik (2014) use centrality measures in studying the trading profits of all investors
in Istanbul Stock Exchange in 2005.
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necessarily mean that I completely ignore other forms of social connections. In fact, it is likely
that a pair of connected fund managers (through their prior careers in the same fund family) are
also likely to establish other forms of social connections (e.g. being a neighbor) and therefore my
measures of centrality might have captured these other types of social connections.
Table 1.5 presents the summary statistics of these measures of centrality for the sample funds,
as well other fund characteristics and manager characteristics, in monthly frequency. TNAt is the
total net assets of the fund (in millions). FamilySizet is the total net assets of the fund family (in
millions). NetF lowt is defined as
NetF lowt =
TNAt − TNAt−1(1 +Rt)
TNAt−1
(1.5)
where Rt is the net raw return of the fund. TurnoverRatiot is the minimum of aggregated sales
or aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month TNA of the fund. Aget
is the age of the fund since inception. ManagerSATt is the median SAT of matriculants at the
manager’s undergraduate institution. ManagerMBAt is a dummy variable which equals to one if
the manager has an MBA degree and zero otherwise. ManagerTenuret is the number of years
that the manager has been managing the fund. ManagerAget is the age of the manager. If the
fund is managed by multiple managers, ManagerSATt, ManaagerMBAt, ManagerTenuret,
and ManagerAget are averaged at the fund level.
1.5.2 Determinants of Mutual Fund Centrality
In this section, I study the determinants of fund centrality using pooled panel regressions. Specif-
ically, I regress measures of fund centrality (EigenvectorCentralityt and DegreeCentralityt) on
a list of fund characteristics (Log(FundSize)t, Log(FamilySize)t, NumMgrst, and Log(Age+
1)t) and manager characteristics (ManagerSATt, ManagerMBAt). Month fixed effects are
included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund family level.
17
Table 1.6 presents the regression results for each of the three centrality measures. Importantly,
FamilySize and NumMgrs are the two most significant determinants of the fund centrality
measures. Large families tend to have more funds and hire more fund managers, which establishes
more social connections according to my definition. Funds managed by more managers tend
to have more connections with other funds. In addition, funds with managers from higher SAT
undergraduate school and managers with MBA degree are more likely to have higher centrality
measures. In model (3) and (4), I also control for MgrDollarAlphaHistt, which is cumulative
dollar weighted alpha generated by fund managers (equally weighed across all managers at fund
level). Interestingly, the coefficients forMgrDollarAlphaHistt are negative and highly statistically
significant, suggesting that low-skilled fund managers are more likely to have higher centrality
measures. I will explore the implication of this relationship further in Section 1.5.5.
Next, I study the cross-sectional difference in manager behavior and its link to fund centrality. I
run a monthly rolling regression of fund gross return on Fama-French-Carhart four factors (MKT ,
SMB, HML, and UMD) using a 24-month lookback window. I obtain the estimates of the
factor loadings including βMKT , βSMB, βHML, and βUMD. I regress these beta estimates on
the eigenvector centrality measure. In addition, I also regress Turnovert, ActiveSharet,11 and
ExpenseRatiot on the eigenvector centrality measure.
Table 1.7 presents the regression results. I find funds with higher eigenvector centrality measure
have higher loadings on market (MKT ) and momentum factors (UMD). I also find funds with
higher eigenvector centrality measure tend to hold more large-cap stocks and growth stocks. In
addition, mutual funds with higher eigenvector centrality have lower Active Share, and therefore
they are more likely to be closet indexers. On the other hand, I do not find a significant relationship
between eigenvector centrality measure and Turnovert or ExpenseRatiot.
11ActiveSharet is Active Share measure defined in Petajisto (2013), which represents the share of portfolio
holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings. It is downloaded from Antti Petajisto’s website.
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1.5.3 Predictability of Centrality for Fund Performance
In this section, I test whether the centrality measures are able to predict fund performance
adjusting for risk factors. I estimate the following regression
ri,t+1 = α + βCentralityi,t + γXi,t + i,t+1 (1.6)
where the dependent variable ri,t+1 is fund i’s monthly gross return or Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor
alpha for month t+ 1. As in Fama and French (2010) and Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005), I use
pre-expense returns to best capture fund manager’s stock picking skills. Thus, I add 1/12-th of the
annual expense ratio to the net returns reported in CRSP.12 Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha
is calculated with respect to the market, size, value and momentum factors following Carhart (1997).
The factor loadings are estimated with a 24-month look-back period and I require at least 12 monthly
returns. In the regression, I control for fund characteristics Xk,t, including Log(FundSize)t (fund
size), Log(FamilySize)t (family size), NumMgrst (team size), NetF lowt, NetF low2t (liquidity
cost), TurnonverRatiot (fund turnover), Log(1 + Age)t (age of the fund), and factor loadings
βMKT , βSMB, βHML, and βUMD. I also control for manager characteristics variables including
ManagerSATt and ManagerMBAt.
Table 1.8 summarizes the results of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Newey-
West(1987) adjusted (12 lags) standard errors. The eigenvector centrality is used throughout
this section.13 In model (1)-(5), the dependent variable is the gross return of the fund. While I
do not find a statistically significant univariate relationship between the eigenvector centrality and
fund gross return in model (1), the coefficient for EigenvectorCentralityt is negative and highly
statistically significant in model (2), indicating that EigenvectorCentralityt has significant pre-
dictive power for fund performance, after controlling for fund’s exposure to systematic risk factors
and other fund characteristics. The coefficient for EigenvectorCentralityt is -1.424 in model (2),
12My results are robust to using net returns instead of gross returns.
13While I primarily use eigenvector centrality in the empirical analysis, I also use degree and closeness centrality
measures to verify the the results still hold.
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implying a one-standard-deviation increase in EigenvectorCentralityt predicts a decrease of 2.4
basis points in monthly fund gross returns and 29.0 basis points in annualized fund gross returns.
In model (3), I include additional control variables of manager characteristics. Consistent with
findings in Chevalier and Ellison (1999), I find that both ManagerSATt and ManagerMBAt
have positive and statistically significant predictive power for fund returns. In addition, I find that
EigenvectorCentralityt retains its predictive power and is of similar economic magnitude to that
in model (3), suggesting that it is not the selection of manager quality that is driving my results. In
model (4)-(6), I use Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha as the dependent variable and find even
stronger results. The coefficient for EigenvectorCentralityt is -1.772 in model (5), implying a
one-standard-deviation increase in EigenvectorCentralityt predicts a decrease of 3.0 basis points
in monthly fund Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha and 36.1 basis points in annualized fund
Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha.
In Table 1.8, consistent with the findings in the literature, the control variables also show the
right direction of predictability for fund performance. I find a negative and significant relationship
between fund size and fund returns, and a positive and significant relationship between family size
and fund returns. This result is consistent with the findings in Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik
(2004), who argue that fund size erodes performance due to liquidity reasons and, controlling for
fund size, belonging to a large family is beneficial for the fund return because of the economy of
scale. I also find a significant and positive relationship between NetF low and fund return, which is
consistent with the “smart-money" effect documented in Zheng (1999). Meanwhile, there exists
a significant and negative relationship between NetF low2 and fund return, which is likely due to
liquidity costs associated with flow. On the other hand, fund age and turnover play a secondary role
in predicting fund returns.14
14In the Online Appendix, I run pooled regression with month fixed effects and fund fixed effects, and I find similar
predictive power of eigenvector centrality for fund returns. I also show that superior performance of less connected
funds is not driven by those managers taking a large “Active Share" (as documented in Cremers and Petajisto (2009)).
In addition, I split the sample periods into pre-Reg FD period and post-Reg FD periods, and find no difference in
predictive power of centrality for fund performance. Finally, I also scale the centrality measure by management team
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Next, I examine the predictability of eigenvector centrality measure for the fund’s future alpha
using the portfolio sort approach. For each calendar month, I sort funds into quintile portfolios
based on the eigenvector centrality measure unconditionally. Next, I calculate the equal-weighted
Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha over the next one month, three months, six months, and twelve
months after the portfolio formation date. The equal-weighted (Panel A) and value-weighted (Panel
B) returns of these portfolios are presented in Table 1.10. The 1-5 quintile spread is the zero-
investment long-short portfolio that is long on quintile one and short on quintile five. In columns
(1)-(4), I use Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha based on the gross fund returns (before fee). In
columns (5)-(8), I use Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha based on the net fund returns (after fee).
In columns (1)-(4) of Panel A, the 1-5 decile spread is 5.0 basis points for the 1-month horizon,
16.8 basis points for the 3-month horizon, 32.8 basis points for the 6-month horizon, and 63.5
basis points for 12-month horizon. These 1-5 decile spreads are highly statistically significant.15 In
columns (5) -(8), I find similar results when the 4-factor alphas of the portfolios are calculated based
on after-fee fund net returns. In Panel B, where the portfolio returns are value-weighted (by fund
size), I find even larger 1-5 quintile spread. In columns (1)-(4) of Panel B, the 1-5 decile spread
is 7.3 basis points for the 1-month horizon, 26.9 basis points for the 3-month horizon, 54.9 basis
points for the 6-month horizon, and 100.3 basis points for 12-month horizon. It implies that the
negative relationship between negative centrality and future fund alpha is especially strong among
funds with large total net assets (TNA).
In conclusion, in this section I show that there is a negative relationship between fund centrality
and fund returns, i.e. better connected funds have less alphas compared to less connected funds. It
suggests that the “free riding on friends" effect dominates the information diffusion effect (through
social connections) in the information production decision of individual mutual funds. Fund
size and find equally strong results.
15In the Online Appendix, I additionally make sure there is no overlap in returns between different period for the
same portfolio. For instance, I re-balance the portfolio every quarter if the portfolio return is calculated over a 3-month
horizon. I show that the 1-10 decile spreads have similar point estimates, and are statistically significant at the 10%
level.
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managers in better connected funds devote less resources or efforts into information production,
compared to fund mangers in less connected funds, and the extra signals they receive from their
social connections are not sufficient to compensate for the loss of precision in the signals produced on
their own. As a result, social connections demonstrate a negative effect on mutual fund performance.
1.5.4 Fixed Effects
Large fund families, e.g. Fidelity Investments, hire a large number of research analysts and
support staffs to build up in-house information production capacity for all affiliated funds. In this
section, first, I study whether the relationship between centrality and fund returns I uncovered
in the previous section is only driven by the differences in performance between fund families.
Specifically, I study whether the relationship between centrality and fund returns holds, even within
the same family. Second, I want to study whether fund families internalize their managers’ external
social connections, as a source of information, when allocating resources into internal research.
Specifically, I study whether the relationship between centrality and fund returns holds across
different families.
Empirically, I add family fixed effects to the regression model, and specifically I estimate the
following “within family" and “between family" predictive power of the eigenvector centrality
measure,
ri,t+1 − rAj,t+1 = α + β(EigenvectorCentralityi,t − EigenvectorCentralityAj,t)
+ γ(Xi,t −XAj,t) + i,t+1 (1.7)
rAj,t+1 = α + βEigenvectorCentrality
A
j,t + γX
A
j,t + j,t+1 (1.8)
where rAj,t+1 represents the cross-section average of ri,t+1 (fund i is affiliated with family j) for
family j during period t + 1. Meanwhile, EigenvectorCentralityAj,t and X
A
j,t also represent the
family average of their corresponding variable during period t. Table 1.9 presents the results for
both “within family" and “between family" in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient estimate is
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-0.877 for the “within family" estimator and -2.240 for the “between family" estimator, and both
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 5% level. This suggests that the predictive power
of eigenvector centrality for future fund returns exists both within family and between families,
and is stronger between families. The result of the “within family" estimator in column (1) implies
that managers’ social connections matter for their own information production, and consequently
their fund performance, even within the same mutual fund family. The result of the “between
family" estimator in column (2) suggests that fund families internalize managers’ external social
connections, as a source of information, when deciding how much to invest in internal research.
It is also interesting to study whether the relationship between centrality and fund returns is
driven by the differences in performance between mutual funds located in different geographical
locations. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.9, I similarly study the “within city" and “between city"
predictive power of the eigenvector centrality measure. The coefficient estimate is -1.970 for the
“within city" estimator and -1.546 for the “between city" estimator, and both coefficient estimates
are statistically significant at 5% level. The “within city" estimator in column (3) suggests that the
relationship between centrality and fund returns holds, even within the same city. The “within city"
estimator is even larger than the “between city" estimator in terms of both economic magnitude
and statistical significance. The predictive power of the eigenvector centrality measure exists both
within city and between cities.
1.5.5 Alternative Hypothesis: Frequent Job Switchers
It is documented in the literature that there is an inverse relationship between fund manager
turnover and lagged fund performance (e.g., Kostovetsky and Warner (2015)). Hence, managers’
centrality may be endogenous to their stock-picking skills through turnovers. More specifically,
managers with low stock picking skills are more likely to be fired and switch jobs across fund
families, and thereby establish more “connections" in the fund industry. Hence, fund centrality
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could be correlated with the past performance of its manager(s),16 and the finding of an inverse
relationship between mutual fund centrality and future fund performance in section 1.5.3 could be
driven by the persistence of bad performance of “Frequent Job Switchers".
To address this endogeneity concern, I adopt three empirical tests. First, I include management
tenure, Log(ManagerTenure+1), as an additional control variable in my baseline regression. The
result is presented in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.11. The coefficient for Log(ManagerTenure+
1) is not statistically significant and does not affect the predictive power of EigenvectorCentrality
for fund performance. The weakness of this test is that management tenure only reflects the length
of current employment relationship and does not fully capture the historical performance of the
fund manger being considered.
In the second test, I directly measure the historical performance of each fund manager. The first
variable is MgrDollarAlphaHistt, which equals to the cumulative dollar weighted Cahart 4-factor
alpha generated by a fund manager. The second variable is MgrAlphaRankHistt. To construct
MgrAlphaRankHistt, I rank Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha of every fund in every month
and assign a percentile value (higher percentile, better performance). I average the percentile ranking
value for all funds managed by every manager in my sample.MgrAlphaRankHistt is defined as
the cumulative average of a manager’s past 4-factor alpha percentile rankings. If a fund has multiple
managers, I average MgrDollarAlphaHistt and MgrAlphaRankHistt equally across all man-
agers in the fund. If my main results are driven by these “Frequent Job Switchers", I will expect cen-
trality has no predictive power for fund performance after controlling for MgrDollarAlphaHistt
or MgrAlphaRankHistt. The empirical result is presented in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) of Table
1.11. The coefficients for MgrDollarAlphaHistt and MgrAlphaRankHistt are positive and
highly statistically significant, suggesting past performance of managers predicts future returns of
the fund. Rejecting the “Frequent Job Switchers" hypothesis, I find that eigenvector centrality retains
its predictive power even with the presence of MgrDollarAlphaHistt and MgrAlphaRankHistt
16The negative relationship between past performance of managers and centrality is shown in Table 1.6.
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as control variables. The results hold when I use either gross fund return or Fama-French-Carhart
4-factor alpha as the dependent variable.
In the third test, I decompose the fund centrality measure into “In" and “Out" components based
on the direction of social connections. The direction of connection is determined by whether the
manager joins a new fund family (“Out" connection) or whether the other party joins from another
family (“In" connection). In these new centrality measures, “Frequent Job Switchers" are likely
to have many “Out" connections and little “In" connections, while managers with long tenure in
the family are likely to have many “In" connections and little “Out" connections. Based on the
“In" and “Out" connections, I calculate two sets of eigenvector and degree centrality measures,
and label them as EigenvectorCentrality(In) and DegreeCentrality(In) (I refer to them as “in
centrality"), and EigenvectorCentrality(Out) and DegreeCentrality(Out) (I refer to them as
“out centrality").
If the inverse relationship between fund centrality measures and future performance is entirely
driven by the persistence of bad performance of “Frequent Job Switchers", there should exist an
inverse relationship between “out centrality" measures and future fund performance, and simultane-
ously no relationship between “in centrality" measures and future fund performance. The empirical
results are presented in Table 1.12. In columns (1)-(4), I find that both “in centrality" measures
and “out centrality" measures negatively predict future fund alpha performance and the coefficient
estimates are statistically significant and are of similar economic magnitude as my baseline results.
I do find, however, the coefficient estimates for “out centrality" measures are weaker in terms of
economic magnitude. This indicates that while my results are not fully explained by the “Frequent
Job Switchers", the presence of “Frequent Job Switchers" does contribute to the worse performance
of funds they are managing.
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1.5.6 Fund Flows and Centrality
Previous studies document that outsider investors chase past fund performance when allocating
their wealth (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). The response of flow to performance indicates that
investors learn from past returns about managers’ stock picking abilities (Berk and Green (2004)).
In this section, I study whether mutual fund centrality directly affects flows of money into the funds,
and also whether mutual fund centrality affects the flow-performance relationship.
To examine the two effects empirically, I estimate the following panel regression:
NetF lowi,t = α + β0EigenvectorCentralityi,t−1 + β1Returnt−1 (1.9)
+ β2Returnt−1 × EigenvectorCentralityi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + i,t
For the lagged return performance measure, I use both raw returns Rt−1 and Fama-French-Carhart
4-factor alpha α4ft−1. Following the existing literature, I control for fund-specific characteristics such
as log of fund size, family size, log of fund age, expenses ratio, and turnover. I estimate this panel
regression using pooled regressions with month fixed effects. Robust standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are two-way clustered in family and month levels.
I report the empirical results in Table 1.13. In columns (1) and (4), I reproduce results doc-
umented in the literature: Fund flows from outside investors chase past performance, and the
flow-performance relationship is robust using both raw returns and Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor
alphas. The significant negative coefficient on the standard deviation of lagged fund performance
(ReturnV olt−1) suggests that investors care about risk. In columns (2) and (5), I find that eigenvec-
tor centrality measure is negatively correlated with future fund flows. In addition, the interaction term
between eigenvector centrality measure and past performance (α4ft−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1
or Rt−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the
flow-performance relationship is stronger for less connected, comparing to better connected funds.
The effect of centrality on the flow-performance relationship is also economically significant.
In column (2), the coefficient for α4ft−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1 is -1.251, implying that a
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two-standard-deviation difference in eigenvector centrality corresponds to a difference of 4.3%
in the flow-performance relationship, which is 18.9%17 of the unconditional flow-performance
relationship.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) document that flows for younger funds are more sensitive to
past performance than older funds. To control for the effect of fund age on the flow-performance
relationship, I further add an interaction term, α4ft−1×Log(Age+1)t−1 and Rt−1×Log(Age+1)t−1
, in columns (3) and (6) respectively. I find the coefficients for α4ft−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1
and Rt−1 ×EigenvectorCentralityt−1 remain statistically significant and retain similar economic
magnitude, suggesting that the effect of centrality on the flow-performance relationship is not driven
by fund age.
Taken together, the results in this section show that mutual funds with lower centrality are able
to attract larger money inflows. In addition, investors’ flow seems to be more responsive to the past
performance of mutual funds with lower centrality. This is consistent with the results in section
1.5.3 where I find "free riding on friends" effect of social connection dominates the information
diffusion effect. In this case, mutual funds with lower centrality produce more precise signals,
and past returns of these mutual funds are stronger signal about the stock picking abilities of their
managers, compared to mutual funds with higher centrality.18
1.6 Mechanism: Stock-level Evidence
In the previous section, I show that a higher centrality for mutual funds predicts worse future
fund alphas. I interpret the findings as that managers from less connected funds devote more efforts
into producing more precise information, and this overcomes the disadvantages that they do not
receive as much information from social connections as managers from better connected funds.
17Calculated as follows: 4.3%/22.6% = 18.9%.
18An alternative explanation is that managers in higher centrality funds have less incentive to produce alpha because
investors’ flow into these funds are less responsive to past performance. However, we do not have evidence showing
difference in clienteles between well connected funds and less connected funds.
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If this is true, less connected funds should aggregately have more precise information than better
connected funds. In this section, I explore the information content of stock holdings of mutual
fund investors.19 More specifically, I study whether the holdings of less connected funds are more
informed about stocks’ future abnormal returns and earnings-related fundamentals, compared to
those of better connected funds.
1.6.1 Central and Peripheral Funds
In each quarter t, I classify fund i with above median eigenvector centrality as central fund and
below median eigenvector centrality as peripheral fund. The average portfolio weights for central
funds and peripheral funds are represented as CTRk,t and PERk,t, respectively.20 I construct a
PMC measure, which is defined as the difference in average portfolio weights between peripheral
funds and central funds,
PMCk,t =
PERk,t − CTRk,t
2
(1.10)
I also use variable ALLk,t to represent the average portfolio weights of stock k for all funds in the
sample.
Table 1.14 presents summary statistics for the variables used in my analysis. ∆BREADTHt is
the change in breadth of ownership from the end of quarter t− 1 to quarter t21. ∆IOt is the change
in fraction of shares outstanding of a stock held by 13F institutions from the end of quarter t− 1
to quarter t. LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of quarter t.
BK/MKTt is the most recently available observation of book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter
19Following modern portfolio theory, a mutual fund manager’s portfolio holdings are the outcome of an optimization
based on his specific beliefs about stock expected returns and the covariance structure of these returns. Shumway,
Szefler, and Yuan (2011) propose a method to extract the information embedded in the cross-sectional portfolio holdings
for fund managers’ beliefs. Other papers investigating the information revealed by portfolio holdings of mutual funds
include Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers
and Petajisto (2009), and Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2014).
20I use the average portfolio weight of mutual funds instead of the fractional holdings (as a percentage of total shares
outstanding) to rule out the possibility that a few large funds are driving the results.
21I follow Lehavy and Sloan (2008) to construct ∆BREADTHt using 13F data.
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t. MOM12t is the raw stock return for the last 12 months excluding the recent one month. XTRt
is the quarterly share turnover (volume normalized by number of shares outstanding) adjusted for
the average share turnover of the firm’s exchange.
Panel A of Table 1.14 shows the summary statistics for each size quintiles (size quintiles are
determined using NYSE breakpoints), as well as the total. Size quintile 1 includes the smallest cap
stocks and size quintile 5 has the largest cap stocks. The average portfolio weight for a stock is
41 basis points (of the fund’s total net assets). On average, large-cap stocks have larger average
portfolio weights across mutual funds, compared to small-cap stocks. Interestingly, PMCt is
positive across each size quintile, which suggests that peripheral funds hold larger, and more
concentrated position in a typical stock, compared to central funds. It reflects the superior stock
picking skills of peripheral funds, and their information advantage in a particular stock they invest
in. The alternative theory is that central funds are typically large funds and they are refrained from
taking a large position in a particular stock due to liquidity constraints and price impact (Chen,
Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004)). However, if this “liquidity hypothesis" is true, PMCt is ought
to be more positive in small-cap stocks where liquidity constraint is more close to be binding,
compared to large-cap stocks. In fact, there is no monotonic relationship between PMC and size.
Panel B of Table 1.14 show the contemporaneous correlations between these variables. MOM12t
is highly positively correlated with ALLt, suggesting that average mutual funds tend to hold and
purchase past winners (as documented in Wermers (1999)). MOM12t is also highly positively
correlated with ∆BREADTHt and ∆IOt, suggesting average 13F institutions are also engaged in
momentum trading strategies. PERt is highly correlated with CTRt with average correlation about
53%. Therefore, I am primarily focused on the PMCt variable in studying the relative information
advantage held by peripheral funds over central funds. PMCt is weakly correlated with ALLt.
Also, PMCt, is only weakly correlated with the other control variables.
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1.6.2 Forecast Stock Returns
In the baseline test, I estimate the following two equivalent regression models,
rk,t+j−1,t+j = α + β11PERk,t + β
1
2CTRk,t + γXk,t + k,t,t+1 (1.11)
rk,t+j−1,t+j = α + β21PMCk,t + β
2
2ALLk,t + γXk,t + k,t,t+1 (1.12)
where the independent variable rk,t+j−1,t+j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is stock i’s cumulative returns (raw
returns or risk-adjusted returns) from the end of quarter t+ j − 1 to the end of quarter t+ j. My
main variable of interest, PMCk,t, reflects the private information advantage of peripheral funds
over central funds regarding the future stock return. The control variables Xk,t represent public
available information including ∆IOk,t, ∆BREADTHk,t, and XTRk,t, which are known in the
literature to have predictive power for stock returns in cross-section.
In Table 1.15, I present the results of a series of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions forecasting
stock returns over the first, second, third and fourth quarter following the formation date. I run cross-
sectional regression every quarter and report the mean coefficients across different specifications.
The standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-
West (1987) with four lags. There are three groups of regressions in Table 1.15. The first group
corresponds to forecasting raw cumulative returns. The second quarter uses Fama-French-Carhart
four-factor alpha over the same horizon as the dependent variable. The third group uses DGTW-
adjusted returns as the dependent variable instead.22 In each group, two sets of regression models
are used: one uses PERk,t and CTRk,t, and the other one uses PMCk,t and ALLk,t.
In Panel A of Table 1.15, the coefficient for PER is positive and significant, while the coefficient
for CTR is negative and significant. The results imply that the average portfolio weight by
peripheral funds is a positive predictor for stock returns and the average portfolio weight by central
funds is a negative predictor for stock returns. Since PER and CTR is high correlated, I focus my
22I create portfolio benchmarks using a characteristics-based procedure similar to Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). The DGTW benchmarks are available via
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm
30
discussion around my main variable of interest, PMC. The coefficient for PMC is positive and
highly statistically significant across three different specifications of cumulative raw and abnormal
return measures. To get a sense of the economic magnitude, the coefficient estimate 2.126 for
PMC in model (2) implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in PMC predicts an increase of
37 basis points in the next quarter cumulative return (1.48% on an annualized basis). Similarly, the
coefficient estimate 2.216 for PMC in model (4) implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in
PMC predicts an increase of 38 basis points in the next quarter cumulative Fama-French-Carhart
4-factor alpha (1.52% on an annualized basis). Interestingly, the coefficient for ALL is small and
not statistically significant across all three return specifications, suggesting that the average portfolio
weight for all funds does not contain incremental information for predicting stock returns.23
The coefficient for PMC is also positive and statistically significant in Panel B and Panel C of
Table 1.15, suggesting that the predictive power of PMC for cumulative stock returns persists until
the second and the third quarter after the formation date. However, the predictive power of PMC
disappears when forecasting cumulative stock returns for the fourth quarter after the formation date
(as seen in Panel D of Table 1.15).
In conclusion, the results in Table 1.15 suggest that the average portfolio weight of peripheral
funds have superior forecasting power than that of central funds. I show that this forecasting power
is statistically and economically significant, and it lasts up to three quarters after the formation date.
In addition, there is no reversal of the relationship between PMC and stock abnormal returns after
the third quarter, suggesting that PMC proxies for an information advantage by peripheral over
central funds, and that information is gradually impounded into stock prices through the portfolio
rebalancing by these funds.
23In the Online Appendix, I also show that the predictive power of my PMC measure for abnormal stock returns
holds after excluding small stocks (lowest NYSE quntile), or funds’ local holdings (the firm is within 50 miles from the
fund family’s headquarter).
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1.6.3 Forecast Earnings Surprises
Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) find that mutual fund trades forecast earnings
surprises and they conclude that mutual fund managers are able to trade profitably in part because
they are able to forecast earnings-related fundamentals. Given the evidence of superior forecasting
power of the PMC measure in forecasting future stock abnormal returns, it is natural to turn to
the question whether it is due to an ability to forecast fundamental news not yet release into the
public market or, say, proprietary technical signals. In this section, I will test whether the holdings
of peripheral funds are able to predict earnings surprises better, compared to those of central funds.
Similar to the previous section, I estimate the following two equivalent regression models,
SUEk,t+j = α + β
1
1PERk,t + β
1
2CTRk,t + γXk,t + k,t,t+1 (1.13)
SUEk,t+j = α + β
2
1PMCk,t + β
2
2ALLk,t + γXk,t + k,t,t+1 (1.14)
where SUEk,t+j, j = 1, 2 is the earnings announcement surprise of earnings announced between
the end of quarter t+ j− 1 and the end of quarter t+ j. I define the SUE (standardized unexpected
earning) as follows,
SUEk,t+j =
EPSAk,t+j − EPSEk,t
Pt
(1.15)
where EPSAk,t+j is actual announced earnings during quarter t+ j for stock k. EPS
E
t is the median
of I/B/E/S analysts forecasts for stock k at the end quarter t for the earnings to be announced in the
future quarter t+ j.
Table 1.16 presents the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of model 1.13. The
coefficient for PER is positive and significant, while the coefficient for CTR is negative and
significant. My main variable of interest, PMC, is positive and statistically significant with p-
value less than 0.001 for the standard earnings surprises based on the first quarter and second
quarter earnings announcement after the formation date. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-
standard-deviation increase in PMC predicts an increase of approximately 20 basis points in SUE
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for the first quarter after the formation date, and 19 basis points for the second quarter after the
formation date. The findings in this section complements the evidence in Baker, Litov, Wachter, and
Wurgler (2010), where they shown mutual fund managers as a group have forecasting abilities for
earnings-related fundamentals.
In conclusion, I am able to show that peripheral funds have information advantage over central
funds in terms of forecasting the earnings announcement surprises for the first and second quarter
after the formation date. However, keep in mind this test only partially explores the source of
information advantage of peripheral funds. As argued by Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler
(2010), this approach is complementary to tests using long-horizon returns.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a proxy for social connections between mutual funds through career
experiences of their fund managers in the mutual fund industry. I find that connected funds are more
likely to hold similar stocks and make same-direction trades, compared to unconnected funds. This
result confirms the findings in the literature that the portfolio choices of institutional investors are
affected by the social connections among their managers.
My paper takes a step further by showing that social connections among investment managers
dampen their incentives to produce independent signals, and thereby managers of peripheral funds
collectively hold more precise signals than managers of central funds. I show that funds with
higher centrality earn less returns/alphas. Further, I empirically construct a PMC variable that
approximates the relative information advantage of peripheral funds over central funds, and I find
PMC has significant predictive power for future stock abnormal returns and earnings surprises.
My results contrast with the findings in the literature that information diffusion through social
connections is beneficial for the information precision of managers since they have access to more
signals and hold more precise information collectively. This could be reconciled under the theoretical
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framework of Han and Yang (2013) where they discuss two opposite effects of social connections,
i.e. the information diffusion effect and “free riding on friends" effect. My empirical study identifies
a setting (using a sample of mutual fund managers and their career experience as proxy for social
connections) where the “free riding on friends" effect dominates the information diffusion effect.24
The implication for investors in mutual fund is that controlling for fund characteristics and manager
characteristics, fund managers’ social connections carry additional information that is relevant
for the future performance of the fund. And my test regarding the flow-performance relationship
suggests that investors, rationally, are more responsive to the past performance of less connected
fund or fund managers.
Notably, the finding that funds with lower network centrality have better returns/alphas is
not a direct implication from the model of Han and Yang (2013). In fact, under their rational
expectations equilibrium framework, mutual funds should earn equal investment returns after the
cost of information production. There are two possible explanations. First, managers in funds with
lower centrality devote extra effort producing more precise signals and incur higher information
production costs. The true information production cost is unobserved, hence the difference in
alphas, between funds with high and low centrality, simply reflects the difference in true information
production costs; Or, there are certain forms of inefficiencies associated with the incentive contracts
of fund managers (e.g. career risk from taking unique risky investment positions) that refrain
managers from devoting optimal efforts into information production. However, exactly identifying
these inefficiencies (or agency issues) in the mutual fund industry falls beyond the scope of this
paper, and may be of interest to the readers for future research.
24It is possible that in the cases of social connections based on education or geographical proximity, the sharing of
investment ideas between fund managers is more likely to be sporadic, and managers may not internalize the effect
of social connections when making information production decisions. On the other hand, in the case when two fund
managers previously work together in the same fund family, they may share and communicate investment ideas or
strategies systematically, and consequently it is more likely that they internalize the effect of social connections, as a
source of information, when making information production decisions.
34
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Sample Fund Pairs
The sample includes actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds between 1996 and 2010 (I restrict the samples to those with
Morningstar category in the 3 by 3 size/value grid). Connectedi,j,t equals to one if fund managers i and j worked in the same
fund family as portfolio managers any time prior to quarter t. PortOverlapi,j,t measures the portfolio overlap in holdings (in
percentage) between funds i and j during quarter t. BuyOverlapi,j,t measures the overlap in stock purchases (in percentage)
between fund i and j during quarter t. SellOverlapi,j,t measures the overlap in stock sales (in percentage) between fund
i and j during quarter t. SameCityi,j,t is a dummy variable which equals to one if funds i and j are headquartered in the
same city (using the mutual fund company address); SameFamilyi,j,t equals to one if funds i and j are affiliated with the
same mutual fund family; CommonManageri,j,t equals one if funds i and j have at least one portfolio manager in common;
MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t equals to one if at least one pair of portfolio managers from funds i and j managing at least one
other fund together at quarter t. SameMSGridi,j,t equals to one if both funds i and j belong to the same Morningstar size and
value/growth grid. In addition, We include as control variables a set of dummies that equal to one if funds i and j match on
Morningstar size or value/growth categories (For example, BothV aluei,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified
as Value funds by Morningstar; BothLargeCapi,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Large-Cap funds by
Morningstar). We also include the absolute value of the difference between the total net asset (TNA)-based quintiles of funds i
and j (TNAQuinDiffi,j,t) and the average TNA-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t).
Connectedi,j,t = 0 Connectedi,j,t = 1 Total
Mean Std. N (thousands) Mean Std. N (thousands) Mean Std. N (thousands)
PortOverlapi,j,t(%) 7.39 8.45 56,117 9.41 10.26 5,871 7.58 8.66 61,988
BuyOverlapi,j,t(%) 7.99 12.93 56,117 10.48 14.66 5,871 8.23 13.12 61,988
SellOverlapi,j,t(%) 7.50 12.59 56,117 9.95 14.05 5,871 7.73 12.76 61,988
Connectedi,j,t 0.000 0.000 56,117 1.000 0.000 5,871 0.095 0.293 61,988
SameCityi,j,t 0.051 0.221 56,117 0.112 0.315 5,871 0.057 0.232 61,988
SameFamilyi,j,t 0.001 0.038 56,117 0.076 0.264 5,871 0.008 0.092 61,988
CommonManageri,j,t 0.001 0.035 56,117 0.018 0.134 5,871 0.003 0.053 61,988
MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t 0.000 0.012 56,117 0.045 0.207 5,871 0.004 0.066 61,988
SameMSGridi,j,t 0.203 0.402 56,117 0.212 0.409 5,871 0.204 0.403 61,988
BothBlendi,j,t 0.092 0.289 56,117 0.076 0.265 5,871 0.091 0.287 61,988
BothV aluei,j,t 0.057 0.232 56,117 0.078 0.268 5,871 0.059 0.236 61,988
BothGrowthi,j,t 0.228 0.420 56,117 0.223 0.416 5,871 0.228 0.420 61,988
BothLargeCapi,j,t 0.442 0.497 56,117 0.490 0.500 5,871 0.447 0.497 61,988
BothMidCapi,j,t 0.049 0.215 56,117 0.034 0.181 5,871 0.047 0.212 61,988
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BothSmallCapi,j,t 0.068 0.253 56,117 0.066 0.248 5,871 0.068 0.252 61,988
TNAQuinDiffi,j,t 1.61 1.21 56,117 1.51 1.17 5,871 1.60 1.21 61,988
TNAQuinAvgi,j,t 2.03 1.00 56,117 2.29 0.98 5,871 2.05 1.00 61,988
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Table 1.2: Social Connections and Overlap in Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
This table presents the OLS regression analysis of the the effect of social connections on mutual fund portfolio holdings. The dependent
variable is PortOverlapi,j,t, which measures the portfolio overlap in holdings (in percentage) between funds i and j during quarter t.
The sample includes 62 million mutual fund pairs between 1996 and 2010. In column (1), the sample excludes fund pairs with common
portfolio managers during quarter t. In column (2), the sample is limited to fund pairs from different mutual fund families. In column
(3), the sample is restricted to fund pairs where both funds have only a single portfolio manager. Connectedi,j,t equals to one if fund
managers i and j worked in the same fund family as portfolio managers any time prior to quarter t. SameCityi,j,t is a dummy variable
which equals to one if funds i and j are headquartered in the same city (using the mutual fund company address); SameFamilyi,j,t equals
to one if funds i and j are affiliated with the same mutual fund family; CommonManageri,j,t equals one if funds i and j have at least one
portfolio manager in common; MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t equals to one if at least one pair of portfolio managers from funds i and j
managing at least one other fund together at quarter t. SameMSGridi,j,t equals to one if both funds i and j belong to the same Morningstar
size and value/growth grid. In addition, We include as control variables a set of dummies that equal to one if funds i and j match on
Morningstar size or value/growth categories (For example, BothV aluei,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Value
funds by Morningstar; BothLargeCapi,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Large-Cap funds by Morningstar). We
also include the absolute value of the difference between the total net asset (TNA)-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinDiffi,j,t)
and the average TNA-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t). Standard errors are two-way clustered by each fund in the pair.
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: PortOverlapi,j,t(%)
Full Sample Full Sample No Common Managers Different Families Funds with Single Manager
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connectedi,j,t 1.03∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗
(7.68) (7.96) (8.04) (7.28)
SameCityi,j,t 0.54∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.30
(4.17) (4.32) (3.79) (3.28) (1.59)
SameFamilyi,j,t 1.59∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
(7.54) (12.03) (5.27) (7.28)
CommonManageri,j,t 11.70∗∗∗ 11.70∗∗∗ 9.69∗∗∗ 9.61∗∗∗
(16.11) (16.26) (12.62) (9.74)
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MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t 1.03∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 0.25 0.94∗∗∗ 0.83∗
(3.69) (6.65) (1.12) (3.42) (1.72)
SameMSGridi,j,t 2.62∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗
(23.49) (23.47) (23.13) (23.35) (14.34)
BothV aluei,j,t 0.69∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.04
(2.97) (3.07) (2.97) (2.98) (0.10)
BothGrowthi,j,t 1.20∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(11.99) (11.97) (11.97) (11.88) (6.90)
BothBlendi,j,t 0.68∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗
(3.15) (3.08) (3.20) (3.13) (2.18)
BothLargeCapi,j,t 9.32∗∗∗ 9.33∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 9.30∗∗∗ 8.84∗∗∗
(48.40) (48.46) (48.41) (48.31) (31.39)
BothMidCapi,j,t 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.15
(5.14) (5.01) (4.99) (4.99) (0.79)
BothSmallCapi,j,t 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.49∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.23) (0.04) (0.06) (2.70)
TNAQuinDiffi,j,t -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(6.93) (7.10) (6.94) (6.96) (5.50)
TNAQuinAvgi,j,t 0.48∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(7.59) (7.87) (7.50) (7.54) (6.23)
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.365 0.364 0.364 0.335
N(thousands) 61,988 61,988 61,812 61,462 10,878
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Table 1.3: Social Connections and Overlap in Mutual Fund Trades
This table presents the OLS regressional analysis of the effect of social connections on mutual fund trades (stock purchases and sales). The
sample includes 62 million mutual fund pairs between 1996 and 2010. In columns (1) (2) and (3), the dependent variable isBuyOverlapi,j,t,
which measures the overlap in stock purchases (in percentage) between funds i and j during quarter t. In columns (4) (5) and (6), the
dependent variable is SellOverlapi,j,t, which measures the overlap in stock sales (in percentage) between funds i and j during quarter t. In
column (1) and (4), the sample excludes fund pairs with common portfolio managers during quarter t. In columns (2) and (5), the sample is
limited to fund pairs from different mutual fund families. In columns (3) and (6), the sample is restricted to fund pairs where both funds have
only a single portfolio manager. Connectedi,j,t equals to one if fund managers i and j worked in the same fund family as portfolio managers
any time prior to quarter t. SameCityi,j,t is a dummy variable which equals to one if funds i and j are headquartered in the same city
(using the mutual fund company address); SameFamilyi,j,t equals to one if funds i and j are affiliated with the same mutual fund family;
CommonManageri,j,t equals one if funds i and j have at least one portfolio manager in common; MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t equals
to one if at least one pair of portfolio managers from funds i and j managing at least one other fund together at quarter t. SameMSGridi,j,t
equals to one if both funds i and j belong to the same Morningstar size and value/growth grid. In addition, We include as control variables
a set of dummies that equal to one if funds i and j match on Morningstar size or value/growth categories (For example, BothV aluei,j,t
equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Value funds by Morningstar; BothLargeCapi,j,t equals to one if both funds in the
pair are classified as Large-Cap funds by Morningstar). We also include the absolute value of the difference between the total net asset
(TNA)-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinDiffi,j,t) and the average TNA-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t).
Standard errors are two-way clustered by each fund in the pair. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
BuyOverlapi,j,t(%) SellOverlapi,j,t(%)
No Common Managers Different Families Funds with Single Manager No Common Managers Different Families Funds with Single Manager
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connectedi,j,t 1.47∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗
(8.23) (8.35) (4.42) (8.71) (8.93) (6.01)
SameCityi,j,t -0.00 -0.11 0.08 0.55∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.64) (0.30) (3.46) (3.00) (3.82)
CommonManageri,j,t 10.45∗∗∗ 8.55∗∗∗ 9.60∗∗∗ 8.61∗∗∗
(10.32) (7.38) (11.91) (9.13)
SameFamilyi,j,t 0.71∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗
(2.73) (9.24) (2.66) (8.51)
MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t 2.42∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 0.81 1.05∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 0.46
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(4.68) (6.58) (1.32) (3.08) (5.18) (1.02)
BothV aluei,j,t 0.63∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.03 -0.33 -0.32 -0.11
(2.47) (2.49) (0.09) (1.43) (1.40) (0.35)
BothGrowthi,j,t 0.80∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(5.48) (5.34) (2.92) (9.09) (8.98) (6.43)
BothBlendi,j,t 1.41∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗
(5.56) (5.51) (3.61) (4.65) (4.60) (2.37)
BothLargeCapi,j,t 7.53∗∗∗ 7.51∗∗∗ 6.84∗∗∗ 6.97∗∗∗ 6.94∗∗∗ 6.20∗∗∗
(37.32) (37.13) (22.74) (37.55) (37.41) (24.83)
BothMidCapi,j,t 0.87∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(5.27) (5.32) (2.76) (4.03) (4.07) (2.19)
BothSmallCapi,j,t 1.40∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.62 0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ -0.32
(4.82) (4.85) (1.43) (3.75) (3.78) (1.38)
SameMSGridi,j,t 1.60∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(17.08) (17.33) (10.52) (16.37) (16.63) (10.11)
TNAQuinDiffi,j,t 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(2.10) (2.11) (1.10) (0.35) (0.31) (1.05)
TNAQuinAvgi,j,t 0.86∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(9.20) (9.27) (7.01) (12.66) (12.74) (11.68)
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.104 0.094 0.097 0.098 0.097
N(thousands) 61,812 61,462 10,878 61,812 61,462 10,878
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Table 1.4: Social Connections and Overlap in Mutual Fund Portfolios: Falsification Test
This table presents the OLS regressioni analysis of the effect of social connections on mutual
fund portfolios (holdings, purchases and sales). The sample includes 10 million mutual
fund pairs between 1996 and 2010 that both funds are managed by a single fund manager.
Connectedi,j,t equals to one if fund managers i and j worked in the same fund family as
portfolio managers any time prior to quarter t. MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t equals to one if
fund managers from fund i and j are connected at least four quarters after the focal quarter t.
PortOverlapi,j,t measures the portfolio overlap in holdings (in percentage) between funds i
and j during quarter t. BuyOverlapi,j,t measures the overlap in stock purchases (in percentage)
between funds i and j during quarter t. SellOverlapi,j,t measures the overlap in stock sales
(in percentage) between fund i and j during quarter t. SameCityi,j,t is a dummy variable
which equals to one if funds i and j are headquartered in the same city (using the mutual
fund company address); SameFamilyi,j,t equals to one if funds i and j are affiliated with the
same mutual fund family; CommonManageri,j,t equals one if funds i and j have at least one
portfolio manager in common; MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t equals to one if at least one pair
of portfolio managers from funds i and j managing at least one other fund together at quarter
t. SameMSGridi,j,t equals to one if both funds i and j belong to the same Morningstar
size and value/growth grid. In addition, We include as control variables a set of dummies
that equal to one if funds i and j match on Morningstar size or value/growth categories (For
example, BothV aluei,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified as Value funds
by Morningstar; BothLargeCapi,j,t equals to one if both funds in the pair are classified
as Large-Cap funds by Morningstar). We also include the absolute value of the difference
between the total net asset (TNA)-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinDiffi,j,t) and
the average TNA-based quintiles of funds i and j (TNAQuinAvgi,j,t). Standard errors are
two-way clustered by each fund in the pair. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
PortOverlapi,j,t(%) BuyOverlapi,j,t(%) SellOverlapi,j,t(%)
(1) (2) (3)
Connectedi,j,t 2.12∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗
(8.43) (4.26) (6.78)
MgrConnectedFuturei,j,t -0.40∗∗ 0.28 -0.32∗
(2.29) (1.25) (1.87)
SameCityi,j,t 0.30 0.07 0.67∗∗∗
(1.60) (0.30) (3.82)
SameFamilyi,j,t 3.01∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗
(7.28) (9.23) (8.51)
CommonManageri,j,t 9.60∗∗∗ 8.56∗∗∗ 8.60∗∗∗
(9.72) (7.38) (9.11)
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MngOtherFundTogetheri,j,t 0.87∗ 0.78 0.49
(1.78) (1.26) (1.09)
BothV aluei,j,t 0.04 0.03 -0.11
(0.11) (0.08) (0.34)
BothGrowthi,j,t 1.06∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(6.91) (2.92) (6.43)
BothBlendi,j,t 0.67∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗
(2.17) (3.61) (2.36)
BothLargeCapi,j,t 8.84∗∗∗ 6.83∗∗∗ 6.20∗∗∗
(31.38) (22.70) (24.83)
BothMidCapi,j,t 0.15 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.77) (2.77) (2.18)
BothSmallCapi,j,t -0.48∗∗∗ 0.62 -0.31
(2.69) (1.43) (1.37)
SameMSGridi,j,t 2.39∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(14.33) (10.52) (10.10)
TNAQuinDiffi,j,t -0.20∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.04
(5.50) (1.11) (1.05)
TNAQuinAvgi,j,t 0.60∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(6.26) (6.99) (11.72)
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.094 0.097
N(thousands) 10,878 10,878 10,878
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics
The sample includes actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds between 1996 and 2010 (I restrict
the sample to those with Morningstar category in the 3 by 3 size/value grid and having monthly
return information in CRSP survivor-bias-free mutual fund database). The network centrality mea-
sures, EigenvectorCentralityt, DegreeCentralityt, and ClosenessCentralityt, are calculated
each month between 1996 and 2010 for all the fund samples in that month. FundSizet is the total
net assets of the fund (in millions). FamilySizet is the total net assets of the all active equity funds
in the fund family (in millions). NetF lowt is calculated asNetF lowt =
TNAt−TNAt−1(1+Rt)
TNAt−1
, where
Rt is the net raw return of the fund during month t. NumMgrst is the number of managers manag-
ing the fund during month t. FundAget is the age of the fund since inception. TurnoverRatiot
is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average
12-month Total Net Assets of the fund. ManagerSATt is the median SAT of matriculants at the
manager’s undergraduate institution. ManagerMBAt is a dummy variable which equals to one if
the manager has an MBA degree and zero otherwise. ManagerTenuret is the number of years
that the manager has been managing the fund. ManagerAget is the age of the manager. If the
fund is managed by multiple managers, ManagerSATt, ManagerMBAt, ManagerTenuret,
and ManagerAget are averaged at the fund level. Rt is the net return of the fund. α
4f
t is the
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha (factor loadings are calculated using monthly fund returns of
prior 36 months). βMKT , βSMB, βHML, and βUMD are estimates from monthly rolling regressions
of gross fund returns on Fama-French-Carhart four factors (MKT , SMB, HML, and UMD)
using a 36-month window.
Mean Std. Median 10th 90th
EigenvectorCentralityt 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.000 0.036
DegreeCentralityt 0.096 0.138 0.062 0.000 0.222
ClosenessCentralityt 0.402 0.199 0.478 0.000 0.548
TNAt 798 3593 92 5 1415
FamilySizet 18474 55079 2892 45 39846
NumMgrst 2 2 2 1 4
FundAget 11 12 7 1 23
NetF lowt 0.01 0.09 -0.00 -0.04 0.06
TurnoverRatiot 0.94 1.20 0.68 0.19 1.83
ExpenseRatiot 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.018
ManagerSATt 1242 121 1240 1086 1410
ManagerMBAt 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.00 1.00
ManagerTenuret 5.69 5.27 4.33 1.00 11.67
ManagerAget 48 9 47 38 60
Rt(GrossReturn,%) 0.70 5.77 1.13 -6.41 7.10
α4ft (GrossReturn,%) 0.03 2.32 0.00 -2.25 2.30
Rt(NetReturn,%) 0.60 5.77 1.04 -6.52 7.00
α4ft (NetReturn,%) -0.08 2.32 -0.09 -2.36 2.19
βMKT,t 1.00 0.21 0.99 0.78 1.22
βSMB,t 0.23 0.39 0.13 -0.19 0.79
βHML,t 0.03 0.38 0.04 -0.44 0.48
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βUMD,t 0.03 0.21 0.01 -0.19 0.27
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Table 1.6: Determinants of Mutual Fund Centrality
This table presents the results for the pooled panel regression for the determinants of mutual fund centrality mea-
sures. The dependent variables are monthly fund network centrality measures including EigenvectorCentralityt and
DegreeCentralityt. Log(FundSize)t is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Log(FamilySize)t
is the natural logarithm of total net assets of all active equity funds in the fund family. NumMgrst is the number
of managers managing the fund during month t. Aget is the age of the fund since inception. ManagerSATt is the
median SAT of matriculants at the manager’s undergraduate institution. ManagerMBAt is a dummy variable which
equals to one if the manager has an MBA degree and zero otherwise. ManagerTenuret is the number of years that the
manager has been managing the fund. ManagerAget is the age of the manager. MgrDollarAlphaHistt is cumulative
dollar weighted alpha generated by every fund manager. If the fund is managed by multiple managers, ManagerSATt,
ManagerMBAt, ManagerTenuret, ManagerAget and MgrDollarAlphaHistt are averaged equally at the fund
level. Month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the fund family level. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EigenvectorCentralityt DegreeCentralityt EigenvectorCentralityt DegreeCentralityt
Log(TNA)t 0.000∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.000 0.001
(1.66) (2.42) (0.61) (0.46)
Log(FamilySize)t 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(7.00) (5.25) (5.71) (3.74)
NumMgrst 0.002∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(12.25) (13.77) (10.53) (9.69)
Log(Age+ 1)t -0.001∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(3.08) (3.40) (4.92) (4.27)
ManagerSATt 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.98)
ManagerMBAt 0.003∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(5.01) (5.07)
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Log(ManagerTenure+ 1)t -0.001∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(2.81) (2.29)
Log(ManagerAge)t -0.000 0.004
(0.06) (0.36)
MgrDollarAlphaHistt−1 -0.079∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗
(3.46) (4.50)
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.264 0.127 0.096
No. of observations 259,903 259,903 309,264 309,264
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Table 1.7: Mutual Fund Behavior and Centrality
This table presents the results for the pooled panel regression for the relationship between mutual fund behavior and the
eigenvector centrality measure. The dependent variables are βMKT , βSMB, βHML, βUMD, Turnovert, ActiveSharet,
and ExpenseRatiot. ActiveSharet is downloaded from Antti Petajisto’s website, and is defined in Petajisto (2013).
ManagerSATt is the median SAT of matriculants at the manager’s undergraduate institution. ManagerMBAt is a
dummy variable which equals to one if the manager has an MBA degree and zero otherwise. ManagerTenuret is the
number of years that the manager has been managing the fund. ManagerAget is the age of the manager. If the fund
is managed by multiple managers, ManagerSATt, ManagerMBAt, ManagerTenuret, and ManagerAget are
averaged at the fund level. Log(FundSize)t is the natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund. Log(FamilySize)t
is the natural logarithm of total net assets of all active equity funds in the fund family. Month fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the fund family level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
βMKT,t βSMB,t βHML,t βUMD,t TurnoverRatiot ActiveSharet ExpenseRatiot
EigenvectorCentralityt 1.142∗∗∗ -0.747∗ -0.766∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.358 -1.591∗∗∗ -0.003
(6.09) (1.80) (1.71) (2.68) (0.21) (5.73) (0.43)
ManagerSATt 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.005 -0.000
(2.64) (0.89) (0.70) (0.76) (0.59) (1.56) (0.69)
ManagerMBAt 0.011 0.003 0.033∗ -0.008 -0.083 -0.002 -0.000
(1.64) (0.16) (1.90) (0.98) (1.35) (0.21) (0.85)
Log(ManagerTenure+ 1)t -0.022∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.000
(5.16) (2.20) (3.82) (4.10) (7.55) (3.33) (1.13)
Log(TNA)t -0.001∗∗∗
(5.80)
Log(FamilySize)t -0.000∗∗∗
(3.43)
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Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.012 0.078 0.053 0.030 0.052 0.061
No. of observations 276,951 276,951 276,951 276,951 271,399 49,288 277,746
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Table 1.8: Predicting Mutual Fund Returns with Centrality: Fama-MacBeth Regression
The sample includes actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds between 1996 and 2010 (I restrict
the samples to those with Morningstar category in the 3 by 3 size/value grid and having monthly
return information in CRSP survivor-bias-free mutual fund database). The dependent variables are
monthly fund gross return and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha (factor loadings are calculated
using monthly fund returns of prior 36 months). Log(TNA)t is the natural logarithm of total net
assets of the fund. Log(FamilySize)t is the natural logarithm of total net assets of all active equity
funds in the fund family.NumMgrst is the number of managers managing the fund during month t.
NetF lowt is calculated as NetF lowt =
TNAt−TNAt−1(1+Rt)
TNAt−1
, where Rt is the net return of the fund
during month t. TurnoverRatiot is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of
securities, divided by the average 12-month Total Net Assets of the fund. Aget is the age of the fund
since inception. ManagerSATt is the median SAT of matriculants at the manager’s undergraduate
institution. ManagerMBAt is a dummy variable which equals to one if the manager has an MBA
degree and zero otherwise. βMKT , βSMB, βHML, and βUMD are estimates from monthly rolling
regressions of gross fund returns on Fama-French-Carhart four factors (MKT , SMB, HML, and
UMD) using a 24-month window. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are reported.
t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (12 monthly lags) for serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Gross Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6))
EigenvectorCentralityt -1.335 -1.424∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -1.411∗∗∗ -1.772∗∗∗ -1.798∗∗∗
(1.39) (3.70) (2.99) (2.77) (4.65) (3.33)
Log(TNA)t -0.013∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(2.50) (2.95) (2.56) (2.93)
Log(FamilySize)t 0.015∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(5.01) (3.16) (3.21) (1.93)
NumMgrst 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.61) (0.19) (0.99) (0.82)
Log(Age+ 1)t -0.021∗ -0.019 -0.019∗ -0.017
(1.83) (1.55) (1.74) (1.44)
NetF lowt 0.716∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(3.12) (4.05) (2.80) (3.32)
NetF low2t -0.946
∗∗ -0.903∗∗ -0.930∗∗ -0.909∗∗
(2.40) (2.58) (2.07) (2.16)
49
TurnoverRatiot 0.019 0.025 0.013 0.009
(0.89) (1.13) (0.43) (0.27)
βMKT,t 0.153 0.143
(0.41) (0.39)
βSMB,t 0.300 0.285
(1.30) (1.23)
βHML,t 0.189 0.170
(0.64) (0.57)
βUMD,t 0.024 -0.004
(0.06) (0.01)
ManagerSATt 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(4.09) (3.33)
ManagerMBAt 0.048∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(4.04) (2.59)
Average R2 0.003 0.415 0.424 0.002 0.029 0.031
No. of months 180 180 180 180 180 180
No. of observations 327,222 290,573 266,657 304,009 291,649 267,617
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Table 1.9: Predicting Mutual Fund Returns with Centrality: Fixed Effects
In this table, I study the predictive power of centrality for fund returns with family fixed effects and
city fixed effects. The dependent variable is Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha for all regressions.
Specifically, I estimate between estimator and within estimator for family fixed effects and city
fixed effects separately. In columns (1) and (2), I keep only fund samples if its affiliated family has
at least two funds in each calendar month. In column (1) “within family" estimation, all variables
are demeaned at the fund family level for each calendar month. In column (2) “between family"
estimation, all variables are family level averages for each calendar month. In columns (3) and
(4), I keep only fund samples if its affiliated city is in the top 100 according to total net assets
in the calendar month. In column (3) “within city" estimation, all variables are demeaned at the
city level for each calendar month. In column (4) “between city" estimation, all variables are city
level averages for each calendar month. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are
reported. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (12 monthly lags) for serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha
Within Family Between Family Within City Between City
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EigenvectorCentralityt -0.877∗∗ -2.214∗∗∗ -1.970∗∗∗ -1.546∗∗
(2.14) (3.57) (4.21) (2.11)
Log(TNA)t -0.030∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.017∗∗∗ 0.001
(3.79) (0.69) (2.97) (0.06)
Log(FamilySize)t 0.005 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.84) (3.71) (0.43)
NumMgrst 0.002 0.001 0.006∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.49) (0.18) (1.89) (1.98)
Log(Age+ 1)t 0.004 -0.020 -0.017 -0.014
(0.31) (0.71) (1.44) (0.47)
NetF lowt 0.618∗∗ 0.861∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗
(2.27) (2.24) (2.95) (2.08)
NetF low2t -0.625 -1.807
∗∗ -1.200∗∗∗ -0.558
(1.40) (2.52) (2.61) (0.39)
TurnoverRatiot 0.038 0.002 0.027 -0.025
(1.14) (0.03) (0.88) (0.63)
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Average R2 0.025 0.083 0.030 0.135
No. of months 180 180 180 180
No. of observations 257,431 41,727 272,610 17,808
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Table 1.10: Predicting Mutual Fund Returns with Centrality: Portfolio Sorts
This table reports future Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha for 5 quintile mutual fund portfolios
formed based on the eigenvector centrality measure. At the start of each calendar month, I sort
funds into quintile portfolios (low to high) based on the eigenvector centrality measure at the end
of last month. In Panel A, I calculate equal-weighted Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha of each
portfolio over the next one month, three months, six months, and twelve months after portfolio
formation. In Panel B, I calculate Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha weighted by fund size for
each portfolio over the next one month, three months, six months, and twelve months after portfolio
formation. The 1-5 decile spread is the zero-investment long-short portfolio that is long on quintile
one and short on quintile five. In columns (1) - (4), I use Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha based
on gross fund returns (before fee). In columns (5) - (8), I use Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha
based on net fund returns (after fee). t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (12 monthly
lags) for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
α4ft+1(GrossReturn,%) α
4f
t+1(NetReturn,%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quintile 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Panel A: equal-weighted portfolio
1(Low) 0.057 0.198∗ 0.446∗ 0.867∗∗ -0.048 -0.122 -0.213 -0.513
(1.43) (1.71) (1.91) (2.01) (1.19) (1.05) (0.91) (1.19)
2 0.042 0.139 0.309 0.676 -0.057 -0.163 -0.309 -0.621
(0.98) (1.08) (1.15) (1.26) (1.31) (1.25) (1.14) (1.15)
3 0.019 0.086 0.221 0.386 -0.076∗∗ -0.204∗ -0.374∗ -0.861∗∗
(0.52) (0.78) (0.99) (0.95) (2.00) (1.83) (1.64) (2.09)
4 0.035 0.095 0.245 0.558 -0.064 -0.205 -0.371 -0.732
(0.67) (0.62) (0.78) (0.88) (1.23) (1.33) (1.18) (1.18)
5(High) 0.007 0.030 0.118 0.233 -0.092∗ -0.271∗ -0.500∗ -1.058∗
(0.14) (0.21) (0.39) (0.41) (1.86) (1.85) (1.68) (1.89)
Low - High 0.050∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(1.91) (3.87) (5.22) (6.56) (1.67) (3.44) (4.60) (5.76)
Panel B: value-weighted portfolio
1(Low) 0.014 0.077 0.224 0.425 -0.064 -0.162 -0.265 -0.596
(0.26) (0.48) (0.71) (0.71) (1.16) (1.02) (0.85) (1.03)
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2 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 -0.048 -0.077 -0.227 -0.447∗ -0.982∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.10) (1.41) (1.54) (1.65) (1.98)
3 -0.035 -0.072 -0.056 -0.210 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗∗
(1.08) (0.81) (0.33) (0.79) (3.40) (3.35) (3.00) (4.26)
4 -0.021 -0.060 -0.152 -0.371 -0.095∗∗ -0.286∗∗ -0.612∗∗ -1.325∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.49) (0.63) (0.82) (2.21) (2.27) (2.46) (2.80)
5(High) -0.059 -0.193 -0.325 -0.578 -0.139∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗ -0.822∗∗∗ -1.604∗∗∗
(1.20) (1.36) (1.18) (1.21) (2.82) (3.08) (3.01) (3.42)
Low - High 0.073 0.269∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗
(1.62) (3.21) (4.58) (6.14) (1.67) (3.28) (4.68) (6.27)
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Table 1.11: Predicting Mutual Fund Returns with Centrality: Control for Manager Tenure
and Historical Performance
The sample includes active managed U.S. equity mutual funds between 1996 and 2010 (I restrict
the sample to those with Morningstar category in the 3 by 3 size/value grid and having monthly
return information in CRSP survivor-bias-free mutual fund database). The dependent variables
are monthly fund gross return and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha (factor loadings are
calculated using monthly fund returns of prior 36 months). Log(TNA)t is the natural logarithm
of total net assets of the fund. Log(FamilySize)t is the natural logarithm of total net assets of
all active equity funds in the fund family.NumMgrst is the number of managers managing the
fund during month t. NetF lowt is calculated as NetF lowt =
TNAt−TNAt−1(1+Rt)
TNAt−1
, where Rt is the
net return of the fund during month t. TurnoverRatiot is the minimum of aggregated sales or
aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month Total Net Assets of the fund.
Aget is the age of the fund since inception. ManagerSATt is the median SAT of matriculants at
the manager’s undergraduate institution. ManagerMBAt is a dummy variable which equals to
one if the manager has an MBA degree and zero otherwise. Log(ManagerTenure+ 1) is defined
as the natural logarithm of the number of years the manager have been working in the fund plus
1. I rank 4-factor alpha of every fund and assign a percentile ranking (higher percentile, better
performance). MgrAlphaRankHistt is the cumulative average of the percentile ranking for every
managers in our sample. MgrDollarAlphaHistt is cumulative dollar weighted alpha generated
by every fund manager. If a fund has multiple managers, I average MgrAlphaRankHistt and
MgrDollarAlphaHistt equally across managers in the fund level. βMKT , βSMB, βHML, and
βUMD are estimates from monthly rolling regressions of gross fund returns on Fama-French-Carhart
four factors (MKT , SMB, HML, and UMD) using a 24-month window. Coefficients of Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions are reported. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (12
monthly lags) for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Gross Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EigenvectorCentralityt -1.721∗∗∗ -1.243∗∗∗ -1.227∗∗∗ -2.130∗∗∗ -1.588∗∗∗ -1.601∗∗∗
(3.45) (2.78) (2.73) (3.83) (2.98) (2.96)
Log(ManagerTenure+ 1)t 0.005 0.006
(0.34) (0.42)
MgrAlphaRankHistt 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(5.64) (4.98)
MgrDollarAlphaHistt 0.120∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(5.56) (4.13)
Log(TNA)t -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
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(3.78) (3.49) (3.27) (3.70) (3.75) (3.42)
Log(FamilySize)t 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(4.62) (3.21) (3.25) (3.23) (2.18) (2.23)
NumMgrst 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.29) (0.51) (0.48) (0.91) (1.06) (1.03)
Log(Age+ 1)t -0.017 -0.009 -0.014 -0.016 -0.006 -0.012
(1.29) (0.82) (1.24) (1.29) (0.56) (1.18)
NetF lowt 0.805∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(3.79) (3.61) (3.76) (3.16) (2.82) (2.96)
NetF low2t -0.749
∗∗ -0.669∗∗ -0.682∗∗ -0.768∗ -0.572 -0.559
(2.14) (2.05) (2.01) (1.86) (1.48) (1.43)
TurnoverRatiot 0.028 0.025 0.024 0.011 0.010 0.010
(1.17) (1.20) (1.19) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35)
ManagerSATt 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(4.20) (3.66) (3.87) (3.44) (2.88) (3.27)
ManagerMBAt 0.046∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(3.90) (3.80) (4.10) (2.62) (2.32) (2.63)
βMKT,t 0.124 0.172 0.173
(0.34) (0.48) (0.47)
βSMB,t 0.291 0.267 0.277
(1.26) (1.17) (1.21)
βHML,t 0.165 0.189 0.186
(0.56) (0.63) (0.62)
βUMD,t -0.023 0.015 0.012
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Average R2 0.429 0.428 0.429 0.033 0.039 0.042
No. of months 180 180 180 180 180 180
No. of observations 261,811 266,657 266,657 262,749 267,242 267,242
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Table 1.12: Predicting Mutual Fund Returns with Centrality: Directed Social Connections
The sample includes actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds between 1996 and 2010 (I
restrict the sample to those with Morningstar category in the 3 by 3 size/value grid and hav-
ing monthly return information in CRSP survivor-bias-free mutual fund database). The depen-
dent variable is Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha (calculated based on fund gross returns).
See section 1.5.5 for the definition of EigenvectorCentrality(In)t, DegreeCentrality(In)t,
EigenvectorCentrality(Out)t and DegreeCentrality(Out)t. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regressions are reported. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (12 monthly lags)
for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DegreeCentrality(In)t -0.290∗∗∗
(3.81)
DegreeCentrality(Out)t -0.326∗∗∗
(3.98)
EigenvectorCentrality(In)t -0.988∗∗∗
(3.00)
EigenvectorCentrality(Out)t -1.277∗∗∗
(3.29)
Log(TNA)t -0.014∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(2.48) (2.55) (2.44) (2.55)
Log(FamilySize)t 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(2.48) (2.62) (2.58) (2.87)
NumMgrst 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.79) (1.02) (0.88) (1.40)
Log(Age+ 1)t -0.018∗ -0.019∗ -0.018∗ -0.019∗
(1.68) (1.74) (1.65) (1.77)
NetF lowt 0.717∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.77) (2.78) (2.80)
NetF low2t -0.928
∗∗ -0.908∗∗ -0.943∗∗ -0.911∗∗
(2.05) (2.02) (2.07) (2.04)
TurnoverRatiot 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013
(0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
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Average R2 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029
No. of months 180 180 180 180
No. of observations 291,649 291,649 291,649 291,649
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Table 1.13: Relationship between Centrality and Fund Flows
This table reports the results of pooled regression on the relationship between fund flows and centrality. The dependent
variable is NetF low, calculated as NetF lowt =
TNAt−TNAt−1(1+Rgt )
TNAt−1
, where Rgt is the gross return of the fund during
month t. α4ft−1 is monthly Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha lagged by one month. Rt−1 is monthly lagged net return
of the fund. EigenvectorCentrality is the eigenvector centrality of the fund. ReturnV ol is the standard deviation of
the monthly gross return of the fund (using a 24-month window). Month fixed effects are included. Robust standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are two-way clustered at the family and month levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
NetF lowt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6))
α4ft−1 0.226
∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(11.13) (12.02) (9.39)
Rt−1 0.237∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(8.66) (9.10) (8.72)
EigenvectorCentralityt−1 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(3.42) (3.43) (3.29) (3.28)
α4ft−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1 -1.251∗∗ -1.461∗∗
(2.06) (2.48)
Rt−1 × EigenvectorCentralityt−1 -0.612∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗
(2.51) (2.69)
α4ft−1 × Log(Age+ 1)t−1 -0.107∗∗∗
(6.33)
Rt−1 × Log(Age+ 1)t−1 -0.035∗∗∗
(5.09)
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ReturnV olt−1 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.077∗∗
(2.62) (2.59) (2.59) (2.19) (2.15) (2.10)
Log(Age+ 1)t−1 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(18.04) (18.13) (18.16) (18.22) (18.29) (18.34)
Log(FundSize)t−1 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(2.27) (2.20) (2.20) (2.32) (2.25) (2.26)
Log(FamilySize)t−1 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(2.29) (2.72) (2.74) (2.27) (2.71) (2.71)
TurnoverRatiot−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.64) (0.67) (0.66) (0.62) (0.64) (0.63)
ExpenseRatiot−1 0.100∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(4.97) (4.94) (4.60) (4.98) (4.95) (4.79)
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.042
No. of observations 290,256 290,256 290,256 290,310 290,310 290,310
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Table 1.14: Summary Statistics of Sample Stocks
The sample includes common stocks from NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ between 1996 and 2010. For each quarter t, I classify fund i with
above median eigenvector centrality as central fund and below median eigenvector centrality as peripheral fund. The average portfolio
weights in stock k for central investors and peripheral investors are represented as CTRk,t and PERk,t, respectively. PMC factor is
constructed as the difference in average portfolio weights between peripheral funds and central funds, PMCk,t =
PERk,t−CTRk,t
2
. ALLk,t
is the average portfolio weights of stock k for all funds in the sample. ∆BREADTHt is the change in breadth of ownership from the
end of quarter t− 1 to quarter t. ∆IOt is the change in fraction of shares outstanding of a stock held by 13F institutions from the end of
quarter t− 1 to quarter t. LOG(SIZE)t is the log market capitalization at the end of quarter t. BK/MKTt is the most recently available
observation of the book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter t. MOM12t is the raw stock return for the last 12 months excluding the recent
one month. XTRt is the quarterly share turnover (volume normalized by shares outstanding) adjusted for the average share turnover of
the firm’s exchange. CTRt, PERt, PMCt, ALLt, and ∆BREADTHt are expressed in basis points (×10, 000). ∆IOt is expressed in
percentage terms (×100). Size quintiles are determined using NYSE breakpoints.
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Panel A: Means and standard deviations
PERt CTRt PMCt ALLt ∆BREADTHt ∆IOt LOG(SIZE)t BK/MKTt MOMt XTRt
Size Quintile 1
Mean 29.54 13.59 7.67 22.33 -0.43 0.15 4.54 0.91 0.05 -0.24
Std. dev. 32.19 19.19 15.04 22.04 31.53 8.59 1.00 1.10 0.88 1.85
Median 19.64 6.28 3.80 16.45 0.00 0.06 4.66 0.68 -0.06 -0.59
No. of obs. 105,057 107,384 105,035 105,137 108,986 109,744 109,744 101,065 107,316 109,744
Size Quintile 2
Mean 48.47 32.12 8.26 40.65 8.39 1.17 6.16 0.62 0.23 0.42
Std. dev. 31.31 29.17 17.63 24.96 53.34 11.14 0.50 0.64 0.89 2.05
Median 43.52 27.33 6.81 37.18 6.61 0.78 6.13 0.51 0.09 -0.11
No. of obs. 47,108 47,222 46,653 47,238 46,716 47,400 47,400 42,701 45,587 47,400
Size Quintile 3
Mean 61.51 45.00 8.45 53.66 14.60 1.08 7.01 0.56 0.30 0.63
Std. dev. 30.84 36.82 20.34 28.52 70.15 9.93 0.44 0.57 1.02 2.22
Median 57.90 40.66 7.74 50.62 11.21 0.73 6.98 0.46 0.13 0.06
No. of obs. 32,574 32,613 32,319 32,622 32,306 32,760 32,760 29,913 31,625 32,759
Size Quintile 4
Mean 71.09 54.55 8.42 63.31 18.13 0.56 7.90 0.53 0.30 0.62
Std. dev. 30.46 38.76 20.13 29.92 89.64 9.78 0.44 0.45 1.05 2.05
Median 68.37 50.24 8.17 60.54 14.65 0.49 7.91 0.42 0.15 0.07
No. of obs. 26,302 26,309 26,122 26,315 26,226 26,497 26,497 24,693 25,841 26,496
Size Quintile 5
Mean 91.41 74.77 7.29 83.03 27.28 0.26 9.55 0.47 0.27 0.28
Std. dev. 33.03 43.34 19.45 35.44 143.98 9.65 0.93 0.38 0.83 1.67
Median 88.34 70.02 7.53 79.12 21.14 0.30 9.37 0.37 0.15 -0.14
No. of obs. 21,850 21,078 22,382 21,199 22,694 22,778 22,778 21,953 22,514 22,778
Total
Mean 48.34 31.78 7.94 40.62 8.07 0.53 6.05 0.72 0.17 0.15
Std. dev. 37.71 35.57 17.44 32.76 68.19 9.57 1.83 0.86 0.92 1.99
Median 42.69 24.30 5.82 35.43 0.00 0.30 5.93 0.54 0.05 -0.29
No. of obs. 232,891 234,606 232,511 232,511 236,928 239,179 239,179 220,325 232,883 239,177
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Panel B: Contemporaneous correlations
PERt CTRt PMCt ALLt ∆BREADTHt ∆IOt LOG(SIZE)t BK/MKTt MOMt XTRt
PERt 1.000
CTRt 0.530 1.000
PMCt 0.510 -0.459 1.000
ALLt 0.879 0.870 0.038 1.000
∆BREADTHt 0.232 0.204 0.036 0.250 1.000
∆IOt 0.076 0.068 0.011 0.083 0.262 1.000
LOG(SIZE)t 0.577 0.581 0.015 0.662 0.123 0.043 1.000
BK/MKTt -0.186 -0.168 -0.024 -0.202 -0.013 -0.013 -0.251 1.000
MOMt 0.195 0.173 0.029 0.211 0.250 0.112 0.131 0.048 1.000
XTRt 0.096 0.129 -0.031 0.128 0.005 -0.021 0.186 -0.097 0.163 1.000
Panel C: Autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations
PERt−1 CTRt−1 PMCt−1 ALLt−1 ∆BREADTHt−1 ∆IOt−1 LOG(SIZE)t−1 BK/MKTt−1 MOMt−1 XTRt−1
PERt 0.837 0.477 0.356 0.747 0.170 0.064 0.538 -0.177 0.142 0.067
CTRt 0.477 0.579 -0.053 0.588 0.162 0.057 0.550 -0.161 0.150 0.108
PMCt 0.365 -0.051 0.437 0.189 0.009 0.013 0.011 -0.024 -0.001 -0.034
ALLt 0.746 0.590 0.171 0.769 0.185 0.066 0.594 -0.186 0.163 0.095
∆BREADTHt 0.129 0.120 0.014 0.142 0.086 0.025 0.078 -0.010 0.110 -0.016
∆IOt 0.023 0.019 0.008 0.026 0.013 -0.215 0.028 -0.008 0.041 -0.023
LOG(SIZE)t 0.556 0.562 0.016 0.614 0.140 0.042 0.984 -0.250 0.134 0.153
BK/MKTt -0.200 -0.181 -0.028 -0.212 -0.031 -0.024 -0.278 0.894 -0.034 -0.103
MOMt 0.195 0.168 0.038 0.211 0.268 0.120 0.109 0.087 0.639 0.134
XTRt 0.109 0.142 -0.023 0.140 0.053 0.032 0.169 -0.094 0.190 0.737
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Table 1.15: Forecasting Returns using Fund Holdings
The sample includes common stocks from NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ between 1996 and 2010. In columns
(1) and (2), the dependent variable is quarterly raw cumulative return for sample stocks. In columns (3) and
(4), the dependent variable is quarterly Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor alpha for sample stocks. In columns (5)
and (6), the dependent variable is quarterly DGTW-adjusted cumulative return for sample stocks. Panel A
studies the stock returns over the next quarter t+ 1 following the focal quarter t. Panel B studies the stock
returns over the quarter t+ 2 following the focal quarter t. Panel C studies the stock returns over the quarter
t + 3 following the focal quarter t. Panel D studies the stock returns over the quarter t + 4 following the
focal quarter t. For each quarter t, I classify fund i with above median eigenvector centrality as central fund
and below median eigenvector centrality as peripheral fund. The average portfolio weights in stock k for
central investors and peripheral investors are represented as CTRk,t and PERk,t, respectively. PMC factor
is constructed as the difference in average portfolio weights between peripheral funds and central funds,
PMCk,t =
PERk,t−CTRk,t
2
. ALLk,t is the average portfolio weights of stock k for all funds in the sample.
∆BREADTHt is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of quarter t − 1 to quarter t. ∆IOt
is the change in fraction of shares outstanding of a stock held by 13F institutions from the end of quarter
t− 1 to quarter t. XTRt is the quarterly share turnover (volume normalized by shares outstanding) adjusted
for the average share turnover of the firm’s exchange. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions
are reported. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (using 4 lags) for serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Panel A: Quarter 1
Raw Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha DGTW-adjusted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PERHt 0.793
∗∗ 0.454 0.706∗∗
(2.38) (1.41) (2.45)
CTRHt -1.075
∗∗ -1.495∗ -1.097∗∗
(2.08) (1.88) (2.32)
PMCHt 2.126
∗∗∗ 2.216∗∗ 2.023∗∗∗
(3.98) (2.57) (3.99)
ALLHt -0.332 -1.099 -0.435
(0.46) (1.32) (0.69)
∆BREADTHt 0.531∗∗ 0.532∗∗ -0.028 -0.028 0.337 0.337
(2.46) (2.45) (0.08) (0.08) (1.59) (1.60)
XTRt -0.004 -0.004 -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗
(1.61) (1.61) (1.89) (1.88) (1.74) (1.73)
∆IOt -0.028∗ -0.028∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(1.96) (1.97) (2.62) (2.63) (2.20) (2.23)
BK/MKTt 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.65) (0.65) (0.81) (0.81) (1.21) (1.21)
MOMt -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.12) (0.12) (0.65) (0.64) (0.19) (0.19)
Log(Size)t -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.44) (0.42) (0.22) (0.19) (1.60) (1.63)
Average R2 0.052 0.052 0.030 0.030 0.023 0.023
No. of quarters 60 60 60 60 60 60
No. of observations 214,128 214,128 188,633 188,633 210,893 210,893
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Panel B: Quarter 2
Raw Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha DGTW-adjusted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PERHt 0.856
∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗
(3.05) (3.28) (2.76)
CTRHt -0.973
∗∗ -0.943 -0.965∗∗
(2.10) (1.50) (2.39)
PMCHt 2.126
∗∗∗ 1.980∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗
(4.28) (3.28) (4.17)
ALLHt -0.251 -0.261 -0.386
(0.43) (0.39) (0.81)
∆BREADTHt 0.167 0.177 -0.065 -0.058 0.046 0.054
(0.66) (0.70) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23)
XTRt -0.003 -0.003 -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗
(1.54) (1.54) (1.93) (1.93) (1.76) (1.76)
∆IOt -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.012 -0.012
(0.55) (0.56) (0.20) (0.20) (1.15) (1.17)
BK/MKTt 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.74) (0.73) (0.10) (0.11) (1.12) (1.12)
MOMt -0.007 -0.007 0.006∗ 0.006∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.58) (0.58) (1.99) (1.99) (0.27) (0.26)
Log(Size)t 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.05) (2.21) (2.30)
Average R2 0.048 0.048 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.018
No. of quarters 60 60 60 60 60 60
No. of observations 209,599 209,599 184,909 184,909 205,855 205,855
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Panel C: Quarter 3
Raw Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha DGTW-adjusted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PERHt 0.520
∗ 0.710∗∗ 0.461∗∗
(1.86) (2.58) (2.00)
CTRHt -0.896
∗∗ -0.664 -0.767∗∗
(2.02) (1.14) (2.05)
PMCHt 1.654
∗∗∗ 1.595∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(3.48) (2.93) (3.55)
ALLHt -0.485 -0.050 -0.401
(0.84) (0.07) (0.83)
∆BREADTHt 0.106 0.111 0.084 0.087 0.124 0.129
(0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.76) (0.79)
XTRt -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(1.20) (1.20) (1.58) (1.58) (1.30) (1.29)
∆IOt -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(3.03) (3.03) (2.56) (2.57) (3.14) (3.14)
BK/MKTt 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.60) (0.59) (0.20) (0.20) (1.17) (1.17)
MOMt -0.008 -0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(1.24) (1.23) (1.14) (1.14) (1.44) (1.42)
Log(Size)t -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.14) (0.08) (0.42) (0.36) (1.56) (1.65)
Average R2 0.045 0.045 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.016
No. of quarters 60 60 60 60 60 60
No. of observations 205,094 205,094 181,222 181,222 200,853 200,853
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Panel D: Quarter 4
Raw Return Fama-French-Carhart Alpha DGTW-adjusted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PERHt 0.262 0.718
∗∗ 0.248
(0.95) (2.48) (1.13)
CTRHt -0.501 -0.098 -0.207
(1.00) (0.13) (0.45)
PMCHt 0.867 0.879 0.578
(1.55) (1.38) (1.11)
ALLHt -0.348 0.571 -0.072
(0.60) (0.67) (0.14)
∆BREADTHt -0.367 -0.358 -0.229∗ -0.223∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗
(1.52) (1.47) (1.72) (1.69) (2.67) (2.61)
XTRt -0.002 -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002 -0.002
(1.10) (1.10) (1.78) (1.78) (1.33) (1.33)
∆IOt 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.38) (0.38) (0.29) (0.28) (0.53) (0.52)
BK/MKTt 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.21) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.96) (0.96)
MOMt -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.92) (0.90) (0.08) (0.06) (0.89) (0.88)
Log(Size)t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.16) (0.10) (0.22) (0.20) (2.24) (2.39)
Average R2 0.042 0.042 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.016
No. of quarters 60 60 60 60 60 60
No. of observations 200,635 200,635 177,600 177,600 195,934 195,934
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Table 1.16: Forecasting Earnings Surprises
The sample includes common stocks from NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ between 1996 and 2010. The
dependent variable is earnings announcement surprises (SUE) over the first quarter (columns (1) and (2))
and the second quarter (columns (3) and (4)). We define the SUE as the difference between the actual and
consensus EPS, scaled by the share price at the beginning of the quarter. Consensus EPS is the median
of latest analyst forecasts issued within 90 days prior to the earning announcement date. Each quarter t,
I classify fund i with above median eigenvector centrality as central fund and below median eigenvector
centrality as peripheral fund. The average portfolio weights in stock k for central investors and peripheral
investors are represented as CTRk,t and PERk,t, respectively. PMC factor is constructed as the difference
in average portfolio weights between peripheral funds and central funds, PMCk,t =
PERk,t−CTRk,t
2
. ALLk,t
is the average portfolio weights of stock k for all funds in the sample. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1973)
regressions are reported. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted (using 4 lags) for serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
Qtr 1 Qtr 2
(1) (2) (3) (4))
PERHt 0.387
∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(3.02) (3.37)
CTRHt -0.742
∗∗ -0.462∗
(2.44) (1.73)
PMCHt 1.179
∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗
(2.92) (2.78)
ALLHt -0.341 0.063
(1.58) (0.35)
BK/MKTt -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(2.41) (2.41) (2.28) (2.28)
MOMt 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(3.78) (3.79) (3.89) (3.90)
Log(Size)t 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(7.63) (7.80) (10.97) (11.32)
Average R2 0.040 0.040 0.042 0.042
No. of quarters 60 60 60 60
No. of observations 170,013 170,013 159,129 159,129
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Chapter 2
Noisy Signaling through Open Market
Share Repurchase Programs and
Information Production by Institutions
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, the number of firms undertaking stock repurchases has increased dramatically,
while the proportion of firms distributing value through cash dividends has declined (see, e.g.,
Fama and French (2001)). Open-market share repurchases (OMSRs) constitute around 90% of
the stock repurchases consummated in recent years: see, e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991). An
interesting question in this context is regarding the precise economic mechanism through which
OMSR programs maximize shareholder value. The predominant rationale for share repurchase
programs provided by the existing theoretical literature is that they serve to signal firm insiders’
private information about the intrinsic value of the firm to outsiders in the equity market: see, e.g.,
Ofer and Thakor (1987) or Constantinides and Grundy (1989). However, there are certain important
modifications of the traditional signaling paradigm that need to be made if we are to apply it to the
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case of OMSR programs.
Signaling models of share repurchase assume that the firm commits to repurchase a certain
number of shares, as is the case in practice in Dutch auction or fixed-price tender offer repurchase
programs. However, there is no such commitment to buy a specified number of shares in an OMSR
program: the announcement of such a program involves announcing the authorization by the firm’s
board to repurchase a certain number of shares, not a commitment to buy these shares. This means
that an important assumption underlying theoretical models of signaling private information using
stock repurchases does not hold in the case of OMSR programs, implying that stock repurchases
using OMSR programs may not be able to signal insider private information fully to the equity
market. In particular, since top managers’ compensation is often linked to stock price, firm managers
have an incentive to boost stock prices in the short run, even if they believe that their equity is
correctly valued or even overvalued. Given this incentive, and if there is no cost incurred by firm
managers for not repurchasing a significant fraction of the shares announced in an OMSR program,
even the managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to announce an OMSR program (in order
to mimic the behavior of undervalued firms) but actually repurchase only a small fraction of the
announced shares (or none at all).
The fact that OMSR programs may not be able to fully signal firm insiders’ private information,
however, does not necessarily imply that such programs are not able to convey any information at
all to outside investors in the equity market. In this paper, we argue that as long as firm managers
suffer a moderate reputational or other cost arising from the firm’s actual repurchase falling short
of the number of shares authorized in the OMSR program announcement, OMSR programs will
be able to convey a noisy signal that the firm’s equity is undervalued to outside shareholders.1 In
1It is worth noting that the completion rate of actual OMSR programs announced in practice is broadly consistent
with firms facing a moderate per share cost of not actually repurchasing the number of shares announced in the
OMSR program (as required by our noisy signaling hypothesis). In particular, the evidence in our sample is that,
on average, firms actually repurchase 80.11 percent of the shares announced in the OMSR program in the one-year
period after the announcement. The evidence documented in various other papers in the existing literature point to a
substantial completion rate in OMSR programs, on average: see, e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998), who document
that firms acquire on average 74 to 82 percent of the number of shares announced within three years of the repurchase
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other words, while an OMSR announcement itself may not fully eliminate the undervaluation of the
firm’s equity, it is likely to reduce it, with additional information being conveyed gradually over
time as the firm subsequently repurchases a larger and larger number of its shares. We further argue
that, in this setting, institutional investors play an important role complementary to OMSR program
announcements and actual share repurchases by firms in reducing the information asymmetry faced
by firms in the equity market (and therefore their equity undervaluation): institutions are able
to accomplish this by producing information about announcing firms and trading in their equity
after the announcement of OMSR programs. We will refer to the above hypothesis as the “noisy
signaling hypothesis" of OMSR programs. The objective of this paper is to propose the above novel
hypothesis about OMSR programs and to test its implications in the unique setting of information
production and trading by institutional investors, using a detailed transaction-level institutional
trading database.
The economic setting we consider to develop our empirical analysis can be described as follows.
Consider a situation where the insiders of a firm, having private information about its intrinsic value,
are considering whether or not to undertake an OMSR program. For concreteness, consider three
types of firms: those with the highest intrinsic value (type G), medium intrinsic value (type M ),
and the lowest intrinsic value (type B). Prior to an OMSR program announcement, all three types
of firms are pooled together (priced at the average value across types), so that the type G and type
M firms are undervalued while the type B firm is overvalued. This means that the higher type firms
have an incentive to announce an OMSR program to reduce their undervaluation: we argue that,
even if there is no commitment to buy back all the shares announced in the program, announcing
an OMSR program will convey a noisy signal of higher intrinsic value as long as there is at least
a moderate reputational or other cost per share to firm management of having a shortfall in the
number of shares actually repurchased relative to the target number of shares announced in the
OMSR program (“shortfall cost" from now on). We argue that, in this setting, the type G and type
announcement.
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M (higher intrinsic value) firms will announce an OMSR program while the type B firms (lowest
intrinsic value) firm will not. Further, there will be an announcement effect (abnormal stock return)
following such an announcement. However, the undervaluation of the highest firm type will not
be completely eliminated by an OMSR program, since, after the announcement, the type G and
type M firm will remain pooled together. Consequently, we argue that, after the OMSR program
announcement, while both types will repurchase shares, the highest intrinsic value (type G) firms
will repurchase a larger number of their own shares than the medium intrinsic value (type M ) firms,
so that their equity undervaluation is further reduced.
We argue in Section 2.3.1 that the above partial pooling equilibrium is the one that is most likely
to prevail in the equity market after an OMSR program announcement for a very wide range of
the per share shortfall cost incurred by firm insiders.2 Given the nature of this equilibrium, there
is room for information production about intrinsic firm values by institutional investors, who will
trade on this information in the equity market. The precision of this information produced by
institutions is likely to be lower than that of the private information (about their own firm’s intrinsic
value) held by firm insiders, so that, while information production helps institutions reduce their
information disadvantage with respect to firm insiders, it does not eliminate it. Since the information
produced by institutions gets reflected in firms’ stock prices through their trading, institutional
trading will further reduce the information asymmetry faced by the highest intrinsic value (type
G) firms (and therefore the undervaluation of their equity). In summary, we hypothesize that there
are three complementary mechanisms that serve to reduce the information asymmetry facing firms
(and thereby the undervaluation of their equity) in OMSR programs: first, the OMSR program
announcement itself; second, actual share repurchases by firms in the open market following the
announcement; and third, information production and trading by institutions subsequent to the
2In particular, we argue in Section 2.3.1 that a fully pooling equilibrium is likely to prevail only if the per share
shortfall cost is close to zero; similarly, a fully separating equilibrium is likely to prevail only if the per share shortfall
cost is extremely high. Further, we point out that the implications of these two types of equilibria are contradicted
by the empirical evidence on the announcement effects of OMSR programs and the completion rate of actual share
repurchases following OMSR program announcements.
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OMSR program announcement. We discuss this economic setting in more detail in Section 2.3.1
where we develop a theoretical framework incorporating the above ingredients, based on which we
develop testable hypotheses for our empirical analysis (in Section 2.3.2).
We address the following four sets of research questions in the above economic setting. The
first set of research questions is regarding the ability of institutions to produce valuable information
about a firm prior to its announcing an OMSR program. We address this question empirically by
analyzing whether institutional trading prior to an OMSR program announcement has predictive
power for the announcement effect of such a program. The second set of research questions is
regarding institutions’ ability to produce valuable information about a firm immediately after its
announcing an OMSR program. The answer to this question gives us insight into the nature of the
equilibrium that prevails in the equity market after an OMSR program announcement: clearly, there
is no room of information production by institutions in the event this equilibrium is fully separating,
thus resolving all information asymmetry upon the announcement of the program. We address this
question empirically, in two steps. First, by analyzing the predictive power of institutional trading
immediately after an OMSR program announcement for the subsequent long-run performance of
the firm’s equity. Second, by analyzing whether institutions are able to make abnormal profits by
trading in the announcing firm’s equity after the announcement of an OMSR program. If institutions
indeed have a residual information advantage over retail investors after the announcement of an
OMSR program, they should be able to translate this information advantage into abnormal profits
by trading in the firm’s equity.
The third research question is regarding the interaction between the information production
by institutions and the actual share repurchases by firms after an OMSR program announcement.
If institutions are able to produce valuable information about the undervaluation of firms’ equity
after an OMSR program announcement (and buy more equity in more undervalued firms), while
more undervalued firms repurchase a larger number of their own shares after the announcement,
then institutional net buy should be positively related to the number of shares actually repurchased
74
by announcing firms. We address this question by empirically analyzing the predictive power
of institutional trading immediately after an OMSR program announcement for the actual share
repurchases made by the announcing firm in the subsequent period. The fourth and final research
question is how the information produced by institutions interacts with the private information held
by insiders (conveyed to the equity market noisily through the OMSR program announcement and
the actual share repurchases of firms) to affect the information asymmetry facing the firm. We
address this question empirically by analyzing how institutional trading immediately after an OMSR
program announcement affects the change in information asymmetry faced by the firm from before
the announcement of an OMSR program to after.
We are able to address the above four research questions directly, given our transaction-level
institutional trading data. While we conduct our empirical analysis using trading by our entire
sample of institutions around OMSR programs, some of the institutions in our sample may not have
the ability (or inclination) to produce information. Therefore, we also conduct our analysis using
trading by a subsample of institutions, namely, hedge funds, whose avowed objective is to produce
information and to trade on this information in order to generate positive abnormal returns, and who
are likely to be less constrained in their trading relative to other institutions in our overall sample.
We make use of a detailed transaction-level institutional trading database provided by Abel
Noser Solutions (formerly Ancerno Ltd., or Abel/Noser Corporation) to address the above research
questions. Our data includes transactional-level institutional trading data spanning twelve years
from January 2003 to September 2011 originated from 868 different institutions, with an aggregate
annualized trading principal of around $9 trillion on all U.S. domestic equity. For an average
open-market repurchase event, our sample institutions collectively account for about 12% of the
CRSP-reported trading volume within the two-year period surrounding the open-market repurchase
announcement. With this dataset, we are able to track institutional trading both before and after an
open-market share repurchase announcement. We are also able to compute realized institutional
trading profitability net of explicit trading costs (i.e., brokerage commissions) and implicit trading
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costs (i.e., market impact). Throughout this paper, we use a variable we call “Net Buy" to measure
institutional trading. We define Net Buy as the number of shares purchased by institutions minus
the number of shares sold by institutions, normalized by the number of shares outstanding.
Our paper provides a number of new results on the effect of information production and trading
by institutional investors around OMSR programs on the valuation of the equity of firms announcing
such programs, thereby yielding considerable insight into the mechanism through which OMSR
programs help to reduce the information asymmetry faced by announcing firms. We organize our
empirical tests and results into five parts, corresponding to five different empirical analyses we
undertake to address the four sets of research questions outlined above.
First, we study, for the first time in the literature, the informativeness of institutional trading
before the announcement of an open-market repurchase program. We find that institutional trad-
ing before an open-market repurchase announcement has considerable predictive power for the
announcement effect of these programs.3 This result holds for trading by the entire sample of insti-
tutions as well as for trading by hedge funds. A larger extent of net buying by institutional investors
prior to OMSR program announcements is significantly associated with a smaller announcement
effect. This suggests that institutional investors are indeed able to produce valuable information
about the intrinsic values of firms announcing OMSR programs: since the information produced
by institutions gets reflected in the equity prices of firms as a result of institutional trading, the
undervaluation of firms with greater institutional net buying is reduced to a greater extent prior to
the announcement, so that the stock market reaction to OMSR program announcements by such
firms will be smaller.
Second, we study the predictive power of institutional trading immediately after OMSR program
announcements (over the next month) for the firm’s subsequent long-run (one year) performance,
again for the first time in the literature. We find that hedge fund trading immediately after an open-
3This result is robust to controlling for various variables that have been found in the prior literature to be able to
predict announcement effects of open-market share repurchase programs, including prior firm performance and insider
trading.
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market share repurchase announcement has considerable predictive power for the firm’s subsequent
long-run stock performance: a 1% increase in hedge fund net buying is associated with about 4.5%
increase in the firm’s abnormal stock return over the subsequent one-year period. This result is
robust to controlling for various variables capturing publicly available information, as well as the
extent of trading in the firm’s equity by insiders.
Third, we study the realized profitability of institutional trading after OMSR program announce-
ments, using actual transaction prices and net of brokerage commissions, for the first time in the
literature. We find that institutions make positive abnormal profits by trading in the firms’ equity
after the announcement of OMSR programs, even after taking commissions and other trading costs
into account. This is the case when the information conveyed by the announcement of an OMSR
program is noisier (i.e., when the size of the OMSR program is smaller or when the firm actually
repurchases a smaller number of shares subsequent to the announcement). This result holds not only
for trading by our hedge fund subsample, but also for trading by our entire sample of institutions. In
terms of economic magnitude, over the one-year horizon after an OMSR program announcement,
our sample institutions on average realize a risk-adjusted return of 1% when the size of the OMSR
program is smaller (i.e., below the sample median), and they realize a risk-adjusted return of 0.8%
when the firm actually repurchases less subsequent to the announcement (i.e., below the sample
median). The profitability of trading by hedge funds in the same time horizon (one year) is even
larger. These results suggest that the information produced by institutional investors (especially
hedge funds) after an open-market repurchase announcement that we documented earlier translates
into real trading profits when the information conveyed by the OMSR program announcement made
by the firm is noisier (i.e., when the size of the OMSR program is smaller or when the firm actually
repurchases less subsequent to the announcement).
The above two results, on the predictive power of institutional trading for subsequent stock
returns and the realized profitability of institutional trading, respectively, together show that insti-
tutions are able to generate a residual information advantage over retail investors even after the
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announcement of an OMSR program. The fact that institutions are able to produce valuable infor-
mation about the intrinsic value of firms announcing OMSR programs suggests that the equilibrium
prevailing in the equity market after the announcement of such a program is a partial pooling (rather
than a fully separating) equilibrium, since there would be no room for information production by
institutions in a fully separating equilibrium (where all information asymmetry about firm value is
resolved) upon the OMSR program announcement itself.
Fourth, we study the predictive power of institutional trading immediately after OMSR program
announcements for the actual share repurchases made by firms in the subsequent period, again for
the first time in the literature. We find that institutional trading (by institutions in our entire sample
as well as by our subsample of hedge funds) immediately after an OMSR program announcement
(either over a month or one quarter horizon) has considerable predictive power for the subsequent
actual share repurchases made by the firm: a 1% increase in institutional net buying over the next
quarter is associated with about a 3% increase in the firm’s actual repurchase over the subsequent
two-quarter period.4 The above result is consistent with the noisy signaling hypothesis that we
advance in this paper. In particular, the positive relation we document between institutional trading
and actual stock repurchases is consistent with both the above variables serving as complements to
OMSR program announcements in reducing the information asymmetry (and therefore the equity
undervaluation) of firms making OMSR program announcements.
Fifth and finally, we examine how institutional trading after OMSR program announcements
affects the information asymmetry faced by announcing firms in the equity market. We find that
institutional trading over the two-quarter period immediately after an open-market repurchase
program announcement is associated with a significant reduction in information asymmetry faced
by the firm around the OMSR program announcement (i.e., from before the announcement to after)
where information asymmetry is measured using four proxies widely used in the literature, namely,
4This result is robust to controlling for various variables capturing publicly available information, as well as the
extent of trading in the firm’s equity by insiders. Unless otherwise mentioned, the economic magnitude refers to that of
trading by our entire sample of institutions.
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analyst forecast errors, analyst forecast dispersions, coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts, and
bid-ask spreads. Thus, greater net buying by institutional investors of the equity of firms announcing
OMSR programs is associated with a greater reduction in analyst forecast errors; greater reduction
in analyst forecast dispersions; greater reduction in the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts;
and a greater reduction in the bid-ask spreads of the announcing firms’ equity. This result provides
direct evidence showing that institutional trading subsequent to an OMSR program announcement
serves a role complementary to the announcement itself in reducing the information asymmetry
facing firms announcing OMSR programs, thus providing further support to our noisy signaling
hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 relates this paper to the existing
literature and discusses its contribution relative to this literature. Section 2.3.1 develops a theoretical
framework analyzing the complementary role of OMSR program announcements, subsequent actual
share repurchases, and institutional trading after OMSR program announcements in reducing the
information asymmetry faced by firms; Section 2.3.2 develops testable hypotheses based on the
above theoretical framework. Section 2.4 describes the data and various variables used in our
empirical analysis. Section 2.5 presents our empirical tests and results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Relation to the Existing Literature and Contribution
Our paper is related to two strands in the theoretical literature. The theoretical literature closest
to our paper is the one modeling institutions as information producers and the implications of
such information production for stock repurchases, dividends, and equity issues. Brennan and
Thakor (1990) develop a theoretical model assuming that large investors such as institutions have
the ability to produce information about firms in the context of their choice of distribution method
between open-market repurchases, dividends, and fixed-price tender offers. They, however, do not
assume that firm insiders have any private information about intrinsic firm value, and the objective
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of their paper is to analyze how the presence of both informed investors (such as institutions) and
uninformed investors (such as retail investors) among a firm’s shareholders affect its choice of
payout methods between dividends, OMSR programs, and tender offer repurchases. Nevertheless,
our paper may be viewed as empirically analyzing an important assumption of their model, namely,
that institutional investors are able to produce information about firms undergoing OMSR programs.
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) develop a theoretical model incorporating the role of institutions
as information producers. In their model, institutions have the ability to produce information about
the intrinsic values of firms, and are at a greater advantage relative to retail investors in buying shares
in firms paying dividends, since dividends are taxed for individuals but untaxed for institutions. In
this setting, firms prefer to pay taxable dividends rather than repurchase shares in equilibrium, since
paying taxable dividends allows them to reveal their true values to outside investors making use
of institutions’ ability to produce information about true firm value. Chemmanur and Jiao (2011)
develop a model of institutional trading and information production around SEOs. We adapt their
economic setting to OMSRs when developing a theoretical framework that incorporates information
production by institutions after OMSR program announcements.
The theoretical signaling literature on stock repurchases is also related to our paper. This
literature argues that, in an asymmetric information setting, undervalued firms are able to credibly
and fully separate themselves from overvalued firms using stock repurchases: see, e.g., Ofer and
Thakor (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Vermaelen (1981), or Persons (1994).5 Oded
(2005) points out that, unlike Dutch auction or fixed-price tender offers, OMSR programs do not
pre-commit firms to acquire shares, and that many firms buy back only a fraction of the dollar value
announced, thus calling into the question the ability of OMSR programs to signal true firm value.
5McNally (1999) develops a signaling model of OMSR programs in a setting similar to that of Leland and Pyle
(1977). He assumes that entrepreneurs are risk averse and do not tender their own shares, so that a share repurchase
increases entrepreneurs’ proportionate equity holdings in the firm, triggering an increase in equity value due to the
signaling effect of such an increase (similar to the signaling effect of entrepreneurs’ equity holdings in Leland and
Pyle (1977)). However, he assumes that the announcement of the target number of shares in an OMSR program is
a “commitment to action," thus assuming away the difference between OMSR programs and the other two forms of
repurchase (Dutch auction and fixed-price tender offers) that exists in practice.
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He, however, goes on to develop a signaling model of OMSR programs where firms face a trade-off
between the long-run gains from the informed trading that the option to repurchase shares creates
and the short-run costs from the market’s accounting for this adverse selection.6 Under this trade-off,
only good firms announce open-market repurchase programs, so that the announcement of an OMSR
program acts as a credible signal (i.e., yielding a fully separating equilibrium).7 In contrast to the
above literature, we argue that OMSR program announcements are not able to fully signal true firm
value: i.e., the equilibrium prevailing in the equity market after an OMSR program announcement is
not a fully separating equilibrium but a partial pooling equilibrium. Further, the empirical evidence
we document here, that institutions are able to produce valuable information about firms announcing
OMSR programs and generate abnormal profits from trading on this information, also contradicts
the notion that OMSR program announcements fully convey firm insiders’ private information to
the equity market: there is no room for information production by institutions in a fully separating
equilibrium.8
Our paper is also related to the large empirical literature on stock repurchases in general and
OMSR programs in particular. A number of early papers show that the prices of firms that announce
a stock repurchase program increase significantly in the short run (e.g., Dann (1981); Vermaelen
(1981)) and in the long run (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)). Comment and
Jarrell (1991) study the relative signaling power of Dutch-auctions, self-tender offers and open-
market repurchases, and show that, while the announcement effects of OMSR programs are positive,
they provide weaker signals of stock undervaluation (weaker announcement effects) compared to the
other two forms of repurchase. Comment and Jarrell (1991) also point out that larger OMSR program
6See also Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) for a discussion of this option under symmetric information.
7This result, however, holds only under the rather strong assumption that the stock value distribution of a good
(higher intrinsic value) firm has a higher variance than that of a bad (lower intrinsic value) firm, so that the option to
repurchase the shares of a good firm is more valuable than the corresponding option of a bad firm.
8Bayar, Chemmanur, and Liu (2014) develop a theoretical analysis of a firm’s choice between dividend payments
and share repurchases to pay out cash (in a setting of heterogeneous beliefs between firm insiders and outsiders as
well as among outsiders). They also develop a theoretical rationale for the positive long-run stock returns following
stock repurchases that has been documented in the empirical literature. See Allen and Michaely (2003) for an extensive
review on the payout policy literature.
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announcements are viewed as stronger signals. A number of papers have also studied actual share
repurchases in OMSR programs and compared the number of shares actually repurchased relative
to the target number announced in OMSR programs. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) document that
for OMSR programs announced between 1981 to 1990, firms acquire on average 74 to 82 percent
of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement.
Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2014) show that disclosure of firms’ actual repurchase activity
following OMSR program announcements lead to a positive and significant abnormal stock return,
consistent with actual share repurchases contributing to a reduction in the residual information
asymmetry facing firms even after an OMSR program announcement. Busch and Obernberger
(2017) find that actual share repurchases in OMSR programs increase stock price efficiency and the
information content of stock prices. Despite the above large body of empirical evidence, there has
been no empirical analysis of the role played by information production and trading by institutions
in mitigating the residual information asymmetry faced by firms after the announcement of OMSR
programs in the existing literature: this is our focus here.9,10
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature at a conceptual as well as at an
empirical level. First, ours is the first paper in the literature to propose a noisy signaling hypothesis
of OMSR programs. Thus, we are the first to argue that, in contrast to the existing literature which
has theoretically demonstrated a separating equilibrium after share repurchase programs in general,
the equilibrium in the equity market after an OMSR program announcement is likely to be a partial
pooling equilibrium, where (in a setting with a continuum of types or a discrete type setting with
three or more types) the highest firm types pool by announcing an OMSR program while the lowest
types do not announce such a program. In this context, we argue that there is room for some
9Two other contemporaneous papers also study trading by institutional investors around stock repurchases. DeLisle,
Morscheck, and Nofsinger (2014) document that institutional investors are net sellers during share repurchases. In a
similar spirit, Huang and Zhang (2013) show that institutions sell after share repurchase announcements. Neither of
these papers analyze and test hypotheses regarding the information production role of institutional investors, which is
our focus here.
10Our paper is also distantly related to the empirical literature analyzing institutional trading around corporate events
other than stock repurchases: see, e.g., Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2004) and Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009), who
empirically analyze institutional trading around SEOs.
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information transmission from firm insiders to equity market investors through an OMSR program
announcement, even in the absence of a commitment by the firm to buy back the entire amount
of shares announced, as long as the firm or its insiders suffer a moderate shortfall cost per share:
i.e., the firm incurs such a cost if the actual number of shares repurchased falls short of the target
number of shares announced. Finally, we conjecture that, in such a partial pooling equilibrium, there
are two mechanisms that play a role complementary to OMSR program announcements in further
mitigating the residual information asymmetry faced by the firm even after the OMSR program
announcement. The first such mechanism is actual share repurchases by firms after OMSR program
announcements: we argue that more undervalued firms repurchase a larger number of shares after
OMSR program announcements, thereby conveying further information about intrinsic firm value
to the equity market. The second such mechanism is information production by institutions and
trading by them making use of this information after OMSR program announcements. We argue
that, based on their information production, institutions buy more equity in more undervalued firms,
and institutions’ information getting reflected in stock prices as a result of their trading further
reduces the residual information asymmetry facing firms after OMSR program announcements.
The second contribution made by our paper lies in testing the implications of the above noisy
signaling hypothesis of OMSR program announcements for information production and trading by
institutions. The results of our empirical analysis provide considerable support for the noisy signal-
ing hypothesis. First, the fact that institutions are able to produce valuable information subsequent
to OMSR program announcements (as evidenced by the predictive power of institutional trading
and the realized profitability of such trading) provides support for the notion that the equilibrium
prevailing in the equity market is a partial pooling rather than a fully separating equilibrium: there
would be no room for information production by institutions in a separating equilibrium, since, in
such an equilibrium, all information asymmetry is resolved upon the announcement of the OMSR
program itself. Second, the positive relationship that we document between institutional net buying
and actual share repurchases by firms provides further support for the noisy signaling hypothesis.
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This positive relationship is likely to be induced by the fact that firms that are more undervalued
after OMSR program announcements repurchase more of their own shares, while institutions net
buy a larger number of shares after OMSR program announcements in firms that they believe to
be more undervalued. Third, we provide direct evidence supporting the complementary role of
information production and trading by institutions in reducing the residual information asymmetry
facing firms announcing OMSR programs, by showing that the reduction in information asymmetry
facing firms from before an OMSR program announcement to after such an announcement is greater
when net buying by institutions in the firm’s equity immediately after the announcement is greater.
Our paper also makes a third contribution to the literature by documenting the predictive power
of institutional trading prior to OMSR program announcements for the announcement effects of such
programs. This, along with the other empirical results discussed earlier, allows us to empirically
confirm a crucial assumption made by the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model: we are able to show
that institutional investors are indeed able to produce credible information about the intrinsic values
of firms around OMSR programs.
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section we briefly develop a theoretical framework that allows us to analyze the noisy
signaling role of OMSR programs, and the complementary role of information production and
trading by institutions in conveying information from firm insiders to uninformed outsiders (e.g.,
retail investors) in the equity market. We will use this theoretical framework to develop testable
hypotheses in the next section.
Consider a situation where the insiders of a firm, having private information about its intrinsic
value, are deciding whether or not to undertake an OMSR program. If insiders choose to announce
an OMSR program, it may convey a signal to outsiders that the firm’s equity is undervalued relative
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to its intrinsic value as assessed by firm insiders (based on their private information): whether the
signal is fully revealing or partially revealing, or whether there will be any information content to
this signal at all, will depend upon the nature of the equilibrium that prevails in the equity market
after the OMSR program announcement, as we discuss below. In other words, the announcement
of an OMSR program may convey firm insiders’ private information only partially to outsider
shareholders, thereby reducing (but not necessarily eliminating) the undervaluation of the firm’s
equity relative to its intrinsic value. The fact that, even after an OMSR program announcement,
there may be residual undervaluation of the firm’s equity leaves room for information production
by institutions about the firm’s intrinsic value: i.e., information production by institutions getting
reflected in the stock price may play a role (complementary to the noisy signal conveyed by the
OMSR program) in reducing the undervaluation of the announcing firm’s equity.
We now analyze more precisely the nature of the equilibrium that prevails in the equity market
upon the announcement of an OMSR program. The setting we study is the following. There are
three types of firms: Good (type G) with intrinsic value VG; Medium (type M ) with intrinsic value
VM ; and Bad (type B) with intrinsic value VB; VG > VM > VB. While firm insiders know the true
type of their own firm, outsiders know only the probability distribution across firm types: they
assess that any firm in the equity market is a type G with probability γG, type M with probability
γM , and type B with probability γB, γG + γM + γB = 1. Since outsiders cannot fully distinguish
between the three types of firms, the share price of any firm prior to an OMSR announcement will
be the pooling value across the three types of firms: i.e., it will be γGVG + γMVM + γBVB.
The timeline of events (depicted in Figure 2.1) is the following. At time 0, a firm chooses
whether or not to announce an OMSR program and announces it if it finds it optimal to do so. If the
firm chooses to actually repurchase any of the shares authorized in the OMSR program, it does so
between time 0 and time 1, with the actual repurchases completed at time 1. Investors in the equity
market (both institutional and retail investors) come to know the number of shares (if any) actually
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repurchased by the firm at time 1.11
We assume that the firm and/or its top managers suffer a per share reputation cost arising from
any shortfall in the number of shares actually repurchased relative to the number of shares authorized
in the OMSR program announcement: the aggregate reputation cost suffered by a firm (or its top
managers) is given by the product of the number of shares by which the firm’s actual repurchase
falls short of the number announced (authorized) in the OMSR program and the shortfall cost per
share. The firm incurs this aggregate shortfall cost (if any) at time 1, soon after the actual number of
shares repurchased becomes known. We do not take a position on the magnitude of this per share
shortfall cost: we argue that the nature of the equilibrium in the equity market will depend upon
whether this magnitude is large, moderate, or small.
In the long-run (time 2), the true value of the firm becomes revealed exogenously (i.e., the
information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders is eliminated at time 2, as the firm’s
operating performance becomes known to outsiders over time). As we discuss in more detail below,
institutional investors may produce information (at a cost) about the firm’s intrinsic value between
the announcement of an OMSR program (time 0) and the completion of actual share repurchases (if
any) by the firm (and the public disclosure of the number of shares repurchased) at time 1.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
OMSR program 
announcement
(if any)
Actual share repurchases 
completed and revealed 
to outsiders
Exogenous revelation of 
true firm values
Actual share repurchases by firms
Information production and trading by institutions
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Events
The objective of each firm in deciding whether or not to announce an OMSR program at time
11Beginning from 2004, U.S. firms are required to make quarterly disclosures of actual share repurchases and
average prices paid.
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0, and the actual number of shares to repurchase, is to maximize a weighted average of its equity
values in the short run (time 0), medium run (time 1), and the long-run (time 2), net of any reputation
cost incurred by the firm at time 1 due to the shortfall in shares actually repurchased. The weights
placed on the valuation at each date is determined exogenously (not alterable by firm managers).
Outsiders in the equity market consist of two types of investors.12 The first type of investors
are institutional investors, who have the ability to produce noisy information about the firm (at
a cost). The precision of information produced by institutions is lower than that of the private
information held by firm insiders, so that, while information production helps institutions reduce
their information disadvantage with respect to firm insiders, it does not eliminate it. We assume
that institutions trade on the information they produce: they buy shares that they believe to be
undervalued based on the information they have produced. The second type of investors are retail
investors, who do not have any ability to produce information about the intrinsic value of the firm,
and are therefore at a disadvantage with respect to both institutions and insiders. Retail investors are
essentially liquidity traders in the equity market in the economic setting we study here, similar to
their role in market microstructure models such as Kyle (1985). The price of the firm’s stock in the
equity market is set by a market-maker who is uninformed to begin with, but who sets the stock price
to break even (after observing the aggregate order flow of trades in the firm’s equity), again similar
to the price-setting rule in market microstructure models. The aggregate order flow observed by the
market-maker in the equity market in our setting comes from three sources: trading by institutional
investors; actual share repurchases by firms; and trading by retail investors (uninformed liquidity
traders). While the market-maker cannot fully separate informed and uninformed trades, the price
of the firm’s equity will reflect, to some degree, the information held by institutional investors as
well as that contained in the actual repurchases made by firms. The information flow between firm
12We adapt the setting of Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) to analyze an equity market with information production by
institutional investors around OMSR program announcements, and how this information gets reflected in stock prices.
Chemmanur and Jiao (2011), however, focus on theoretically analyzing the implications of institutional trading around
seasoned equity offerings. In the interest of conserving space, we choose not to develop a formal theoretical model here
to analyze institutional trading around OMSR program announcements, but instead adapt the theoretical analysis of
Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) to the stock repurchase setting.
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insiders, institutional investors, retail investors and the resulting determination of the firm’s stock
price (by the market-maker) in the economic setting we postulate here is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Institutional investors
(Information producers)
Firm insiders/managers
(Private Information)
Retail investors
(Uninformed liquidity traders)
Information in OMSR 
program announcements 
Information in OMSR 
program announcements 
and actual stock repurchases
Information in OMSR 
program announcements 
Stock price
(Set by market-maker)
Institutional trading
Retail investor trading
Figure 2.2: Information flow between firms, institutions, uninformed investors, and the stock price
We now characterize the equilibrium in the above setting as a function of the magnitude of the
repurchase shortfall cost incurred by the firm. We describe three possible equilibria. We start with
the equilibrium which prevails when the per share shortfall cost is moderate.
Equilibrium One (Moderate repurchase shortfall cost per share):
In this equilibrium, only a type G or a type M firm announces an OMSR program at time 0.13
13The number of shares authorized (and announced) in the OMSR program by the type M will be the same as that
by the type G, since, otherwise it will reveal its true type. In other words, we an think of the type G as determining the
number of shares to be announced in the OMSR program and the type M mimicking it by announcing the same number
of shares.
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A type B firm will not announce such a program since its incentive compatibility (truth-telling)
condition is satisfied. In other words, it is optimal for a type B firm to reveal its true type by
refraining from making such an OMSR announcement. The trade-off faced by a type B firm is the
following. On the one hand, if the type B firm makes an OMSR program announcement, it can
prevent a drop in its share price from the pooled value across types to its true value. On the other
hand, in this case, the type B firm will not buy back any shares between time 0 and time 1 even
if it announces an OMSR program, since its shares will be overvalued relative to intrinsic value
between time 0 and time 1, so that actually repurchasing shares will be prohibitively costly for the
firm, resulting in the type B firm having to incur a high aggregate shortfall cost at time 1. Given
that the firm’s true value is revealed exogenously at time 2 (so that its equity value will equal its true
value at time 2 even if it announces an OMSR program at time 0), it can be shown that the value
of the type B firm’s objective will be strictly lower (for moderate values of the shortfall cost) if it
announces an OMSR program at time 0 compared to the case where it refrains from making any
such announcement. In summary, the type B firm does not announce an OMSR program at time 0,
thereby revealing its true type.14
Given the type B firm’s behavior in the equilibrium, outside investors in the stock market
recompute a firm’s stock value upon an OMSR program announcement as a weighted average of
the intrinsic values of the type G and the type M firms, the weights being the Bayesian updated
probabilities of the firm being of type G and type M respectively (conditional on such an announce-
ment). The announcement effect (abnormal stock return) of an OMSR program is therefore positive,
since the equity value of the firm upon the announcement is strictly higher than the fully pooling
value prevailing before the announcement. Subsequent to an OMSR program announcement, the
type G firm continues to be undervalued, though less than before the announcement; the type M
firm, however, is overvalued. Given that its shares continue to be undervalued, the type G firm
14It is straightforward to write down the formal incentive compatibility conditions of the type B and type M firm at
time 0, which are consistent with the type B choosing not to announce an OMSR program (thus separating from the
other two types) while the type M chooses to announce such a program (thus pooling with the type G). We choose not
to present these here due to space limits.
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repurchases the entire number of shares announced in the OMSR program between time 0 and time
1.
In contrast to the type G, the type M firm repurchases only a certain fraction of the number
of shares announced in the OMSR program since its shares are overvalued, resulting in actual
share repurchase being costly for that firm. The number of shares repurchased by the type M firm
between time 0 and time 1 will therefore reflect the trade-off faced by that firm between buying
back its overvalued shares, and incurring the repurchase shortfall cost at time 1.15 Given that the
type G and type M firms actually repurchase different numbers of shares in the open market, once
the actual number of shares repurchased is revealed to outside investors at time 1, the stock prices
of the two types of firms will signal their true intrinsic values (with the type G firm’s stock price
going up (since its true value is now fully revealed) and the type M firm’s price going down). At
time 2 (long-run), the information asymmetry facing all firms is resolved exogenously, so that their
equity market value will be equal to their intrinsic values at this date.
The role of institutions in the above equilibrium is that of information production and trading
on the information produced between time 0 and time 1. In the above equilibrium, institutions
are able to produce noisy information that allow them to distinguish partially between a type
M firm (overvalued) and a type G firm (undervalued). Institutions then buy equity in firms that
they believe to be undervalued and sell equity in those they believe to be overvalued. Since the
information contained in institutional trading gets reflected in the stock price through the inference
and price-setting process of the market-maker (see Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) or Kyle (1985)
for details), institutional trading between time 0 and time 1 plays a role complementary to OMSR
program announcements and actual share repurchases by firms in reducing the undervaluation of
the equity of a type G firm (and in reducing the overvaluation of the equity in a type M firm).16
15Thus, the actual number of shares repurchased by the type M firm between time 0 and time 1 will be a function of
the repurchase shortfall cost.
16Trading by institutions using the information they have produced and its effect on the stock price of the two
firm types (type G and type M ) may, in turn, affect the number of shares actually repurchased by them. However,
the behavior of two firm types we specified under equilibrium remains qualitatively unchanged. Thus, as long as the
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Further, institutional buying of shares will be correlated with actual share repurchases by firms,
since institutions buy equity in undervalued (type G) firms and, as discussed above, a type G firm
actually repurchases more of its own equity than a type M firm between time 0 and time 1.
Equilibrium Two (Very low repurchase shortfall cost per share):
In this equilibrium, all three types pool by announcing an OMSR program.17 There is therefore
no announcement effect at time 0: the stock price of any firm announcing an OMSR program
remains the same as before the announcement. Between time 0 and time 1, the type B firm does
not repurchase any shares, and suffers a low aggregate shortfall cost at time 1. The type B finds
it optimal to announce an OMSR program at time 0 since this enables it to keep its equity value
at the overvalued level at time 0 by pooling with the type G and type M , while incurring only a
low aggregate shortfall cost at time 1, once it is revealed that it did not repurchase any of the shares
announced in the OMSR program. Consequently, the value of the type B firm’s objective is higher
in this equilibrium if it announces an OMSR program but does not repurchase any shares between
time 0 and time 1 (in other words, its truth-telling condition at time 0 is not satisfied when the per
share shortfall cost is low). The type G firm actually repurchases all the shares it announced in
the OMSR program at time 0, since its shares continue to be undervalued after the announcement
(between time 0 and time 1). The type M firm may repurchase all shares announced in the OMSR
program (if its shares are undervalued after the OMSR program announcement between time 0 and
time 1) or only a fraction of the shares it announced (if the pooling value prevailing after the OMSR
program announcement is above its intrinsic value, so that its equity is overvalued). In the latter
case, its trade-off in determining the actual repurchase fraction is similar to that discussed above
under equilibrium one. At time 2, true firm values are exogenously revealed, so that the equity
values of all three firm types equal their intrinsic values.
undervaluation of the type G firm is not fully eliminated due to institutional trading, the firm will repurchase all the
shares it has announced in the OMSR program; similarly, while the precise number of shares that the type M firm
repurchases between time 0 and time 1 may change due to the reduction in overvaluation of the type M firm’s equity
due to institutional trading, its equilibrium behavior remains qualitatively unchanged.
17The type M and type B firms pool with the type G firm by announcing the same number of shares as in the type
G firm’s OMSR program announcement, since they will otherwise reveal their true types.
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Note that this equilibrium is inconsistent with the empirical evidence documented by the existing
literature (as well as that in this paper), since this evidence shows that OMSR programs have a
positive announcement effect (see, e.g., Table 1 of this paper or previous papers such as Comment
and Jarrell (1991) or Vermaelen (1981)).
Equilibrium Three (Very high repurchase shortfall cost per share):
In this case, the equilibrium is fully separating, so that each type of firm fully reveals its type at
time 0. In this equilibrium, the type G firm announces an OMSR program at time 0 and repurchases
the announced number of shares between time 0 and time 1. The type M firm also announces an
OMSR program at time 0, but for a smaller number of shares; it repurchases this smaller announced
number of shares between time 0 and time 1, and therefore avoids incurring any repurchase shortfall
cost. The type B firm does not announce any OMSR program at time 0, since, given the large per
share shortfall cost assumed here, any valuation benefit arising from pooling with the type M or the
type G at time 0 is overcame by its cost of buying back its own overvalued shares (if it chooses to
actually repurchase some shares between time 0 and time 1) or its aggregate shortfall cost it incurs
at time 1 (if it choose not to actually repurchase the number of shares announced at time 0). In other
words, the value of the type B’s objective if it reveals its true type at time 0 itself is greater than
if it attempts to pool with the type M or type G. The announcement effect of an OMSR program
is positive for both the type G and type M firm (and therefore positive on average for all firms
announcing OMSR programs).18
Further, since this equilibrium is fully separating at time 0 (i.e., all information asymmetry is
resolved upon announcement), the magnitude of the announcement effect in an OMSR program
will be as high as in other types of repurchases, such as fixed-price tender offers. This prediction is
clearly inconsistent with the existing empirical literature: see, e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991) and
Vermaelen (1981), who compare the signalling power of fixed-price tender offers, Dutch auctions,
and OMSRs, and conclude that OMSRs have the smallest announcement effect. Further, this
18Here we are assuming that VB is sufficiently smaller than VM , and γG, γM , and γB are such that the type M firm
is undervalued at the pooling price prevailing before the OMSR program announcement.
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equilibrium does not allow any room for costly information production by institutions after an
OMSR program announcement, since the equilibrium is fully separating, so that all information
asymmetry is resolved upon the OMSR program. This, in turn, implies that, if this equilibrium
prevails, institutions are unlikely to have an information advantage over retail investors in the equity
market after an OMSR program announcement, so that there will be no meaningful reward to
institutions engaging in costly information production.
2.3.2 Testable Hypotheses
In this section, we use the theoretical framework developed in Section 2.3.1 to develop testable
hypotheses to analyze the predictive power of institutional trading around open-market stock
repurchases for the announcement effect of stock repurchases; actual shares repurchased (as against
the authorized repurchase in the OMSR program announced); the long-run stock return performance
of the firm’s equity subsequent to the announcement of an open-market repurchase; and finally, the
abnormal profits realized by institutional investors (net of all transaction costs) by trading in the
equity of firms subsequent to their announcement of the OMSR program. We also develop testable
hypotheses for the relationship between institutional trading immediately after an OMSR program
announcement and the change in the information asymmetry faced by the firm from before the
announcement of the OMSR program to after.
We rely on equilibrium one discussed in Section 2.3.1 to develop our testable hypotheses. This
is because we view this equilibrium as the most plausible one in practice, since, as we discussed in
the previous section, the other two equilibria are inconsistent with the empirical evidence on the
announcement effect of OMSR programs. Since the real world is continuous in terms of intrinsic
firm values, we use a continuous analog of the three type model characterized in Section 3 to
develop testable hypotheses: in other words, we can think of type G, type M , and type B firms
that we discussed in Section 2.3.1 as intervals of continuous firm types behaving differently at
different points in time, as discussed in equilibrium one in Section 2.3.1. Finally, equilibrium one is
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even more likely to prevail in this continuous type version of our theoretical framework than in the
discrete type framework, since, even if the per share repurchase shortfall cost that we assume in
Section 2.3.1 is rather small in practice, there will always be a set of firm types that can be identified
as behaving similar to the type B firm in equilibrium one (partial pooling equilibrium) that we
discussed in section 2.3.1.19
Our first hypothesis deals with the relationship between institutional trading prior to an OMSR
program announcement and the announcement effect of such a program. Before the announcement
of an OMSR program, the equity of all firms will be priced at the pooling value across firm types
(as we discussed in Section 2.3.1). Consider now the scenario where institutional investors produce
information about intrinsic firm values and trade in the firm’s equity prior to the OMSR program
announcement. The stock price will reflect the additional information contained in trading by
institutions, with the price of the firm’s equity falling lower if the net buy by institutions (number of
shares bought minus number of shares sold) is negative, while it will rise higher if their net buy is
positive. In other words, effect of the information produced pre-OMSR program announcement
by institutions getting reflected in stock prices is to reduce the extent of pooling across firm types,
reducing the undervaluation of higher type firms while reducing the overvaluation of lower type
firms.20 At this point, if the firm announces an OMSR program, stock market investors will further
19It is also worth noting that the completion rate of actual OMSR programs announced in practice is broadly
consistent with firms facing a moderate per share cost of not actually repurchasing the number of shares announced
in the OMSR program (as in our equilibrium one). In particular, the evidence in our sample is that, on average, firms
actually repurchase 80.11 percent of the shares announced in the OMSR program in the one-year period after the
announcement (the evidence documented in various other papers in the existing literature is broadly similar). This is
inconsistent with firms behaving as if there is no repurchase shortfall cost (as in equilibrium two) or a very high shortfall
cost (as in equilibrium three). In the former scenario, we would expect the number of shares actually repurchased as a
fraction of shares announced in the OMSR program to be much smaller; in latter scenario, we would expect almost all
firms announcing OMSR programs to repurchase one hundred percent of the shares announced in the program. We do
not observe either of the above scenarios in practice.
20We do not incorporate information production and trading by institutions prior to the announcement of an OMSR
program in the theoretical framework developed in Section 2.3.1. However, it is easy to incorporate the effect of
this information production and trading into our theoretical framework by introducing an additional date prior to the
announcement of an OMSR program, namely, date -1, with pre-OMSR program institutional information production
and trading occurring between time -1 and time 0. As we discuss in the main text, the effect of pre-announcement
information production and trading by institutions is to reduce the extent of pooling across types that prevails at time 0,
so that the pooling across types prevailing at time 0 (the date of the OMSR program announcement) would be lower
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positively update the value of the firm’s equity, knowing that higher intrinsic value firms are more
likely to announce an OMSR program than lower intrinsic value firms, and that the decision to
repurchase (or not) is made by firm insiders who have private information about intrinsic firm value.
This means that the magnitude of the announcement effect, which will reflect the difference in
the firm’s stock price from immediately before the repurchase announcement to immediately after,
will be negatively related to net buying by institutional investors. The intuition here is that if the
institutional net buying prior to the OMSR program announcement is larger, the reduction in the
undervaluation of higher types that has already occurred prior to the OMSR program announcement
is more, so that the stock market reaction to the OMSR program announcement itself will be smaller.
This will be the first hypothesis that we test here (H1).
We now turn to trading by institutions subsequent to the announcement of an open-market
repurchase program. If the announcement of an OMSR program conveys firm insiders’ private
information to the equity market, the price of the firm’s stock immediately after the repurchase
announcement will reflect this information. However, as we discussed under equilibrium one in
Section 2.3.1, the OMSR program announcement may only be a noisy signal of firm insiders’ private
information. If this is indeed the case, there is room for further information production by institutions
about intrinsic firm value even after an OMSR program announcement, giving institutional investors
a residual information advantage over retail investors even after the announcement of an OMSR
program. In this case, trading by institutions after an OMSR announcement will have predictive
power for the firm’s future stock returns. This is the second hypothesis that we test here (H2).
If (as we postulated under H2) institutions indeed have an information advantage over retail
investors when they trade in a firm’s equity subsequent to its OMSR program announcement, we
would expect this information advantage to translate into abnormal profits realized by institutions.
This is therefore the next hypothesis that we test here (H3). The residual information advantage
than it would otherwise be in the absence of such information production and trading by institutions. In other words,
while at time 0 three types: type G, M , and B pool in our theoretical framework (discussed in Section 2.3.1), at time
-1 even lower intrinsic value firm types than the type B may be pooling with higher type firms, so that the extent of
undervaluation of higher type firms may be even more severe at time -1 than at time 0.
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of institutional investors over retail investors will be greater as the information conveyed by the
repurchase announcement itself is weaker or more noisy: i.e., if the repurchase program announced
is smaller (as a fraction of total shares outstanding) or if the number of shares actually repurchased
is smaller.21 This, in turn, implies that the abnormal profits made by institutions from trading in the
firms’ equity after an OMSR program announcement will also be greater for smaller repurchase
programs. This is the next hypothesis that we test here (H4).
We now turn to developing a testable hypothesis regarding the relation between institutional
trading after an OMSR program announcement and the number of shares actually repurchased by
the firm. To develop this hypothesis, recall first from our discussion of equilibrium one in Section
2.3.1 that higher intrinsic value firms will actually repurchase a larger number of shares (out of
the total number announced in the OMSR program). If, in the above setting, institutions are able
to produce information about the extent of undervaluation of firms’ equity (i.e., about intrinsic
firm value), and buy more of the equity in firms where the extent of the undervaluation is greater
(i.e., in higher type firms), then the extent of institutional net buying immediately after an OMSR
announcement will be positively related to the amount of shares actually repurchased by the firm.
Thus, a greater net buy of the firms’ equity by institutions after an OMSR program announcement
will be positively related to the actual repurchases made by the firm in the subsequent period (H5).
Finally, we examine how institutional trading after an OMSR program announcement affects the
information asymmetry faced by a firm. Clearly, if OMSR program announcements serve as noisy
signals of firm insiders’ private information to outsiders in the equity market, then the information
asymmetry faced by the firm will be reduced: i.e, the extent of information asymmetry faced by the
firm in the equity market subsequent to an OMSR announcement will be lower than that before the
repurchase announcement. The question we examine here, however, is the effect of the interaction
between the signal conveyed by the OMSR program announcement and the information conveyed by
institutional trading immediately after the announcement of the repurchase program on the change
21 Comment and Jarrell (1991) point out that larger OMSR program announcements act as stronger signals, based
on their announcement effects.
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in information asymmetry facing the firm. In particular, the reduction in the information asymmetry
facing the firm will be greater when the noisy signal conveyed by the repurchase announcement and
the information conveyed to the equity market by institutional trading reinforce each other (which
will be the case when the institutional net buy immediately after the repurchase announcement is
positive). On the other hand, the reduction in information asymmetry facing the firm will be smaller
when the noisy signal conveyed by the repurchase announcement and the information conveyed
to the equity market by institutional trading oppose each other (which will be the case when the
institutional net buy immediately after the repurchase announcement is negative). In summary,
the reduction in information asymmetry facing the firm following the announcement of an OMSR
program will be positively related to the institutional net buy immediately after the repurchase
program announcement (H6).
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 OMSR Program Data
The data on OMSR programs in this study comes from several sources. Our initial sample
of OMSR program announcements from January 2004 to December 2010 comes from the SDC
Platinum Database of Mergers and Acquisitions. We then exclude announcements such that the
repurchase may be executed through tender offer, private negotiation, or Dutch auction.22 If a
firm makes multiple OMSR program announcements in the same calendar year, we only keep the
first announcement. We also require that accounting information from Compustat and stock return
information from CRSP are available for the firms in our OMSR data.
Our data on U.S. firms’ actual share repurchases comes from Quarterly Compustat, which is
made available by the regulatory changes to Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
22The purpose is to eliminate repurchase programs that may be executed through a combination of methods (e.g.,
open-market and private negotiation).
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2003.23 Beginning from 2004, U.S. firms are required to make quarterly disclosures of actual share
repurchases and average prices paid. We then match this actual repurchase data from Quarterly
Compustat with the data on OMSR announcements we obtained from SDC.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of our OMSR data. We have about 3,000 open-market
repurchase programs announced from January 2004 to December 2010. The average OMSR
program size, defined as the dollar amount value of the OMSR program normalized by the market
capitalization of the firm, is 7.94%, consistent with prior studies in the literature (e.g., Peyer and
Vermaelen (2009)). We find a significant 1.74% average abnormal return in the 3-day window
around an OMSR announcement, which is also consistent with the empirical findings in the literature
(e.g., Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012)). Over one-year period following an OMSR
announcement, our sample firms’ actual repurchases on average account for about 80.11% of the
OMSR program size announced. This is largely consistent with prior findings that firms complete a
significant portion of the repurchase programs within the one-year period after the announcement
(e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998)).
2.4.2 Institutional Trading Data
We obtain transaction-level institutional trading data from Abel Noser Solutions, a leading
execution quality measurement service provider for institutional investors. The data are similar to
those used by several microstructure studies on institutional trading costs, for example, Keim and
Madhavan (1995), Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001), and Jones and Lipson (2001). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper to use institutional trading data to study institutional investors’
trading behavior around OMSR programs.
The data cover equity trading transactions by a large sample of institutions from January 2003 to
23Earlier studies (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Fama and French (2001), and Grullon and Michaely (2002))
have used a variety of other CRSP- and Compustat-based measures to estimate actual share repurchases by U.S. firms.
These estimations invariably suffer from different measurement biases. For a detailed discussion of these measures, see
Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008).
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September 2011. For each transaction, the data include the date of the transaction, the stock traded,
the number of shares traded, the dollar principal traded, commissions paid by the institution, and
whether it is a buy or sell by the institution. The data are provided to us under the condition that
the names of all institutions are removed from the data. However, identification codes are provided
enabling us to separately identify all institutions. Sample institutions are either investment managers
or plan sponsors. Within investment managers, hedge funds are identified by merging management
companies in Abel Noser with a list of hedge funds provided by Thomson Reuters. Please see the
Appendix for details of this matching algorithm.
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics of our institutional trading data. We have 868 institutions
in our sample, with 372 of them being investment managers and 496 of them being plan sponsors.
Within the group of investment managers, 162 of them are identified as hedge fund companies
(including institutions that have both hedge funds and non-hedge fund businesses). In aggregate,
these institutions have an annualized trading volume of around 304 billion shares and an annualized
trading principal of around $9 trillion. In association with these trading activities, our sample
institutions in aggregate incur an annualized commission expense of about $7.5 billion. If we
consider a two-year trading horizon surrounding the OMSR announcement dates in our OMSR
data, on average (for each OMSR event), our sample institutions in aggregate execute about 24,510
transactions, with a trading principal of about $3.5 billion, and account for about 12% of the trading
volume reported by CRSP.
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2.5 Empirical Tests and Results
2.5.1 The Relation between Pre-Announcement Institutional Trading and
OMSR Program Announcement Effects
Hypothesis H1 predicts that net buying from institutions prior to OMSR program announcements
will be negatively related to OMSR program announcement effects. In this subsection, we make
use of institutional trading data and examine the relationship between institutional trading before
OMSR program announcements and the announcement effects of OMSR programs.
Table 2.3 presents the results of our OLS analysis. The dependent variable is the cumulative
abnormal return over a 3-day period around OMSR announcements (i.e., the announcement return
described in Table 2.1). Following the literature on open-market share repurchases, we calculate
the announcement effects based on a market model, where the market beta is estimated with daily
returns over the 6-month period ending one trading day before OMSR program announcements.
The variable of interest is Net Buy from institutions. For ease of interpretation, from this subsection
onwards, Net Buy is expressed in percentage rather than in basis points. In Panel A, Net Buy is
aggregated over all sample institutions over the 12-month period before OMSR program announce-
ments, whereas in Panel B, Net Buy is aggregated over all hedge funds over the 12-month period
before OMSR program announcements.
From Model (1) of Panel A, we can see that the coefficient on Net Buy is negative and statistically
significant. This is consistent with H1, suggesting that institutional trading prior to announcements
of OMSR programs leads to the information produced by institutions about the intrinsic values of
firms getting reflected in the announcing firms’ stock prices before the announcement itself, so that
the actual announcement effect of the OMSR program is smaller. We control for the variables that
have been found in the literature to be able to explain OMSR program announcement effects, such
as the size of the OMSR programs and the past stock return of the firm. In a recent paper, Babenko,
Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012) find that insider trading and insider holdings provide additional
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explanatory power regarding OMSR program announcement returns. In Models (2) and (3) of Panel
A, we incrementally control for these variables and the coefficients on Net Buy remain negative and
statistically significant.
In Panel B, we aggregate net buying by hedge funds, a subsample of all institutions, over the
12-month period before OMSR program announcements and perform a similar multivariate analysis
as in Panel A. The coefficients on Net Buy remain negative and statistically significant, and the
economic magnitude here is larger than that in Panel A, where Net Buy is calculated using trading
by all sample institutions.
To summarize, we find evidence in this subsection that is consistent with hypothesis H1. Institu-
tional trading before OMSR program announcements has predictive power for the announcement
effect of such programs, in the sense that an algebraically lower institutional net buying before
an OMSR program announcement is associated with a larger announcement effect. This result
holds even after we control for variables capturing publicly available information such as the size
of the OMSR program, prior firm performance, and insider trading. This evidence suggests that
institutional trading prior to an OMSR program announcement indeed reflects the information
produced by institutional investors about the intrinsic value of the firm. Additionally, we find evi-
dence suggesting that hedge funds, as a subgroup of institutional investors, possess somewhat more
accurate information regarding the intrinsic values of firms compared to the average for institutional
investors in our overall sample. Overall, our empirical results in this section suggest that institutions
are able to produce valuable information about the intrinsic values of firms announcing OMSR
programs, consistent with a crucial assumption of the model of Brennan and Thakor (1990).
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2.5.2 The Relation between Institutional Trading after OMSR Program
Announcements and Subsequent Stock Returns
In the previous subsection, we examined the relationship between institutional trading before
OMSR program announcements and the announcement effect of such programs. From this subsec-
tion onwards, we focus on institutional trading immediately after OMSR program announcements
and examine the informativeness of such trading. We first investigate whether institutional trading
immediately after OMSR program announcements predicts the subsequent stock return performance
of firms (H2).
Table 2.4 reports the results of our multivariate analysis. The variable of interest is institutional
trading, measured by Net Buy, after OMSR program announcements. We focus on institutional
trading over the one month period after an OMSR program announcement. The dependent variable
is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 12-month period in percentage points subsequent to
the measurement period of Net Buy. Buy-and-hold abnormal return is the buy-and-hold raw return
minus the buy-and-hold return of the Fama-French 25 portfolio matched on size and book-to-market.
In Panel A, Net Buy is aggregated over all sample institutions over the one month period after
OMSR program announcements, whereas in Panel B, Net Buy is aggregated over all hedge funds
over the one month period after such announcements.24
In Model (1) of Panel A and Panel B in Table 2.4, we control for the size of the OMSR program,
the amount of shares actually repurchased by the firm during the two fiscal quarters after the
announcement, and various variables capturing different aspects of the firm’s characteristics. The
coefficient on Net Buy in Model (1) of Panel A is not statistically significant, suggesting that we do
not find evidence that trading by institutions in our overall sample has predictive power about the
future stock returns of repurchasing firms. Meanwhile, the coefficient on Net Buy in Model (1) of
24We focus only on hedge funds that participate in trading on the stocks of OMSR announcing firms on the
announcement day. This group of hedge funds, that timely respond to OMSR announcement news, are presumably
more informed about the announcing firm than other hedge funds that do not trade on the announcement day.
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Panel B is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that trading by hedge funds as a group
has strong predictive power for future stock returns of the repurchasing firms. In Models (2) - (4)
of both Panel A and Panel B, we separately control for contemporaneous insider trading, industry
fixed effects, and year fixed effects, and in Model (5) of both Panel A and Panel B, we control for
these variables together. We thus find that hedge funds, as a subgroup of institutional investors,
have a unique information advantage in their post-OMSR program announcement trading in terms
of predicting the long-run stock returns of repurchasing firms.
In summary, we find evidence that trading by a subgroup of institutional investors, namely,
hedge funds, after OMSR program announcements has predictive power for the subsequent stock
return performance of OMSR program announcing firms. This is consistent with hypothesis H2,
suggesting that some institutions, notably hedge funds, possess a residual information advantage
over retail investors about the firm’s intrinsic value, even after the announcement of an OMSR
program.25 Overall, this evidence suggests that the equilibrium in the equity market after an OMSR
program announcement is such that there is room for the production of valuable information about
the intrinsic value of firms by at least one subgroup of institutions, namely, hedge funds.
2.5.3 Profitability of Institutional Trading after OMSR Program
Announcements
In the previous subsection, we presented evidence that institutional (hedge fund) trading after
OMSR program announcements has predictive power for the subsequent long-run stock return
performance of firms. This result suggests that institutions are able to produce private information
about the intrinsic values of firms announcing OMSR programs, even after the announcement
of such programs which may partially convey firm insiders’ private information as well. In this
subsection, we investigate hypotheses H3 and H4 by analyzing whether institutions are able to
25The result that aggregate institutional trading does not have predictive power for future stock returns may be
partially explained by the fact that some institutions may also sell shares passively to provide liquidity for firms buying
back shares in the open market: see, e.g., Huang and Zhang (2013).
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use the information they have produced to realize abnormal trading profits after OMSR program
announcements. Further, we analyze whether institutional investors make larger abnormal profits
when the information conveyed by an OMSR program is more noisy (i.e., when the size of the
OMSR program is smaller or when the firm repurchases a smaller number of shares).
We make use of our transaction-level institutional trading data to calculate trading profits,
capital committed, and investment returns earned by sample institutions. Following Chemmanur,
He, and Hu (2009), we consider a “raw" measure as well as a risk-adjusted measure, where we
use the cumulative returns from the corresponding Fama-French 25 portfolio matched on size
and book-to-market to discount profits and capital committed back to the first day of the trading
horizon. We focus on institutional trading over the four quarters immediately after OMSR program
announcements.
Table 2.5 presents the results of our analysis. In Panel A, we include trading for all institutions,
and in Panel B, we include trading only for our identified hedge fund subsample. Further, we split
our data by the noisiness of the signal conveyed by the OMSR program announcement: i.e., smaller
versus larger OMSR programs; and by the subsequent actual share repurchase: i.e., smaller versus
larger number of shares actually repurchased. In Panel A1 and B1, we split by the OMSR program
size. We expect that a larger OMSR program size sends a stronger signal to the market, which leaves
less room for information production by market participants (both institutional and retail investors)
after such an OMSR program announcement. Therefore, we expect that institutional investors have
less informational advantage compared to retail investors (and hence make smaller abnormal trading
profits) when the OMSR program size is larger. In Panel A2 and B2, we split by the cumulative
actual share repurchases made by the firm during the first two fiscal quarters after the OMSR
program announcement. If a firm actually repurchases more, we expect that more information about
firm value is already impounded into stock prices. Therefore, we expect institutional investors
to have less of an informational advantage compared to retail investors (and hence make smaller
abnormal trading profits) when the firm actually repurchases more shares.
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We examine the realized investment return by institutions after OMSR program announcements
in Table 2.5. We calculate two return measures, i.e., return on buy principal and return on maximum
investment. For each return measure, we calculate a raw return measure without risk adjustment
and a risk-adjusted return measure by discounting using benchmark returns of the corresponding
Fama-French 25 portfolio matched on size and book-to-market. For example, raw return on buy
principal is defined as raw profit divided by buy principal and risk-adjusted return on maximum
investment is defined as risk-adjusted profit divided by risk-adjusted maximum investment. As
we can see in Table 2.5 Panel A1, when the OMSR program size is smaller, institutions earn
positive and statistically significant investment returns. Specifically, institutions on average realize
a risk-adjusted return on maximum investment of 0.77% when the OMSR program size is below
the sample median. On the other hand, when the OMSR program size is larger (above the sample
median), institutions make zero and sometimes negative investment returns. The difference in
investment returns realized by institutions between small and large OMSR programs is statistically
significant. In Panel A2, we split our sample by the actual shares repurchased by the firm during the
first two fiscal quarters after the OMSR program announcement, and show that, when firms actually
repurchase less (below the median), institutions earn positive and statistically significant investment
returns. Specifically, institutions on average realize a risk-adjusted return on maximum investment
of 1.03% when the actual repurchase is below the sample median. On the other hand, when firms
actually repurchase more (above the sample median), institutions make zero and sometimes negative
investment returns. The difference in investment returns realized by institutions between small and
large actual share repurchases is also statistically significant.
We also examine the realized investment returns by hedge funds after OMSR program an-
nouncements using similar return measures, and the results are presented in Panel B of Table 2.5.
Consistent with our findings for all institutions, we find that hedge funds earn positive and statisti-
cally significant investment returns when the OMSR program size is smaller (Panel B1), or when
the firm’s actual repurchase is smaller (Panel B2). In comparison to the results reported in Panel A,
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hedges funds realize even higher investment returns than that realized by the average institution in
our overall sample. When the OMSR program size is below the sample median, we find hedged
funds on average realize 1.17% risk-adjusted return on maximum investment (versus 0.77% realized
by average institutions); when the firm’s actual share repurchase is below the sample median, we
find that hedge funds on average realize 2.11% risk-adjusted return on maximum investment (versus
1.03% realized by the average institution in our overall sample).
In summary, we find that institutional investors realize abnormal investment returns in trading the
stock of OMSR program announcing firms when the size of the OMSR program is smaller and when
the firm makes smaller actual share repurchases subsequent to the OMSR program announcement
(H3 and H4). This suggests that institutional investors are able to produce valuable information
about the intrinsic values of firms announcing OMSR programs, and are able to translate this
information advantage into realized trading profits, when the information conveyed by an OMSR
program announcement itself is more noisy, or when the number of shares actually repurchased
after the OMSR program announcement is smaller. We also find that hedge funds, who are more
specialized information producers compared to institutions as a whole, hold even more of an
information advantage and realize greater investment profits. Overall, our empirical results in this
subsection, together with our results presented in Section 2.5.2, suggest that the equilibrium in the
equity market after an OMSR program announcement is a partial pooling equilibrium, which leaves
room for the production of valuable information by institutions. Further, our results suggest that
the precision of the information produced by institutions depends upon the noisiness of the signal
conveyed by the OMSR program announcement and the information conveyed by the number of
shares actually repurchased. Thus, our results presented in the subsection provide considerable
support for the noisy signaling hypothesis of OMSR programs.
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2.5.4 Institutional Trading after OMSR Program Announcements and
Actual Share Repurchases
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between institutional trading after OMSR
program announcements and the firm’s actual share repurchase activities. Specifically, we test hy-
pothesis H5 by examining whether institutional net buying after OMSR program announcements is
positively related to the actual share repurchases made by firms subsequent to these announcements.
Table 2.6 presents the results of our multivariate analysis. In Panel A, we aggregate institutional
trading (Net Buy) over the first month and the first quarter after an OMSR program announcement.
The dependent variable is the firm’s actual share repurchases during the two fiscal quarters after the
measurement period of institutional net buying, and is defined as the number of shares repurchased
by the firm normalized by the number of shares outstanding. In Panel A, the coefficient on Net Buy
is positive and statistically significant for the one quarter horizon (it is positive but insignificant for
the one month horizon). This suggests that aggregate trading by all institutions during the quarter
after OMSR program announcements is positively related to the future actual share repurchases by
firms.
We control for variables capturing different firm characteristics. In particular, we control for
several variables that affect the firm’s financial ability to repurchase. Specifically, we control for
the firms’ cash holdings, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, and whether these firms are paying
dividends. All of the coefficients on these variables have the expected signs and are statistically
significant in most cases. In Models (2)-(5) and (7)-(10), we additionally control for different
combinations of insider trading, insider holdings, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
The coefficients on Net Buy remain positive and statistically significant. In fact, the magnitude
and statistical significance of the coefficients on Net Buy remain similar across all the models we
consider here, suggesting that institutional trading possesses additional predictive power that is not
captured by these control variables regarding the firm’s subsequent actual share repurchases.
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We also examine the relationship between net buying by hedge funds after OMSR program
announcements and firms’ subsequent actual shares repurchases: the results are presented in Panel
B of Table 2.6. We find that the coefficient on Net Buy (aggregated trading by hedge funds) is
positive and statistically significant for the one month horizon (it is positive but insignificant for the
one quarter horizon). This suggests that aggregate trading by all hedge funds during the first month
after OMSR announcements is positively related to the future actual share repurchases by firms.
In summary, in this subsection we present evidence that institutional trading after an OMSR
program announcement has predictive power for the subsequent actual share repurchases made by
the firm, in the sense that greater net buying by institutional investors after an OMSR announcement
is associated with greater actual share repurchases by the firm in the subsequent period. This is
consistent with hypothesis H5, suggesting that the information produced by institutional investors
after an OMSR program announcement is correlated with the residual undervaluation of firms
announcing such programs. Since firms that are more undervalued after an OMSR program
announcement are likely to undertake larger actual share repurchases according to the noisy signaling
hypothesis, this induces a positive relationship between institutional net buying after OMSR program
announcements and actual share repurchases. Overall, our results presented in this subsection
provide further support for the noisy signaling hypothesis.
2.5.5 Institutional Trading and the Change in Equity Market Information
Asymmetry around OMSR Program Announcements
In this subsection, we empirically examine the relationship between institutional trading after
OMSR program announcements and the change in the information asymmetry facing firms from
before an OMSR program announcement to after. Specifically, we test hypothesis H6 by examining
whether institutional net buying after an OMSR program announcement is associated with a larger
decrease in the extent of information asymmetry facing firms in the equity market.
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Table 2.7 presents the results of our multivariate analysis. Our main variable of interest is
Net Buy, measured as the aggregate institutional net buying during the first two quarters after an
OMSR program announcement. The dependent variable is the difference in the measures of firms’
information asymmetry from before OMSR program announcements to after. In Panel A, B, and
C, we use three different measures of information asymmetry based on I/B/E/S analyst earnings
forecasts; in Panel D, we use a fourth measure of information asymmetry, namely, the bid-ask
spread. For each firm announcing an OMSR program, we retrieve analyst earnings forecasts for
the fiscal year end before the OMSR program announcement date (at least one year before the
announcement date), and after the OMSR program announcement date (at least one year after the
announcement date). In Panel A, the information asymmetry measure is the mean-squared error
of analysts’ forecasts (MSE). We measure forecast error as the absolute difference between the
average forecasted earnings and the actual earnings per share divided by the price per share at the
time of the forecast. In Panel B, the information asymmetry measure is the standard deviation of
analyst forecasts (Dispersion). In Panel C, the information asymmetry measure is the coefficient of
variation of analyst forecasts (COV), which is defined as the ratio of standard deviation in analyst
forecasts to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. In Panel D, we use the bid-ask
spread (BidAskSpread) as a measure of information asymmetry. We first calculate the daily bid-ask
spread as the average of all quoted spreads (the difference between the log ask price and log bid
price) during normal trading hours on the day based on NYSE TAQ data, and average the daily
bid-ask spread over the one-year horizon before the OMSR program announcement, as well as the
one-year horizon following the second quarter after the OMSR program announcement.
As we can see from model (1) from Table 2.7 Panel A, the coefficient on Net Buy is negative
and statistically significant, suggesting that a larger Net Buy is associated with a decrease in
analyst forecast error from before the OMSR program announcement to after. This result is robust
to controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio, and past stock return. In model (2), we add
industry and year fixed effects; in model (3) and (4), we additionally control for Actual Repurchase
109
(actual shares repurchased by the firm during the first two fiscal quarters after the OMSR program
announcement), Insider Net Buy (aggregate net purchase by top level insiders of the firm during the
two fiscal quarters after the OMSR program announcement), as well as Insider Holding (aggregate
stock holding of top level insiders of the firm at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the
OMSR program announcement). The coefficients on Net Buy remain positive and statistically
significant. Similarly, in Panel B, where we use standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts as the
measure of information asymmetry, we find that a larger Net Buy is associated with a decrease in
Dispersion from before the OMSR program announcement to after; and in Panel C, we find that a
larger Net Buy is associated with a decrease in COV (coefficient of variation of analysts’ forecasts)
from before the OMSR program announcement to after. Finally, in Panel D, we find that a larger
Net Buy is associated with a decrease in the bid-ask spread of the firm’s equity from before the
OMSR program announcement to after.
In summary, in this subsection we present evidence that is consistent with hypothesis H6. This
evidence provides direct support for the role of information production and trading by institutions in
reducing the residual information asymmetry facing firms after an OMSR program announcement.
In particular, we show that the reduction in information asymmetry facing firms in the equity market
from before an OMSR program announcement to after such an announcement is greater when net
buying by institutions in the firm’s equity immediately after the announcement is greater.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have accomplished three objectives.
First, we have proposed a noisy signaling hypothesis of OMSR programs. Thus, in contrast to
the existing literature which has theoretically demonstrated a separating equilibrium after share
repurchase programs in general, we argued that the equilibrium in the equity market after an OMSR
program announcement is likely to be a partial pooling equilibrium, where (in a setting with a
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continuum of types or a discrete type setting with three or more types) the highest firm types pool
by announcing an OMSR program while the lowest types do not announce such a program. In
this context, we argued that there is room for some information transmission from firm insiders
to equity market investors through an OMSR program announcement, even in the absence of a
commitment by the firm to buy back the entire amount of shares announced, as long as the firm
or its insiders suffer a moderate shortfall cost per share: i.e., they suffer such a cost if the actual
number of shares repurchased falls short of the target number of shares announced. Finally, we
conjectured that, in such a partial pooling equilibrium, there are two mechanisms that play a role
complementary to OMSR program announcements in further reducing the information asymmetry
faced by the firm even after such announcements. The first such mechanism is actual share
repurchases made by firms after OMSR program announcements: we argued that more undervalued
firms repurchase a larger number of shares after OMSR program announcements, thereby conveying
further information about intrinsic firm value to the equity market. The second such mechanism is
information production by institutions and trading by them making use of this information after
OMSR program announcements. We argued that, based on their information production, institutions
buy more equity in more undervalued firms, and their information getting reflected in stock prices
as a result of their trading further reduces the residual information asymmetry facing firms after
OMSR program announcements.
Second, we tested the implications of the above noisy signaling hypothesis of OMSR program
announcements for information production and trading by institutions. The results of our empirical
analysis provide considerable support for the noisy signaling hypothesis. First, the fact that
institutions are able to produce valuable information subsequent to OMSR program announcements
(as evidenced by the predictive power of institutional trading and the realized profitability of such
trading) provides support for the notion that the equilibrium prevailing in the equity market is a
partial pooling rather than a fully separating equilibrium: there would be no room for information
production in a separating equilibrium, since, in such an equilibrium, all information asymmetry is
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resolved upon the announcement of the OMSR program itself. Second, the positive relationship that
we documented between institutional net buying and actual share repurchases by firms provides
further support for the noisy signaling hypothesis. This positive relationship is likely to be induced
by the fact that firms that are more undervalued after OMSR program announcements repurchase
more of their own shares, while institutions net buy a larger number of shares after OMSR program
announcements in firms that they believe to be more undervalued. Third, we provided direct
evidence supporting the complementary role of information production and trading by institutions in
reducing the residual information asymmetry facing firms after OMSR program announcements, by
showing that the reduction in information asymmetry facing firms from before an OMSR program
announcement to after such an announcement is greater when net buying by institutions in the firm’s
equity immediately after the announcement is greater.
Finally, our paper documented the predictive power of institutional trading prior to an OMSR
program announcement for the announcement effect of such a program. This, along with the other
empirical results discussed earlier, allows us to empirically confirm a crucial assumption made by
the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model by showing that institutional investors are indeed able to
produce valuable information about the intrinsic values of firms around OMSR programs.
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Appendix: Identifying hedge funds within the Abel Noser
sample
We identify hedge funds in the Abel Noser sample by merging management companies in Abel
Noser with a list of hedge funds provided by Thomson Reuters. The client manager code along
with the institutional manager code allows for the identification of a particular institutional investor.
The second dataset we use is the list of hedge funds provided by Thomson Reuters. This list is
comprehensive as it classifies all 13F filers. We verify the quality of Thomson Reuters hedge fund
classification by checking Form ADV filed by institutions. In particular, following Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009), we classify an institution as a hedge fund if more than
half of its investors are categorized as high net worth individuals or pooled investment vehicles in
item 5.D. In addition, we require that the manager charge a performance-based fee (item 5.E).
To merge management companies in the Abel Noser sample with hedge funds in Thomson
Reuters, we compute each institution’s quarterly change in stock ownership (in number of shares)
for each stock, denoted by ∆IO. For each pair of a Thomson Reuters hedge fund and an Abel
Noser management company, we calculate the difference of ∆IO by two institutions and map
the Thomson Reuters hedge fund to the Abel Noser management company with the closest ∆IO.
Finally, we manually verify the matches identified above, using fund names from the Thomson
Reuters and a manager name list disclosed by Abel Noser in 2011.
Our classification identifies 162 hedge funds in the whole sample. Since our identification is
based on management companies, it is likely that our hedge fund sample includes some institutions
that have both hedge funds and non-hedge funds business. Therefore, it is more appropriate to
refer to hedge funds in our sample as hedge fund management companies: however, for brevity of
presentation, we call them hedge funds in our analyses. b
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Open-Market Share Repurchases.
This table presents summary statistics of the open-market share repurchase programs
(OMSRs) data from January 2004 to December 2010. OMSR Program Size is the value of
the OMR program (in dollar amount), normalized by the market capitalization of the firm
as of the most recent month-end before the announcement date. Announcement Effect
is measured as the three-day ([0,2]) abnormal return, where date 0 is the announcement
date. Abnormal returns are calculated based on a market model, where the market
beta is estimated using returns over 126 trading days ending one trading day before the
announcement (that is, [-126, -1]). Actual Completion is the actual repurchase by the firm
during one-year period after the OMSR program announcement date as a percentage of
OMSR Program Size. Log Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets at the most
recent fiscal year end before the announcement; similarly, Log B/M is the natural logarithm
of Book-to-Market ratio; Cash Holdings is the firm’s cash holdings normalized by total
assets; R&D Expenses is the firm’s R&D expenses normalized by total assets; Dividend
Paying Dummy is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm pays out dividends and
zero otherwise. Prior Quarter Market-adj Return is the market adjusted stock return
during the one-quarter period before the announcement. Prior Year Market-adj Return is
the market adjusted stock return during the one-year period before the announcement.
Variable N Mean Median Std. Err.
OMSR Program Size 2988 7.94% 6.19% 0.12%
Announcement Effect [0, 2] 2988 1.74% 1.39% 0.18%
Actual Completion 2988 80.11% 67.71% 67.25%
Log Total Assets 2988 7.15 7.05 0.04
Log B/M 2988 -0.87 -0.81 0.01
Cash Holdings 2988 0.18 0.10 0.00
R&D Expenses 2988 0.03 0.00 0.00
Dividend Paying Dummy 2988 0.52 1.00 0.01
Prior Quarter Market-adj. Return 2988 -6.18% -5.49% 0.31%
Prior Year Market-adj. Return 2988 -2.58% -7.58% 0.73%
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Institutional and Hedge Fund Trading Data around OMSR Programs.
This table presents summary statistics of the institutional trading sample from January 2003 to September 2011. Annualized number of
transactions, annualized trading volume, annualized principal traded, and annualized commission expense are computed based on all
U.S. domestic equity traded by sample institutions from January 2003 to September 2011. Sample mean, median, and total are presented.
Trading around OMSRs is the aggregated trading by sample institutions during the two-year period surrounding OMSR announcement
dates in our OMSR data. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All Institutions Investment Managers Plan Sponsors Hedge Funds
Number of Institutions 868 372 496 162
Annualized Number of Transactions (thousands)
Mean 75.42 134.64 31.01 26.87
Median 7.59 26.73 4.77 1.10
Total 65,464.75 50,085.37 15,379.38 4,353.14
Annualized Trading Volume (millions)
Mean 350.69 600.57 163.29 170.18
Median 37.75 133.74 12.96 10.80
Total 304,402.64 223,412.34 80,990.29 27,569.45
Annualized Principal Traded ($ millions)
Mean 10,318.32 17,910.06 4,624.51 5,085.31
Median 1,060.36 3,614.01 374.07 272.43
Total 8,956,297.68 6,662,542.45 2,293,755.23 823,819.42
Annualized Commission Expense ($ millions)
Mean 8.65 15.55 3.47 4.86
Median 0.87 3.67 0.40 0.24
Total 7,506.46 5,786.06 1,720.40 788.02
Trading around OMRs ([-4Q, 4Q])
Number of Institutions trading around OMRs 849 360 489 157
Number of Transactions per OMR (thousands) 24.51 21.49 3.02 4.95
Trading Volume per OMR (millions) 100.02 86.01 14.61 25.06
Principal Traded per OMR ($ millions) 3,501.76 3,000.47 522.43 909.38
Commission Expense per OMR ($ millions) 2.58 2.26 0.33 0.72
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Table 2.3: The Predictive Power of Pre-Announcement Institutional Trading for OMSR Pro-
gram Announcement Returns.
This table presents OLS regression analysis of the predictive power of trading by all institutions
(and a subsample of hedge funds) for the OMSR program announcement returns between 2004
and 2010. Panel A (B) presents the results using trading by all institutions (hedge funds). The
dependent variable is OMSR program announcement returns, measured as the three-day ([0,2])
abnormal return, where date 0 is the announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated based
on a market model, where the market beta is estimated using daily returns over 6-month period
ending one trading day before the announcement. In Panel A, Net Buy is the aggregate net buying,
scaled by number of shares outstanding of the firm, by our institutions sample during the one-year
periods before the OMSR program announcement; in Panel B, Net Buy is the aggregate net buying,
scaled by number of shares outstanding of the firm, by our hedge funds sample during the one-year
periods before the OMSR program announcement. OMSR Program Size is the value of the OMR
program (in dollar amount), normalized by the market capitalization of the firm as of the most recent
month-end before the announcement date; Log Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets of
firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Log B/M is the natural logarithm of
Book-to-Market ratio of firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Industry
Adj. ROA is firm’s EBIT/Total Asset minus two-digit SIC industry’s median EBIT/Total Asset, at
the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Cash Holdings is firm’s cash holdings
normalized by total assets, at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Past Stock
Return is the market adjusted stock return during the one-year period before the announcement;
Leverage is firm’s total liabilities normalized by total assets, at the most recent fiscal year end before
the announcement; Dividend Paying Dummy is a dummy variable which equals one if firm pays out
dividends during the most recent fiscal year before the announcement, and equals zero otherwise;
Insider Net Buy is the aggregate net buy from top level insiders of firm during the one-year period
before the announcement; Insider Holding is the aggregate stock holding of top level insiders of
firm at the beginning of the one-year period before the announcement. Industry (two-digit SIC
code) and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Panel A: Trading by all institutional investors
Dep. Var.: OMSR Announcement Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Net Buy -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005**
(-2.06) (-2.03) (-2.03)
OMSR Program Size 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(3.41) (3.42) (3.42)
Log Total Asset -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0020***
(-3.68) (-3.70) (-3.53)
Log B/M 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024
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(1.33) (1.29) (1.28)
Industry Adj. ROA -0.0114 -0.0106 -0.0107
(-0.87) (-0.81) (-0.81)
Cash 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Past Stock Return 0.0068** 0.0068** 0.0068**
(2.05) (2.04) (2.04)
Leverage 0.0069 0.0068 0.0068
(1.07) (1.05) (1.05)
Dividend Dummy 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(0.17) (0.13) (0.11)
Insider Net Buy 0.0006 0.0006
(0.74) (0.74)
Insider Holding 0.0000
(0.17)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,853 2,853 2,853
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Panel B: Trading by hedge funds
Dep. Var.: OMSR Announcement Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Net Buy -0.0013** -0.0013** -0.0013**
(-2.53) (-2.51) (-2.51)
OMSR Program Size 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(3.44) (3.45) (3.46)
Log Total Asset -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0020***
(-3.65) (-3.67) (-3.50)
Log B/M 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024
(1.33) (1.29) (1.28)
Industry Adj. ROA -0.0119 -0.0112 -0.0112
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(-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.85)
Cash 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Past Stock Return 0.0070** 0.0070** 0.0070**
(2.10) (2.09) (2.09)
Leverage 0.0068 0.0067 0.0066
(1.05) (1.03) (1.02)
Dividend Dummy 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
(0.25) (0.21) (0.19)
Insider Net Buy 0.0006 0.0006
(0.76) (0.77)
Insider Holding 0.0000
(0.19)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,853 2,853 2,853
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
118
Table 2.4: The Predictive Power of Institutional Trading after OMSR Program Announcements for
Subsequent Long-run Stock Returns.
This table presents OLS regression analysis of the predictive power of institutional trading after an OMSR
program announcement for the subsequent one-year stock return performance of a firm. Net Buy is the
aggregate net buying from all institutions (hedge funds) during the first month after the OMSR program
announcement in panel A (B). The dependent variable is cumulative stock return measured in percentage
points over the one-year period subsequent to the measurement period of Net Buy, adjusted by the return of
matched Fama-French 5× 5 size and book-to-market portfolio return. OMSR Program Size is the value of
the OMSR program (in dollar amount), normalized by the market capitalization of the firm as of the most
recent month-end before the announcement date; Past Stock Return is the market adjusted stock return during
the one-year period before the announcement; Log Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets of
firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Industry Adj. ROA is firm’s EBIT/Total
Asset minus 2-digit SIC industry’s median EBIT/Total Asset, at the most recent fiscal year end before the
announcement; Cash is firm’s cash holdings normalized by total assets, at the most recent fiscal year end
before the announcement; Cash Flow is firm’s cash flow normalized by total assets; S&P 500 Dummy is
an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the S&P 500 Index and zero otherwise; Log B/M is the
natural logarithm of Book-to-Market ratio of firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement;
Insider Net Buy is the aggregate net buy from top level insiders of firm during the one-year period before the
announcement; Insider Holding is the aggregate stock holding of top level insiders of firm at the beginning
of the one-year period before the announcement. Industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects are
included. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels.
Panel A: Trading by all institutional investors
Dependent Variable: Size and book-to-Market adjusted buy-and-Hold return
over 12 months after the measurement period of Net Buy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Buy -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-0.31) (-0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
OMSR Program Size -0.0026*** -0.0023** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(-2.97) (-2.54) (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.67)
Past Stock Return 0.5143*** 0.5711*** 0.5680*** 0.5680*** 0.5680***
(12.22) (10.39) (10.35) (10.33) (10.33)
Log Total Asset -0.0069 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0047
(-1.43) (-0.98) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.90)
Industry Adj. ROA -0.2341* -0.2353* -0.2484* -0.2485* -0.2483*
(-1.83) (-1.91) (-1.88) (-1.88) (-1.88)
Cash 0.0760** 0.0614* 0.0578 0.0578 0.0576
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(2.06) (1.69) (1.37) (1.37) (1.36)
Cash Flow 0.3502*** 0.3363*** 0.3122*** 0.3123*** 0.3123***
(2.86) (2.89) (2.67) (2.67) (2.67)
S&P 500 Dummy 0.0385** 0.0366** 0.0369* 0.0369* 0.0368*
(2.10) (2.01) (1.92) (1.91) (1.91)
Log B/M -0.0082 -0.0204* -0.0212* -0.0212* -0.0212*
(-0.71) (-1.80) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.82)
Insider Net Buy -0.0012 -0.0010
(-0.04) (-0.04)
Insider Holding 0.0001
(0.12)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,789 2,789 2,789 2,789 2,789
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
Panel B: Trading by hedge funds
Dependent Variable: Size and book-to-Market adjusted buy-and-Hold return
over 12 months after the measurement period of Net Buy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Buy 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005**
(2.15) (2.35) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25)
OMSR Program Size -0.0026*** -0.0022** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024***
(-2.91) (-2.48) (-2.63) (-2.63) (-2.63)
Past Stock Return 0.5146*** 0.5715*** 0.5681*** 0.5681*** 0.5681***
(12.26) (10.43) (10.39) (10.37) (10.37)
Log Total Asset -0.0068 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0045
(-1.42) (-0.97) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.86)
Industry Adj. ROA -0.2354* -0.2367* -0.2520* -0.2521* -0.2519*
(-1.84) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.90)
Cash 0.0745** 0.0595 0.0569 0.0568 0.0567
(2.02) (1.63) (1.35) (1.35) (1.34)
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Cash Flow 0.3500*** 0.3353*** 0.3118*** 0.3118*** 0.3119***
(2.86) (2.88) (2.66) (2.66) (2.66)
S&P 500 Dummy 0.0379** 0.0359** 0.0357* 0.0358* 0.0356*
(2.07) (1.98) (1.86) (1.85) (1.85)
Log B/M -0.0087 -0.0211* -0.0218* -0.0218* -0.0218*
(-0.75) (-1.86) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.87)
Insider Net Buy -0.0012 -0.0010
(-0.04) (-0.04)
Insider Holding 0.0001
(0.12)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,789 2,789 2,789 2,789 2,789
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
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Table 2.5: Profitability of Institutional Trading after OMSR Program Announcements.
This table reports univariate results of the profitability of institutional trading around open-market share repurchase programs (OMSRs).
We consider the trading horizon starting from the first fiscal quarter after the OMSR announcement and ending at the fourth fiscal quarter
after the OMSR announcement. Panel A (B) reports the profitability of trading by all institutions (hedge funds). Panel A1 (B1) reports
the result where we split the sample by the cumulative actual repurchase by the firm during the first two fiscal quarters after the OMSR
announcement. Panel A2 (B2) reports the result where split the sample by the OMSR program size, defined as the dollar amount value of
the OMSR program, normalized by the market capitalization of the firm as of the most recent month-end before the announcement date.
Raw Profit is the total raw profit earned by institutions using actual transaction prices net of commissions, with the net position marked
to market at the end of the trading horizon. Buy Principal is the sum of the actual dollar amount of all the buy transactions including
commissions spent by sample institutions during the trading horizon. Maximum Investment is the maximum dollar amount committed to
trading the sample firms’ shares during the trading horizon by the institutions. Raw Return on Buy Principal is defined as the ratio of Raw
Profit to Buy Principal. Raw Return on Maximum Investment is defined as the ratio of Raw Profit to Maximum Investment. We also discount
profit and investment amount back to the first day of the trading horizon using the buy-and-hold value-weighted return from the Fama and
French 25 portfolios matched on size and book-to-market. For example, Risk-adjusted Profit is computed by discounting the raw profit
back to the first day of the trading horizon using the benchmark return from the matched Fama-French 25 portfolios; and Risk-adjusted
Return on Buy Principal equals Risk-adjusted Profit divided by Risk-adjusted Buy Principal. T-tests are performed on the profits and the
returns, respectively. T-tests are also performed on the difference in the profits, the difference in the investment amount, and the difference
in the returns. Statistical significance is indicated by *** for 1% level, ** for 5% level, and * for 10% level.
Panel A: Trading by all institutional investors
Institutional trading over [FQ1, FQ4]
Panel A1: Split by Panel A2: Split by
OMSR Program Size Actual Repurchase
Below Median Above Median Diff (B-A) Below Median Above Median Diff (B-A)
Number of Observations (Events) 1392 1392 1392 1392
Raw Profit ($ thousands) 4488.44 -3085.63 7574.08 3590.33 -2187.52 5777.86
Risk-adjusted Raw Profit ($ thousands) 4479.27 -2838.73 7317.99 4901.88 -3261.33 8163.21*
Buy Principal ($ millions) 837.72 865.93 -28.21 674.67 1028.45 -353.78***
Risk-adjusted Buy Principal ($ millions) 840.05 880.86 -40.80 691.9 1028.56 -336.65***
Maximum Investment ($ millions) 582.48 601.87 -19.39 468.23 716.12 -247.89***
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Risk-adjusted Maximum Investment ($ millions) 580.83 607.12 -26.29 474.75 713.21 -238.46***
Raw Return on Buy Principal (%) 0.54** -0.36 0.90** 0.54* -0.21 0.75**
Risk-adjusted Return on Buy Principal (%) 0.54** -0.32* 0.86*** 0.72*** -0.32* 1.03***
Raw Return on Maximum Investment (%) 0.77*** -0.51* 1.28*** 0.77** -0.31 1.07***
Risk-adjusted Return on Maximum Investment (%) 0.77*** -0.47* 1.24*** 1.03*** -0.46** 1.49***
Panel B: Trading by hedge funds
Hedge fund trading over [FQ1, FQ4]
Panel B1: Split by Panel B2: Split by
OMSR Program Size Actual Repurchase
Number of Observations(Events) 1392 1392 1392 1392
Raw Profit ($ thousands) 2626.12 595.81 2030.32 2154.55* 1068.61 1085.94
Risk-adjusted Raw Profit ($ thousands) 3588.88*** 184.54 3404.33** 2738.66*** 1036.68 1701.98
Buy Principal ($millions) 468.87 29.37 439.5*** 193.67 304.26 -110.59***
Risk-adjusted Buy Principal ($millions) 472.63 28.96 443.66*** 200.29 301 -100.71***
Maximum Investment ($millions) 306.01 23.61 282.41*** 126.28 203.14 -76.87***
Risk-adjusted Maximum Investment ($millions) 307.89 23.23 284.66*** 129.91 201.01 -71.11***
Raw Return on Buy Principal (%) 0.55* 1.90** -1.35 1.10** 0.33 0.77
Risk-adjusted Return on Buy Principal (%) 0.75*** 0.6 0.15 1.37*** 0.33 1.04**
Raw Return on Maximum Investment (%) 0.90* 1.77* -0.88 1.68*** 0.51 1.17
Risk-adjusted Return on Maximum Investment (%) 1.17*** 0.54 0.63 2.11*** 0.49 1.63***
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Table 2.6: The Relation between Institutional Trading after OMSR Program Announcements and Actual Share Repurchases.
This table presents OLS regression analysis of the relationship between institutional trading after an OMSR announcement and the
subsequent actual share repurchases by the firm. Actual Share Repurchase, the dependent variable, is the actual shares repurchased by the
firm (normalized by the number of shares outstanding) during the second and third fiscal quarter after the OMSR program announcement
(two fiscal quarters after the measurement period of Net Buy). In Models (1)-(5), Net Buy is aggregated net buying by all institutions (hedge
funds) during the first month after the OMSR announcement in panel A (B); In Models (6)-(10), Net Buy is aggregated net buying by all
institutions (hedge funds) during the first quarter after the OMSR announcement in panel A (B). Log Total Assets is the natural logarithm
of total assets of firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Log B/M is the natural logarithm of Book-to-Market
ratio of firm at the most recent fiscal year end before the announcement; Past Stock Return is the market adjusted stock return during the
one-year period before the announcement; Cash is firm’s cash holdings normalized by total assets, at the most recent fiscal year end before
the announcement; CapEx is firm’s capital expenditure normalized by total assets; R&D is firm’s R&D expenditure normalized by total
assets; Dividend Paying Dummy is a dummy variable which equals one if firm pays out dividends during the most recent fiscal year before
the announcement, and equals zero otherwise; OMSR Program Size is the value of the OMSR program (in dollar amount), normalized by
the market capitalization of the firm as of the most recent month-end before the announcement date; Actual Share Repurchase FQ1 is
the actual share repurchased by the firm (normalized by the number of shares outstanding) during the first fiscal quarter after the OMSR
program announcement; Insider Net Buy is the aggregate net buying from top level insiders of firm during the one-year period before the
announcement; Insider Holding is the aggregate stock holding of top level insiders of firm at the beginning of the one-year period before
the announcement. Industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Panel A: Trading by all institutional investors
Net Buy (one month after OMSR program announcement) Net Buy (one quarter after OMSR program announcement)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Net Buy 0.0126 0.0074 0.0219 0.0162 0.0164 0.0309** 0.0290** 0.0369*** 0.0346** 0.0346**
(0.32) (0.19) (0.56) (0.41) (0.42) (2.25) (2.12) (2.67) (2.51) (2.51)
Log Total Asset 0.1683*** 0.1548*** 0.1782*** 0.1654*** 0.1576*** 0.1699*** 0.1565*** 0.1793*** 0.1667*** 0.1589***
(4.98) (4.57) (5.00) (4.64) (4.29) (5.03) (4.62) (5.04) (4.68) (4.33)
Log B/M -0.2751*** -0.2020** -0.2003** -0.1148 -0.1150 -0.2715*** -0.1997** -0.1958** -0.1119 -0.1121
(-3.48) (-2.49) (-2.41) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-3.44) (-2.47) (-2.35) (-1.31) (-1.31)
Past Stock Return -0.2189 -0.3660** -0.2566 -0.4176** -0.4168** -0.2344 -0.3819** -0.2785* -0.4391** -0.4384**
124
(-1.31) (-2.09) (-1.55) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-1.41) (-2.18) (-1.68) (-2.52) (-2.52)
Cash 0.3490 0.4052 0.0700 0.1147 0.1333 0.3624 0.4179 0.0782 0.1230 0.1416
(0.90) (1.04) (0.17) (0.28) (0.32) (0.93) (1.08) (0.19) (0.30) (0.34)
CapEx -1.4664 -1.1464 -2.8027* -2.3719 -2.3167 -1.5085 -1.1915 -2.8765* -2.4452* -2.3894
(-1.26) (-0.98) (-1.89) (-1.60) (-1.57) (-1.29) (-1.02) (-1.95) (-1.66) (-1.62)
R&D -3.4815*** -3.0161** -2.3372 -1.9301 -1.9621 -3.4672*** -3.0134** -2.3180 -1.9259 -1.9581
(-2.67) (-2.31) (-1.59) (-1.31) (-1.33) (-2.66) (-2.31) (-1.58) (-1.31) (-1.33)
Dividend Paying Dummy -0.5925*** -0.5934*** -0.3667*** -0.3566** -0.3492** -0.5896*** -0.5901*** -0.3604** -0.3506** -0.3431**
(-4.45) (-4.45) (-2.62) (-2.55) (-2.49) (-4.43) (-4.43) (-2.57) (-2.51) (-2.45)
OMSR Program Size 0.0782*** 0.0771*** 0.0694*** 0.0679*** 0.0678*** 0.0781*** 0.0770*** 0.0692*** 0.0677*** 0.0675***
(8.56) (8.45) (7.50) (7.35) (7.33) (8.56) (8.44) (7.49) (7.33) (7.31)
Actual Repurchase FQ1 0.1896*** 0.1861*** 0.1675*** 0.1633*** 0.1627*** 0.1940*** 0.1906*** 0.1719*** 0.1678*** 0.1672***
(6.94) (6.77) (6.14) (5.95) (5.92) (7.09) (6.92) (6.30) (6.10) (6.08)
Insider Net Buy 0.1309 0.1167 0.1121 0.0978
(0.37) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27)
Insider Holding -0.0071 -0.0072
(-0.87) (-0.88)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13
Panel B: Trading by hedge funds
Net Buy (one month after OMSR program announcement) Net Buy (one quarter after OMSR program announcement)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Net Buy 0.0034** 0.0033** 0.0034** 0.0033** 0.0033** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
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(2.20) (2.16) (2.20) (2.15) (2.15) (0.43) (0.43) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32)
Log Total Asset 0.1686*** 0.1552*** 0.1790*** 0.1662*** 0.1585*** 0.1683*** 0.1549*** 0.1780*** 0.1653*** 0.1575***
(4.99) (4.58) (5.03) (4.66) (4.32) (4.98) (4.57) (5.00) (4.64) (4.29)
Log B/M -0.2727*** -0.1998** -0.1981** -0.1129 -0.1131 -0.2752*** -0.2019** -0.2011** -0.1152 -0.1154
(-3.45) (-2.47) (-2.38) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-3.48) (-2.49) (-2.42) (-1.34) (-1.35)
Past Stock Return -0.2152 -0.3607** -0.2529 -0.4127** -0.4120** -0.2195 -0.3671** -0.2572 -0.4191** -0.4183**
(-1.29) (-2.06) (-1.53) (-2.37) (-2.37) (-1.32) (-2.09) (-1.55) (-2.41) (-2.40)
Cash 0.3383 0.3956 0.0589 0.1054 0.1237 0.3452 0.4034 0.0608 0.1082 0.1266
(0.87) (1.02) (0.14) (0.26) (0.30) (0.89) (1.04) (0.15) (0.26) (0.31)
CapEx -1.5220 -1.2061 -2.8915* -2.4676* -2.4125 -1.4708 -1.1536 -2.7852* -2.3606 -2.3053
(-1.31) (-1.04) (-1.96) (-1.67) (-1.63) (-1.26) (-0.99) (-1.88) (-1.60) (-1.56)
R&D -3.4193*** -2.9613** -2.2835 -1.8819 -1.9135 -3.4683*** -3.0082** -2.3265 -1.9235 -1.9553
(-2.62) (-2.27) (-1.55) (-1.28) (-1.30) (-2.66) (-2.30) (-1.58) (-1.31) (-1.33)
Dividend Paying Dummy -0.5922*** -0.5927*** -0.3646*** -0.3540** -0.3466** -0.5929*** -0.5937*** -0.3678*** -0.3574** -0.3500**
(-4.45) (-4.45) (-2.60) (-2.53) (-2.48) (-4.45) (-4.46) (-2.62) (-2.56) (-2.50)
OMSR Program Size 0.0787*** 0.0776*** 0.0698*** 0.0683*** 0.0682*** 0.0782*** 0.0771*** 0.0693*** 0.0679*** 0.0678***
(8.62) (8.51) (7.55) (7.40) (7.38) (8.56) (8.45) (7.50) (7.35) (7.33)
Actual Repurchase FQ1 0.1901*** 0.1867*** 0.1681*** 0.1640*** 0.1634*** 0.1897*** 0.1864*** 0.1673*** 0.1633*** 0.1627***
(6.97) (6.80) (6.18) (5.98) (5.95) (6.95) (6.78) (6.14) (5.94) (5.92)
Insider Net Buy 0.1399 0.1258 0.1342 0.1201
(0.39) (0.35) (0.38) (0.34)
Insider Holding -0.0070 -0.0071
(-0.86) (-0.87)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Observations 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13
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Table 2.7: The Relation between Institutional Trading after OMSR Program Announcements and
Changes in Equity Market Information Asymmetry.
This table presents OLS regression analysis of the effect institutional trading after an OMSR announcement
has on the change in the firm’s information asymmetry from before the OMSR announcement to after. The
dependent variable is the difference in the measures of firm’s information asymmetry from before the OMSR
announcement to after. In Panel A, B, and C, we use three measures of information asymmetry based
on I/B/E/S analyst earnings forecasts. For each firm announcing an OMSR program, we retrieve analyst
earnings forecasts for the fiscal year end before the OMSR program announcement date (at least one year
before the announcement date), and after the OMSR program announcement date (at least one year after the
announcement date). In Panel A, the information asymmetry measure is the mean-squared error of analysts’
forecasts (MSE). We measure forecast error as the absolute difference between the average forecasted earnings
and the actual earnings per share divided by the price per share at the time of the forecast. In Panel B, the
information asymmetry measure is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (Dispersion). In Panel C, the
information asymmetry measure is the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts (COV), which is defined as
the ratio of standard deviation to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. In Panel D, we use
bid-ask spread (BidAskSpread) as a measure of information asymmetry. We first calculate the daily bid-ask
spread as the average of all quoted spread (the difference between the log ask price and log bid price) during
normal trading hours on the day based on NYSE TAQ data, and we average the daily bid-ask spread over
the one-year horizon before the OMSR program announcement, as well as the one-year horizon following
the second quarter after the OMSR program announcement. Log (Market Cap) is the natural logarithm of
market capitalization of the firm at the end of OMSR program announcement; Book-to-Market Ratio is the
book-to-market ratio based on the accounting information at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the
OMSR announcement; Actual Repurchase is the actual repurchased shares by the firm, as a percentage of
total shares outstanding at OMSR program announcement, during the first two fiscal quarters after the OMSR
announcement; Past Stock Return is the market adjusted stock return during the one-year period before the
announcement; Insider Net Buy is the aggregate Net Buy from top level insiders of firm during the two fiscal
quarters after the OMSR announcement; Insider Holding is the aggregate stock holding of top level insiders
of firm at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the OMSR announcement. Industry (two-digit SIC
code) and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Panel A: Using change in analyst forecast error as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: ∆ log(MSE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Buy -0.0571∗∗∗ -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0517∗∗ -0.0583∗∗∗
(-2.93) (-3.07) (-2.33) (-2.69)
Log(Market Cap) -0.0475 -0.0570 -0.0906∗ -0.0801
(-1.10) (-1.30) (-1.84) (-1.58)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.0995 -0.1108 -0.1337 -0.2208
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(-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.59) (-0.93)
Past Stock Return -1.8606∗∗∗ -1.5167∗∗∗ -1.7081∗∗∗ -1.3861∗∗∗
(-10.00) (-7.80) (-8.46) (-6.56)
Actual Repurchase 0.0042 -0.0039
(0.16) (-0.15)
Insider Net Buy 0.6697∗∗∗ 0.1672
(3.25) (0.82)
Insider Holding 0.0288∗∗ 0.0278∗∗
(2.13) (2.09)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.061 0.208 0.075 0.218
Observations 1821 1821 1394 1394
Panel B: Using change in analyst forecast dispersion as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: ∆ log(Dispersion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Buy -0.0106 -0.0158∗ -0.0146 -0.0194∗∗
(-1.25) (-1.85) (-1.53) (-1.99)
Log(Market Cap) 0.0036 -0.0065 0.0064 0.0044
(0.19) (-0.32) (0.30) (0.19)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.1344 -0.1878∗∗ -0.2109∗∗ -0.2731∗∗
(-1.57) (-2.04) (-2.14) (-2.57)
Past Stock Return -0.1818∗∗ -0.1642∗ -0.2076∗∗ -0.1769∗
(-2.24) (-1.86) (-2.38) (-1.87)
Actual Repurchase 0.0139 0.0121
(1.21) (1.03)
Insider Net Buy -0.0090 -0.1396
(-0.10) (-1.52)
Insider Holding 0.0134∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗
(2.21) (2.58)
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Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.005 0.091 0.014 0.100
Observations 1807 1807 1384 1384
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Panel C: Using change in coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: ∆ log(COV )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Buy -0.0231∗∗ -0.0268∗∗ -0.0246∗∗ -0.0281∗∗
(-2.18) (-2.57) (-2.06) (-2.37)
Log(Market Cap) -0.0245 -0.0283 -0.0249 -0.0155
(-1.04) (-1.15) (-0.93) (-0.56)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.0473 -0.0721 -0.1125 -0.1623
(-0.44) (-0.64) (-0.92) (-1.25)
Past Stock Return -0.9062∗∗∗ -0.7998∗∗∗ -0.8458∗∗∗ -0.7387∗∗∗
(-8.95) (-7.39) (-7.79) (-6.40)
Actual Repurchase 0.0114 0.0130
(0.79) (0.91)
Insider Net Buy 0.2233∗∗ -0.0237
(2.00) (-0.21)
Insider Holding 0.0196∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(2.49) (2.76)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.049 0.160 0.061 0.180
Observations 1805 1805 1383 1383
Panel D: Using change in average bid-ask spread (%) as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: ∆BidAskSpread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Buy -0.0057∗∗∗ -0.0037∗ -0.0043∗∗ -0.0036∗
(-2.76) (-1.95) (-2.11) (-1.84)
Log(Market Cap) -0.0594∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗ -0.0410∗∗∗
(-15.68) (-13.65) (-11.91) (-10.13)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.0260 -0.0022 -0.0071 0.0020
(-1.60) (-0.14) (-0.41) (0.11)
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Past Stock Return -0.1248∗∗∗ -0.0705∗∗∗ -0.1350∗∗∗ -0.0856∗∗∗
(-8.47) (-4.87) (-8.27) (-5.17)
Actual Repurchase 0.0014 0.0018
(0.59) (0.80)
Insider Net Buy 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0566∗∗∗
(6.56) (4.61)
Insider Holding 0.0001 0.0011
(0.07) (1.04)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.125 0.297 0.147 0.291
Observations 2621 2621 1820 1820
132
Chapter 3
The Geography of Institutional Investors,
Information Production, and Initial Public
Offerings
3.1 Introduction
It is well-known that institutions play a key role in initial public offerings. On the one hand, it has
been argued that IPO underwriters go out of their way to attract institutional participation in IPOs,
possibly because, as argued by the bookbuilding literature, they wish to extract information from
them about their valuation of the IPO firm’s equity: see, e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989). On the
other hand, the well-known underpricing model of Rock (1986) argues that institutions with private
information may distort the IPO share-allocation process, bidding only on the equity of undervalued
firms going public, thus leaving retail investors with a disproportionate share of overvalued IPO
firm equity. The empirical evidence also suggests the notion that institutional investors have private
information about the true long-run value of the shares of the firm going public: for example,
Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2010), who show that institutions indeed have private information
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about IPOs, retain their information advantage in post-IPO trading, and are able to realize significant
profits from their participation in IPOs (see also, Field and Lowry (2009)).1 However, while the
ability of institutions in general to produce information about IPOs has been well-documented, the
ability of specific kinds of institutions to produce information about firms going public and the
effects of such information production on the characteristics of the IPOs of these firms has not been
studied. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing for the first time
how the geographical location of institutional investors affects their information production and
investment in IPOs, and the relation between such information production by certain groups of
institutions and the characteristics of the IPOs that they invest in.
The starting point of our analysis is an examination of how the geographical location of
institutions affects the incentives to acquire information about IPO firms that they may be evaluating
for possible investment. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) explores (in a broader context) the
hypothesis that investors exchange information and ideas about investing in stocks with each other
directly through word-of-mouth communication, and argue that such communication may be easier
if the institutions involved are in the same geographical location. However, it is our view that
such ease of communication engendered by geographical proximity may be a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, if several institutions that are geographically close together share information
with each other, they may each have access to the signals available to each institution, thereby
increasing the quality of the information available to each of them. On the other hand, if information
production about IPO firms is costly, the ability of individual institutions to free-ride on each others’
information may dampen their incentives to acquire independent information (signal) about the
quality of the IPO firm, so that the precision of the information collectively held by a group of
geographically proximate institutions may in fact be lower than that of the information produced by
a group of geographically isolated institutions working independently.2
1A number of non-information related roles have also been postulated for institutions in the IPO process: see, e.g.,
Ritter and Zhang (2007) or Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang (2007).
2For a formal model that captures some of these ideas in a rational expectations framework, see the model by
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We analyze the implication of the above idea for IPOs in this paper. We start by analyzing
whether geographically proximate institutions tend to free-ride on each others’ information when
they choose IPOs to invest in. If this is indeed the case, the effect of neighboring institutions’ IPO
equity holdings on a given institution’s IPO equity holdings will be greater than those of more
distant institutions. This is the first hypothesis we test in this paper.3
We now turn to the analysis of how the differences in the incentive to produce information
between geographically clustered versus geographically isolated institutions affect the characteristics
of the IPOs dominated (in terms of investment) by the two kinds of institutions. We make use of
measures of geographical dispersion of the institutions investing in a given IPO to conduct this
analysis. If it is indeed the case that more isolated institutions, collectively, have more accurate
information about firms going public, they are more likely to have more independent signals
collectively. IPO underwriters are likely to extract this more precise information from institutions
and use it to determine the final offer price of an IPO using the IPO book building process (see, e.g.,
Benveniste and Spindt (1989)). Institutions will invest in an IPO firm if the information produced by
them is favorable and not invest in the firm when it is unfavorable. Therefore the IPO price revision
(from the mid-point of the initial filing range to the offer price) will be increasing in the geographical
dispersion of the institutions investing in an IPO, since the IPO offer price will reflect this more
accurate favorable information held by institutions.4 This also implies that the IPO valuation at the
Han and Yang (2013). They study a rational expectations equilibrium model of a competitive market in which
traders can learn about a risky asset’s payoff from three sources: the market price; costly information acquisition;
and communication with other traders through a social network. When traders decide whether or not to acquire
costly information, they take into consideration the expected learning through social communication. In equilibrium,
information acquisition and asset prices are determined simultaneously. In the above setting, they show that, when
information is exogenous, social communication improves market efficiency. However, social communication crowds
out information production due to traders’ incentive to “free ride" on informed friends and on a more informative price
system. Overall, social communication hurts market efficiency when information is endogenous.
3While this “neighborhood effect" among mutual fund managers in a general investment setting has been studied in
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), the behavior of institutional investors facing a firm going public, where information
asymmetry is especially high among institutional investors, is not documented.
4To generate this implication, we need two assumptions. First, we assume that underwriters set the mid-point of the
initial filing range based on whatever information they have when they file the preliminary prospectus. In other words,
this mid-point does not reflect any information generated from institutions. Second, institutions participating in an IPO
are more likely to be those with favorable information about that IPO.
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offer price will be increasing in geographical dispersion of institutions investing in an IPO.
We now turn to the relationship between geographical dispersion and secondary market valuation.
Assume that it is common knowledge to all investors in the immediate secondary market that more
isolated institutional investors have more accurate information about an IPO firm’s value. Then, the
immediate secondary market valuation of an IPO firm will be greater for IPOs dominated by equity
holdings from geographically isolated institutions relative to IPOs dominated by geographically
clustered institutions (due to a “certification effect”). This implies that the immediate secondary
market valuation of an IPO will be increasing in measures of geographical dispersion of institutions
investing in an IPO.
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between the geographical dispersion of the institutions
investing in an IPO and IPO initial return. Clearly, the initial return on an IPO stock reflects the
difference between its IPO valuation and its immediate secondary market (first trading day closing
price) valuation. If the relationship between geographical dispersion and IPO valuation is stronger
than the relationship between geographical dispersion and secondary market valuation, then the
IPO initial return will be decreasing in measures of geographical dispersion of the institutions
investing in an IPO. On the other hand, if the relationship between geographical dispersion and IPO
valuation is weaker than the relationship between geographical dispersion and secondary market
valuation, then the IPO initial return will be increasing in measures of geographical dispersion of
the institutions investing in an IPO. Further, assume that all information produced by institutions
is reflected in secondary market prices only gradually through time. Then, the long-run post-IPO
stock return will be increasing in measures of the geographical dispersion of institutions investing
in an IPO as well.
Finally, we study whether the information channel, i.e. clustered institutions are less likely to
produce independent signals, compared to isolated institutions, is driving the above findings. We
explore the information channel through three empirical exercises. First, we look at the information
asymmetry facing a firm in the public equity market and study its relationship with the geographical
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dispersion of the institutional investors investing in the IPO firm’s stock. Second, for each IPO firm,
we classify the institutions investing in that IPO firm into geographically isolated and geographically
clustered institutions. We then study whether the predictive power of institutional trading for the
future stock return of that IPO firm is stronger for geographically isolated institutions compared to
geographically clustered institutions, thus directly analyzing the information production argument
that we discussed above. We measure institutional trading using the “Net Buy" by institutions,
defined as the number of shares purchased by institutions minus the number of shares sold by
institutions, normalized by the number of shares outstanding. Third, we look at the relationship
between institutional trading and the surprise in the earnings announcements of the IPO firms
above market expectations. We study whether trading by geographically isolated institutions is a
stronger predictor of earnings surprises than trading by geographically clustered institutions, thereby
providing further evidence of the information advantage collectively held by geographically isolated
institutions.
We develop our empirical analysis of the implications of the above theoretical arguments making
use of data on IPOs between January 1980 to December 2012 from the SDC Global New Issues
database. We infer on institutional investments in IPOs using quarterly institutional holdings from
Thomson Reuter’s Institutional Holdings (13F) database. To obtain the geographical location for
each institutions, we manually identify the location of institutional investors using the Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Managers and by searching the filings by institutional investors on the
SEC Edgar website. We make use of the analysts earnings forecasts data from Thomson Reuter’s
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database and construct measures of information
asymmetry facing the IPO firm in the secondary market.
The results of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. We start with our empirical
analysis on the geographical proximity between institutions and their investments in IPOs. For
every pair of institutions investing in the IPO considered, we classify them as “neighbors" if the
geographical distance between the two institutions is within 50 miles. We find that a one-percentage-
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point increase in the aggregate investments in the IPO by neighboring institutions is associated
with 1.17 basis points increase in the investment in the same IPO for the institution considered. On
the other hand, a one-percentage-point increase in the aggregate investments in the IPO by distant
institutions is associated with 0.80 basis points increase in the investment in the same IPO for the
institution considered. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that institutional investors’
investment in IPOs is affected more by the investments made by neighboring institutions than
those by distant institutions, implying that geographically proximate institutions are more likely to
free-ride on each others’ information when they choose IPOs to invest in.
Next, we construct a quantitative measure, geographical dispersion, which captures the extent
to which the investments in IPOs are dominated by geographically isolated institutional investors.
We make use of the geographical dispersion measure and study its relationship with various
characteristics of the IPOs. First, we find that, consistent with our hypotheses, a one-standard-
deviation increase in geographical dispersion is associated with a 2.3% upward IPO price revision
by underwriter(s) and an increase of 0.21 in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based on IPO offer price.
It implies that underwriters extract more accurate (and favorable) signals from participation by
geographically isolated institutional investors, compared to the participation by geographically
clustered institutional investors, and use that information to revise the offer price upward and sell
the IPO at a higher valuation at the offering. Second, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase
in geographical dispersion is associated with an increase of 0.39 in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
based on first trading day closing price and an increase of 0.42 in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
at the first fiscal quarter end post-IPO. Lastly, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in
geographical dispersion is associated with an increase in IPO initial return by 3.2%. We also find
that a one-standard-deviation increase in geographical dispersion is associated with an increase
of one-year size and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return by 4.9%. This is
also consistent with our hypothesis that information produced by institutions is reflected in the
secondary market prices gradually through time, and that IPOs dominated by geographically isolated
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institutional investors have higher initial returns and long-run abnormal stock returns, compared to
IPOs dominated by geographically clustered institutions.
The result of our empirical test to analyze the differences in information production between
clustered and isolated institutions can be summarized following. We find that higher geographical
dispersion among the institutions investing in an IPO is associated with lower information asym-
metry facing the IPO firm. This finding is robust to different measures of information asymmetry
including the standard deviation of analysts forecasts, the analyst forecast error, and the coefficient
of variation of analyst forecasts. Second, we find that aggregated net buying by geographically
isolated institutions can predict future one-year abnormal holding period returns (adjusted for
market returns or matched Fama-French 25 portfolio returns), while aggregated net buying by
geographically clustered institutions does not exhibit such predictive power. Specifically, a one-
standard-deviation increase in net buying by geographically isolated institutions predicts an increase
of 2.9% in subsequent one-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns. Third, we find that aggregated net
buying by geographically isolated institutions significantly predicts earnings surprises post-IPO,
while aggregated net buying by geographically clustered institutions does not. In terms of economic
magnitudes, a one-standard-deviation increase in net buying by geographically isolated institutions
predicts an increase of 0.5% in standardized unexpected earnings. These findings further suggest
that geographically isolated institutions produce more precise signals collectively, compared to
geographically clustered institutions
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the related
literature and the contribution of our paper relative to the literature. Section 3.3 discusses the
underlying theory and hypothesis for our empirical tests. Section 3.4 describes our data and sample
selection procedures and presents summary statistics. Section 3.5 presents our main empirical
tests and results. Section 3.6 presents additional tests of the relationship between geography and
information production. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Relation to the Existing Literature and Contribution
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. One strand our paper is related to is the
empirical literature on the role of institutional investors in IPOs. Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2010)
show that institutional trading has predictive power for subsequent long-run IPO performance,
even after controlling for publicly available information, suggesting that institutional investors
possess private information about IPOs. Our finding regarding the predictive power of institutional
trading for long-run IPO stock return is consistent with theirs (see also Boehmer, Boehmer, and
Fishe (2006) and Field and Lowry (2009) for similar evidence). We extend their long-run post-IPO
return predictability results by highlighting the effect of geographical concentration on institutional
investors’ incentives to produce information in IPOs.
The broader literature on the role of institutions in IPOs is also related to our paper. Aggarwal
(2003) and Hanley and Wilhelm Jr. (1995) document that institutional investors receive significant
allocations in underpriced IPOs. Aggarwal (2003) studies IPO allocation and immediate flipping
over the first two days after the IPO. Boehmer, Boehmer, and Fishe (2006) study the relation
between IPO allocation, flipping, and long-run IPO performance. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara
(2000) and Ellis (2006) study aftermarket trading by market makers in IPOs.
The theoretical literature on information production by institutions and other investors around
IPOs is also related to our paper. Rock (1986) argues that institutional investors with private
information about the true long-run value of the shares of firms going public bid only on undervalued
shares, leaving retail investors with a disproportionate share of overvalued IPOs. Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) build on Rock (1986)’s assumption of informed institutional investors, and argue
that the IPO bookbuilding process is a mechanism for underwriters to extract information from
institutional investors in order to use it to price shares in the IPO at the appropriate level. Chemmanur
(1993) views underpricing as a way of inducing information production by institutional and other
investors about the firm going public. See Ritter and Welch (2002) for an excellent review of the
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related theoretical and empirical literature on IPOs.
Our paper is also connected to the literature on investor networks and information production.
Han and Yang (2013) study a rational expectations equilibrium model of a competitive market in
which traders can learn about a risky asset’s payoff from three sources: the market price; costly
information acquisition; and communication with other traders through a social network. They show
that, when information acquisition is exogenous, social communication improves market efficiency.
However, social communication crowds out information production due to traders’ incentive to
“free ride" on informed friends and on a more informative price system. In other words, social
communication hurts market efficiency when information is endogenous. While our empirical
analysis does not focus on social connections, the implications of the above theory broadly apply to
our paper insofar as geographic proximity captures the ease of communication among investors.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on geographical proximity and information sharing
among investors. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) show that mutual fund managers
located in the same city tend to make correlated investment decisions, suggesting that portfolio
managers share investment ideas with each other through word-of-mouth communication. Building
on Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015) find that the overlap in stock
holdings and trades between funds whose managers living in the same neighborhood is considerably
high than that of funds whose managers live in the same city but in different neighborhoods. In
their investigation of stock trades by individual investors, Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2007) find
strong evidence of correlated trades among individual investors in the same geographic location
and attribute about one-quarter to one-half of the correlation between their trades to word-of-
mouth communication.5 Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that such ease of
communication induced by geographical proximity can negatively affect information production.
5Shiller and Pound (1989) present survey evidence that both institutional and individual investors may be influenced
by peer communications.
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3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
The theoretical framework that we use to develop our testable hypotheses is adapted from the
model of Han and Yang (2013). Han and Yang (2013) study a rational expectations equilibrium
model of a competitive market in which traders can learn about a risky asset’s payoff from three
sources: the market price; costly information acquisition; and communication with other traders
through a social network. We assume that institutional investors make use of two kinds of informa-
tion to decide on the IPO firms to invest in as well as to value these IPO firms. First, each institution
has its own (freely available) signal that can help in the above task, for example, the signal may be
based on their prior experience with investing in IPO stocks. Second, institutions may produce an
independent signal at a cost about each IPO firm that they are considering investing in, with the
precision of this signal increasing in the amount of resources they devote to information production.
We assume that institutions are able to share each others’ information. Further, each information
sharing between any two institutions become easier when they are geographically closer to each
other (“local information sharing" effect). On the other hand, if an institution has access to the
information available to other institutions, it reduces its incentive to incur costs for producing
information independently on its own, thereby reducing the precision of the information produced
by each institution (“free riding on neighbors" effect). The above induces the following ambiguous
relationship between the geographical dispersion among the institutions investing in an IPO and
the precision of the aggregate amount of information available to them. To see this, let us consider
two extremes. Consider first the case where the precision of the signal freely available to each
institution is very high while at the same time, the cost to precision ratio of information production
by institutions is also high. In this case, the precision of the aggregate amount of information
available collectively to all institutions will be decreasing in their geographical dispersion, since
the advantage to institutions of being able to more precisely share each other’s information when
institutions are geographically close to each other overcomes any disadvantage arising from the
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dampening of each institution’s incentive to produce information (arising from the ability to free
ride on the information signal of other institutions that are geographically close to them). Consider
the other extreme case where the precision of the the signal freely available to each institution is very
low, while the cost to precision ratio of information production by institutions is also low. In this
case, the precision of the aggregate amount of information available collectively to all institutions
will be increasing in their geographical dispersion, since the advantage to institutions of being able
to more precisely share each other’s information is not enough to overcome the disadvantage arising
from the dampening of each institution’s incentive to produce information when institutions are
geographically close to each other.
In the following, we use the above theoretical framework to develop testable hypotheses to
analyze the relationship between the geographical dispersion among institutions investing in an
IPO and offer price revision; valuation of the IPO firm at offering; valuation of the IPO firm at the
secondary market; IPO initial return; the long-run post-IPO stock return; and finally, the information
asymmetry faced by the IPO firm in the secondary market. We also develop testable hypotheses
for studying whether institutional trading by geographically clustered or geographically isolated
institutions will have stronger predictive power for future stock returns and earnings surprises.
Our first hypothesis is related to the “word-of-mouth" effect documented in Hong, Kubik,
and Stein (2005). Institutions that are closer together are more likely to free ride on each others’
information about the IPO firms that they propose to invest in relative to those that are geographically
more isolated. This implies that the effect of a neighboring institution’s IPO equity holdings on a
given institution’s IPO equity holdings will be greater than those of more distant institutions (H1).
We now turn to developing testable hypotheses to analyze the relationship between the geograph-
ical dispersion among institutions investing in an IPO and various IPO characteristics. First, we look
at the offer price revision and IPO valuation at the offer price. On the one hand, if the “free riding on
neighbors" effect dominates the “local information sharing" effect, then more isolated institutions,
collectively, will have more accurate information about firms going public (since they produce
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more precise signals). IPO underwriters are likely to extract this information from institutions and
use it to determine the final offer price of an IPO using the IPO book building process (see, e.g.,
Benveniste and Spindt (1989)). Institutions will invest in an IPO firm if the information produced
by them is favorable and not invest in the firm when it is unfavorable. Therefore the IPO price
revision (from the mid-point of the initial filing range to the offer price) will be increasing in the
geographical dispersion of the institutions investing in an IPO, since the IPO offer price will reflect
this more accurate (and favorable) information held by geographically isolated institutions (H2A).
Further, the IPO valuation at the offer price will also be increasing in geographical dispersion of
institutions investing in an IPO (H3A). On the other hand, if the “local information sharing" effect
dominates the “free riding on neighbors" effect, then more clustered institutions, collectively, will
have more accurate (and favorable) information about firms going public since they have access to
more signals. In this case, the IPO price revision will be decreasing in the geographical dispersion
of the institutions investing in the IPO, since the IPO offer price will reflect this more accurate
favorable information held by geographically clustered institutions (H2B). As a result, the IPO
valuation at the offer price will be decreasing in the geographical dispersion of the institutions
investing in an IPO (H3B).
In the secondary market, the geographical dispersion among institutions investing in the IPO
becomes public knowledge to all investors, both institutional investors and retail investors. Similarly,
if the “free riding on neighbors" effect dominates the “local information sharing" effect, then the
geographically isolated institutions, collectively, will have more accurate information about firms
going public, and the secondary market valuation of an IPO firm will be greater for IPOs dominated
by equity holdings from geographically isolated institutions. Thus, the secondary market valuation
of an IPO will be increasing in measures of geographical dispersion of institutions investing in an
IPO (H4A). At the same time, the initial return on an IPO stock reflects the difference between
IPO valuation and immediate secondary market (first trading day closing price) valuation. The
favorable information contained in a geographically dispersed institutional shareholder base will
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attract further institutional and retail investors, and translate into higher valuation (relative to
valuation at the offer price) for the IPO firm.6 Thus the IPO initial return will be increasing in
measures of geographical dispersion of institutions investing in an IPO (H5A) as well. Further,
assuming the information produced by institutions is impounded into post-IPO stock prices only
gradually through time, then the long-run post-IPO stock return of an IPO firm will be increasing in
measures of geographical dispersion of the institutions investing in that firm’s IPO (H6A). Further,
as geographically isolated institutions collectively have more accurate information about firms’
fundamentals, their participation in the IPO and subsequent trading activities in the secondary
market reduces information asymmetry facing the IPO firm. Thus, the information asymmetry
facing an IPO firm will be decreasing in measures of geographical dispersion of institutions investing
in an IPO (H7A).
On the other hand, if the “local information sharing" effect dominates the “free riding on
neighbors" effect, the secondary market valuation of an IPO will be decreasing in measures of
geographical dispersion of institutions investing in an IPO (H4B); then the IPO initial return will be
decreasing in measures of geographical dispersion of institutions investing in an IPO (H5B). Further,
in this scenario, the long-run post-IPO stock return will be decreasing in measures of geographical
dispersion of institutions investing in the firm’s IPO (H6B). And finally, the information asymmetry
facing an IPO firm will also be decreasing in measures of geographical dispersion of the institutions
investing in that IPO (H7B).
We next examine which group of investors, geographically clustered or geographically isolated
institutions, are more collectively informed about the firm going public. Assuming that institutions
are able to generate private information about the intrinsic value and future performance of firms
going public, secondary market trading (net buying) of institutions in the equity of the IPO firm
will have predictive power for its subsequent long-run stock return performance and earnings
surprises. Specifically, we study whether the secondary market trading by geographically clustered
6The relationship between breadth of investor base and asset valuation is theoretically modeled in Merton (1987).
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or geographically isolated institutions has stronger predictive power for future stock returns and
earnings surprises. If the “free riding on neighbors" effect dominates the “local information sharing"
effect, then geographically isolated institutions will have more accurate information collectively
about the IPO firm. Thus, the predictive power of secondary market trading by geographically
isolated institutions for long-run IPO stock returns will be greater (H8A), and the predictive power
of secondary market trading by geographically isolated institutions for IPO firm’s earnings surprises
will also be greater (H9A). If the “local information sharing" effect dominates the “free riding on
neighbors" effect, then geographically clustered institutions will have more accurate information
collectively about the IPO firm. In this scenario, the predictive power of post-IPO secondary market
trading by geographically clustered institutions for long-run IPO stock returns will be greater (H8B),
and the predictive power of secondary market trading by geographically clustered institutions for
IPO firm’s earnings surprises will also be greater (H9B).
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
We first identify all IPOs conducted in the U.S. markets from January 1980 to December 2012
using the Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company (SDC) Global New Issues database. We
exclude certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, closed-end funds, REITs, IPOs
with an offer price less than $5, and stocks that are not list on Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) within 5 days of SDC’s IPO date. We use CRSP to identify the exchange on
which each stock first began trading, and retain only stocks that are traded on NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ. For each IPO firm, we collect the issue date, offer price, initial filing range, proceeds,
underwriter name(s), SIC code, and whether the issue is backed by a venture capitalist from SDC.
We use underwriter reputation rankings from Loughran and Ritter (2004) (based on earlier work by
Carter and Manaster (1990)), which ranks each underwriter from zero to nine, with higher ranks
representing higher reputation underwriters. We also collect data on firm age, i.e., the number of
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years since the company was founded, at the time of the IPO.7
Lacking public data on participation of institutional investors in IPOs, we use reported quarterly
holdings of institutions from Thomson Reuter’s Institutional (13F) Holdings database to construct
proxies for institutional investors’ participation in IPOs. We use the first reported holdings within
three months of the offer date for each IPO as our proxy for initial IPO participation.8 To obtain
the geographical location for each institution, we manually identify the location (zip code) of the
headquarters of the institutional investors using the Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers
and by searching the filings by institutional investors on the SEC Edgar website. We exclude
institutions without valid location information. The headquarter location of the IPO firm comes
from Compustat.
Our initial sample consists of 5,590 IPOs from January 1980 to December 2012. We present
summary statistics of these IPOs in Table 3.1. The mean Initial Return, defined as the difference
between the offer price and the first-day closing price divided by the offer price, is 19.6%. The
mean Price Revision, measured as the percentage difference between offer price and the mid-point
of the initial filing range, is 1.1%. The average Age of the firm at the time of the offering is 16 years.
The mean Total Proceeds of the IPO is 88.1 million. Table 1 also reports valuation of the IPO firm
at the offer price (QOPAdj) and in the immediate secondary market (QFTDAdj, and QFQAdj). The
valuation measure we use is Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio of the market value of assets over the book
value of assets. We calculate the market value of assets as the book value of assets minus the book
value of equity plus the product of the number of shares outstanding and share price. We calculate
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as the raw Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q in the 2-digit SIC
industry. We measure the secondary market valuation using the first trading day closing price as the
share price in the above definition (QFTDAdj), and the share price at the end of the first post-IPO
fiscal quarter (QFQAdj). The book value of assets and the book value of equity are measured as of
7We thank Jay Ritter for making the data on firms’ founding dates and underwriter reputation rankings available on
his website.
8Reported holdings are potentially different from initial allocations. For a discussion of the rationales and issues
with using reported holdings as proxies for IPO allocations , see, e.g., Ritter and Zhang (2007).
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the first post-IPO quarter.
3.5 Empirical Tests and Results
3.5.1 Neighbor Effect on Participation of Institutions in the IPO
As discussed in our hypothesis H1, if geographically proximate institutions tend to free-ride on
each others’ information when they choose IPOs to invest in, then we would observe the effects of
neighboring institutions’ investments in the IPO be greater than those of more distant institutions.
To test this hypothesis, we regress individual institution’s holding in an IPO on the total holdings of
neighboring institutions (Neighbor Holdings), and total holdings of all distant institutions (Non-
neighbor Holdings). The neighboring institutions are defined as those institutions headquartered
within 50 miles of the institution considered, while the distant institutions are defined as those
institutions headquartered beyond 50 miles of the institution considered.9
To control for local bias in institutional investments (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), we include
in our regression a Local dummy, which equals 1 if the institution is headquartered within 50 miles
of the IPO firm, and 0 otherwise. We also control for the size of the institution, defined as the
natural logarithm of the total net assets of the institution, Log(TNA), since larger institutions are
more likely to participate in an IPO and receive more allocations. In addition, we control for year
fixed effects, industry fixed effects and institution fixed effects.
The first column of Table 3.3 reports the baseline result, where institutions are defined as
“neighbor" if they are headquartered within 50 miles of each other. We find that both the coefficient
of Neighbor Holdings and that of Non-neighbor Holdings are positive and significant, indicating
that institutions’ participating in an IPO is affected by both types of institutions. Importantly, the
coefficient of Neighbor Holdings is about 50% larger than that of Non-neighbor Holdings, and
9In our baseline result, two institutional investors are defined as “neighbor" if they are headquartered within 50
miles of each other. We also vary the definition of “neighbors" using 100 miles and 200 miles, and obtain similar results.
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a Wald-test examining the equality of the two coefficient yields a p-value less than 0.001. This
suggests that the effect of neighboring institutions’ participation in an IPO is much stronger than
that of distant institutions. In terms of economic magnitudes, a one-percentage-point increase in
the holdings of the IPO stock by the neighboring institutions is associated with 1.17 basis points
increase in the holding of the same stock by the institution considered while a one-percentage-point
increase in the holdings of the IPO stock by the distant institutions is associated with only 0.80
basis points increase in the holding by the institution considered.
In models (2) and (3) of Table 3.3, we vary the definition of “neighbor" using 100 miles
and 200 miles as the cut-off points and re-estimate the regression. We find qualitatively similar
results as those in the baseline regression in model (1). To test whether our findings are driven
by cities with concentrated institutions, we further exclude institutions located in New York and
Boston metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The results, reported in model (4), continue to
show that neighboring institutions’ participation in an IPO has a greater impact on the institution’s
participation in the IPO compared to that of distant institutions, and the economic magnitude
becomes greater. Specifically, a one-percentage-point increase in the holdings of the IPO stock by
the neighboring institutions is associated with 3.09 basis points increase in the holding of the same
stock by the institution considered while a one-percentage-point increase in the holdings of the IPO
stock by the non-neighbor institutions is associated with only 1.18 basis points increase. Consistent
with the local information advantage story (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), Table 2 also suggests
that institutions are more likely to participate in the IPOs of local firms. Also, larger institutions
tend to make larger investments in IPO stocks.
3.5.2 Geographical Dispersion and IPO Characteristics
In this section, we study how the differential incentives to produce information by geographically
clustered versus isolated institutions are related to the characteristics of the IPO they participated.
Specifically, we construct a measure of geographical dispersion among institutional investors
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investing in a given IPO, and empirically analyze the relationship between this geographical
dispersion measure and a list of IPO characteristics including offer price revision, IPO valuation at
the offer price, IPO valuation in the secondary market, IPO initial return (i.e. IPO underpricing),
and IPO long-run stock returns.
3.5.2.1 Measuring the Geographical Dispersion among Institutional Shareholders
To construct the geographic dispersion measure, we calculate the weighted-average geographic
distance among institutional shareholders of a firm. In particular, for each institutional shareholder
of the firm, we calculate the average geographic distance between the institution and all institutions
in the firm, weighted by their respective fractional holdings in the firm. This measure captures
the average distance between an institutional shareholder and its peers. To measure geographic
distance between a pair of institutions, we define an indicator that equals one if the two institutions
are headquartered more than 50 miles away from each other, and zero otherwise. We then calculate
a weighted-average of the geographic distance across all institutional shareholders of the firm, again
weighted by their fractional holdings. This weighting scheme ensures that institutions that are
likely to be more influential, i.e., those with larger holdings in the firm, receive greater weights
in determining geographic dispersion among shareholders. Specifically, geographical dispersion
among institutional investors of IPO firm c is defined as,
Gc =
∑
i∈S
wi,c
∑
j∈S
wi,cI(Distij > 50) (3.1)
where wi,c is the holdings of institution i in IPO firm c as a fraction of total institutional holdings
within three months of the IPO date; S is the set of institutional shareholders in firm c at first
calendar quarter ending after the IPO; I(Distij > 50) is an indicator variable for whether the
geographical distance between institutions i and j is more than 50 miles.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the geographical dispersion measure. The average
geographical dispersion for the IPO firms is 0.700 and there is a fair degree of cross-sectional
150
variation across IPO firms. Table 3.2 also presents summary statistics for other institutional
shareholder characteristics. The average number of institutions holding the equity of the IPO firm
is 26 and the mean Inst. ownership is 23.0%.10 We define Inst. ownership concentration as the
Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on each institution’s holding as
a percentage of total holdings of 13F institutions. The average Inst. ownership concentration is
0.188. Inst. ownership and Inst. ownership concentration are two important control variables of
institutions’ participation in our study. Inst. ownership reflect the aggregate “level" of institutional
participation, while Inst. ownership concentration reflects the “concentration" of institutional
participation.
3.5.2.2 Geographical Dispersion and IPO Offer Price Revision
In this subsection, we study the relationship between geographical dispersion of institutional
investors and the IPO offer price revision. We estimate the following OLS regression,
yj = α + βGj +
∑
φ
′
Zj + j (3.2)
The dependent variable y is offer price revision (Price Revision) and firm valuation at the offer price
(QOPAdj). The definitions for both variables are detailed in Section 3.4. The main independent
variable of interest is Geographic dispersion (G). The control variables Z include Inst. ownership,
Inst. ownership concentration, and IPO offering and firm characteristics. Specifically, we control
for Log(Reputation), defined as the natural logarithm of underwriter reputation ranking. Under-
writer reputation has been shown in the literature to be an important determinant of various IPO
characteristics. We also control for IPO offer size Log(Proceeds), which is the natural logarithm of
IPO total proceeds. Further, we include Log(Age+1), the natural logarithm of firm age plus one, as
a control variable since there is less uncertainty associated with older firms. We use two dummies
for hi-tech (High-Tech, equals to one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industry; see Loughran and
10The average institutional ownership we report here is consistent with that reported in Field and Lowry (2009).
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Ritter (2004) for details) and VC-backed (VC backed) firms. High-tech and VC-backed firms tend
to be younger, higher growth companies and therefore, are expected to have higher price revision
during the book-building process. In addition, we include a dummy for IPOs issued during the
bubble periods (Bubble, equals to one for IPOs in 1990 and 2000). IPOs issued during bubble
periods are likely to have higher price revision and valuation at offering. We also control for market
movement prior to the issue date of the IPO (Prior market return, defined as absolute return on the
CRSP value-weighted index one month before the IPO issue date) since market movement before
IPO issue date affects the investors’ demand for IPO shares, and therefore the eventual IPO offer
price. Finally, Lockup is a dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO has a lock up provision and
Financial is a dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is in the financial industry (with the
first-two digits of SIC code being 60-63 or 67).
We present the results in Table 3.4. Model (1) is our baseline regression and model (2) includes
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. In both regressions, the coefficient of Geographic
dispersion is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that greater geographical dispersion
of institutional investors participating in an IPO is associated with greater offer price revision.
The findings provide support for our hypothesis H2A, instead of hypothesis H2B. It indicates that
geographically isolated institutions collectively have more accurate information about the firm
going public, and IPO underwriters extract this more precise (and favorable) information from
institutions to determine the final offer price of an IPO. Therefore, IPO underwriters are more likely
to revise the offer price up during the book-building process. In terms of economic magnitudes,
a one-standard-deviation increase in Geographic dispersion is associated with an upward price
revision of approximately 2.3%.
Our regressions in Table 3.4 also show that the IPO offer price revision increases with the size of
the offering and prior one-month stock market return and it decreases with institutional ownership,
institutional ownership concentration, the reputation of the underwriters, and age of the IPO firm;
IPO valuation at the offer price increases with institutional ownership concentration, proceeds of
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the offer, and reputation of the underwriters, and it decreases with institutional ownership, the age
of the IPO firm, and prior one-month stock market return. Further, IPO offer price revision is are
higher for VC-backed and high-tech firms and during the IPO bubble years.
3.5.2.3 Geographical Dispersion and IPO Valuation
In this subsection, we study the effect of geographical dispersion among institutional investors
on the IPO valuation at offer price. Similar to regression model in Eq. (3.2), we regress IPO
valuation at offer price on geographical dispersion among institutional investors and other controls.
As described in Section 3.4, we measure IPO valuation using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QOPAdj).
We control for IPO offer size Log(Proceeds), which is the natural logarithm of IPO total
proceeds. Further, we include Log(Age+1), the natural logarithm of firm age plus one, as a control
variable since there is less uncertainty associated with older firms. We also use two dummies for
hi-tech (High-Tech, equals to one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industry; see Loughran and Ritter
(2004) for details) and VC-backed (VC backed) firms. High-tech and VC-backed firms tend to be
younger, higher growth companies and therefore, are expected to have higher valuation at offering.
In addition, we include a dummy for IPOs issued during the bubble periods (Bubble, equals to one
for IPOs in 1990 and 2000). IPOs issued during bubble periods are likely to have higher valuation
at offering. We also control for market movement prior to the issue date of the IPO (Prior market
return, defined as absolute return on the CRSP value-weighted index one month before the IPO
issue date) since market movement before IPO issue date affects the investors’ demand for IPO
shares, and therefore the eventual IPO valuation. Finally, Lockup is a dummy variable that equals to
one if the IPO has a lock up provision and Financial is a dummy variable that equals to one if the
IPO firm is in the financial industry (with the first-two digits of SIC code being 60-63 or 67).
We present the results in Table 3.5. Model (1) is our baseline regression and model (2) includes
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. In both regressions, the coefficient of Geographic
dispersion is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that greater geographical dispersion
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of institutional investors participating in an IPO is associated with higher IPO valuation. The
findings provide support for our hypotheses H3A, instead of hypothesis H3B.. It indicates that
geographically isolated institutions collectively have more accurate information about the firm
going public, and IPO underwriters assign a higher valuation to the IPO firm. In terms of economic
magnitudes, a one-standard-deviation increase in Geographic dispersion is associated with an
increase of approximately 0.21 in the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the IPO firm at the offer price.
Table 3.5 also shows that the IPO valuation increases with the size of the offering and the
reputation of its underwriter(s). Also IPO valuation decreases with the age of the IPO firm. Further,
IPO valuation is higher for VC-backed firms, high-tech firms, and firms went public during the IPO
bubble years.
3.5.2.4 Geographical Dispersion and Secondary Market Valuation
In this subsection, we study the effect of geographical dispersion among institutional investors
on the immediate secondary market valuation of the IPO firms. Similar to the regression model in
Eq. (3.2), we regress secondary market valuation on geographical dispersion among institutional
investors and other controls. As described in Section 3.4, we measure secondary market valuation
using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QFTDAdj and QFQAdj).
We control for underwriter reputation, Log(Reputation), as we expect firms underwritten by
higher reputation underwriters to receive higher valuations. We also control for the age of the firm,
Log(Age+1), since younger firms are likely to have more growth opportunities and thus higher
valuations. We also include VC backed and High-Tech in our regressions since VC-backed and
hi-tech firms are expected to have more growth options and higher valuations. In addition, we
control for IPO offer size, Log(Proceeds), and a list of dummies including Lockup, Financial, and
Bubble.
We report the results in Table 3.6. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is QFTDAdj
and that in models (3) and (4) is QFQAdj. Model (1) and (3) include industry fixed effects
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and year fixed effects. The coefficient on Geographic dispersion is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in all four specifications, suggesting that greater geographical dispersion
among institutional investors participating in an IPO is associated with higher IPO valuation in
the immediate secondary market. The findings provide support for our hypothesis H4A, , instead
of hypothesis H4B. It indicates that secondary market valuation also reflects the more accurate
(and favourable) information held collectively by geographically isolated institutions. In terms
of economic magnitudes, a one-standard-deviation increase in Geographic dispersion leads to an
increase of 0.39-0.42 in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
The results in Table 3.6 also show that younger firms, high-tech firms, VC-backed firms, firms
offered during the bubble years, as well as those underwritten by higher reputation underwriters and
have higher institutional ownership concentration receive higher secondary market valuations. On
the other hand, firms with higher institutional ownership and firms have lock-up provisions receive
lower secondary market valuations.
3.5.2.5 Geographical Dispersion and IPO Initial Return
We study the effect of geographical dispersion among institutional investors on IPO initial
returns by regressing Initial Return, also commonly referred as “underpricing" in the literature, on
Geographic dispersion and controls. We control for underwriter reputation and IPO offer size since
prior literature shows that these variables are significant predictors of IPO underpricing.11 Sherman
and Titman (2002) predict greater underpricing when the cost of investors’ information acquisition
is greater, for example, due to increased uncertainty about the IPO firm. We control for such
uncertainty by including firm age and dummy variables for hi-tech and VC-backed firms. We further
control for market movement in the pre-IPO period using the return on the CRSP value-weighted
11Loughran and Ritter (2004) docuemtn a negative relationship between underpricing and IPO offer size in the 1980s
and the beginning of the 2000s but a positive relationship in the 1990s. Carter and Manaster (1990) document a negative
relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing using data from 1980s. They argue that prestigious
underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings, and consequently lower underpricing. However, in later studies
using data from 1990s and 2000s, Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) document a positive relationship between
underwriter reputation and underpricing.
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index over the one month period prior to the IPO (Prior market return) to account for the flow of
new information to the equity market prior to the IPO.
The results, presented in Table 3.7, show that the coefficient on Geographic dispersion is
significant and positive in both specifications. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H5A, but
not H5B. The positive relationship between geographical dispersion among institutions participating
in the IPO and IPO initial return indicates that geographically isolated institutions hold more accurate
(and favourable) information. This favourable information embedded in the participation of more
geographically isolated institutions further attracts higher demand from other institutional and retail
investors during the first day trading in the public market, and leads to greater IPO initial return.
In terms of economic magnitudes, a one-standard-deviation increase in Geographic dispersion is
associated with an increase of approximately 2.8% in IPO initial returns, which is a 14% increase
relative to the sample mean of 19.8 percentage points. We also find younger firms, VC-backed
firms, hi-tech firms, and IPOs issued during bubble years are associated with higher initial returns.
3.5.2.6 Geographical Dispersion and Post-IPO Stock Return Performance
In this subsection, we study the effect of geographical dispersion of institutional investors on
the post-issue stock return performance of IPO firms. We regress market-adjusted one-year holding
period return (1YrHPRAdjMM) and book-to-market and size adjusted one-year holding period
return (1YrHPRAdjFF25) on Geographic dispersion and controls. 1YrHPRAdjMM is the IPO firms’
one-year holding period return calculated by compounding daily returns over 252 trading days
after the IPO (excluding the first trading day’s return) minus the CRSP value-weighted market
return during the same period; 1YrHPRAdjFF25 is the IPO firms’ one-year holding period return
calculated by compounding daily returns over 252 trading days after the IPO (excluding the first
trading day’s return) minus the matched Fama/French 25 size and book-to-market portfolio buy-
and-hold value-weighted return during the same period. If an IPO firm is delisted before the end of
the one-year period, the returns of the IPO firm and benchmark returns are compounded until the
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delisting date.
Similar to the regression in Eq. (3.2), we control for Inst. ownership and Inst. ownership
concentration. We also control for underwriter reputation, offer size, firm age, IPO initial return
(i.e., underpricing), and indicators for whether the IPO has a lockup provision and whether the IPO
is backed by VCs.12
Table 3.8 presents the regression results. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is
1YrHPRAdjFF25, and that in models (3) and (4) is 1YrHPRAdjMM. The coefficient for Geographic
dispersion is positive and statistically significant across all four specifications. The economic
magnitude is also significant: for example, model (2) shows that a a one-standard-deviation increase
in Geographic dispersion is associated with an increase of approximately 2.9% in book-to-market
and size adjusted one-year holding period return. The result is consistent with our hypothesis H6A,
instead of hypothesis H6B, indicating that while geographically isolated institutions have more
precise and favorable information about the IPO firm, the information produced by institutions is
reflected in the secondary market only gradually over time. Hence the long-run post-IPO stock
return increases with the geographically dispersion of the institutions participating in the IPO.
Table 3.8 also shows that larger IPOs, higher IPO initial returns, and the use of lock-up provisions
are associated with lower post-IPO long-run abnormal stock returns. Moreover, firm age is weakly
positively correlated with market-adjusted one-year holding period returns. We do not find a
statistically significant relationship between underwriter reputation and post-IPO long-run abnormal
stock returns.
12Using a sample of IPOs from 1975 to 1984, Ritter (1991) documents a positive effect of offer size and firm age on
the post-issue long-run stock returns of IPO firms, and a negative effect of underpricing on the same long-run stock
returns.
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3.6 Tests of the Relation between Geography and Information
Production
In the previous section, we show that higher geographical dispersion of the institutions investing
in an IPO is associated with higher IPO price revisions, higher IPO valuation and secondary
market firm valuation, larger IPO initial returns, as well as greater long-run post-IPO stock returns.
These results indicate that the “free riding on neighbors" effect dominates the “local information
sharing" effect, i.e. geographically isolated institutions hold more precise information, compared
to geographically clustered institutions, as the disadvantage arising from the dampening of each
institution’s incentive to produce information overrides any advantage to institutions of being able
to more precisely share each other information. In this section, we test the information advantage of
geographically isolated institutions directly in a variety of ways. First, we study relationship between
geographical dispersion of the institutions investing in an IPO and the information asymmetry facing
the firm in the secondary market. Second, we study the relative predictive power of geographically
isolated versus geographically clustered institutions’ trading for future abnormal stock returns and
earnings surprises of the IPO firm.
3.6.1 Information Asymmetry Facing an IPO Firm
If more isolated institutional investors have more accurate information about an IPO firm’s value,
the extent of information asymmetry facing an IPO firm will be smaller if its equity is predominantly
held by such institutions. As a result, we will expect that analysts produce higher quality research
about IPO firms dominated by geographically isolated institutions.
To test the relationship between information asymmetry facing the IPO firm and the geographical
dispersion of institutional shareholders, we retrieve analyst earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S.
Specifically, for each IPO firm, we retrieve sell-side analyst earnings forecasts (within 90 days
of the announcement date of actual earnings) for the first fiscal year post-IPO. We employ four
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measures for analyst forecasts. The first measure is the mean-squared error of analysts’ forecasts
(MSE). We measure forecast error as the absolute difference between the average earnings forecast
and the actual earnings per share divided by the price per share at the time of the forecast. The
second measure is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts (Dispersion). The third measure
is the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts (COV), which is defined as the ratio of standard
deviation to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. The fourth measure is the number
of analysts following the firm. We take the log of each measure to reduce skewness.
We regress each of the four measures of information asymmetry facing the IPO firm on the
geographical dispersion measure and controls. We control for institutional ownership, ownership
concentration, underwriter reputation, total offer size, firm age, and a list of dummies including
Lockup, VC backed, High-Tech, Financial, and Bubble. These control variables are associated
with various IPO characteristics and are potentially significant determinants of the information
environment facing the IPO firm in the secondary market. Table 3.9 reports the regression results.
The coefficient for Geographic dispersion is positive and statistically significant for three out of four
information asymmetry measures including Log(MSE), Log(Dispersion), and Log(COV). On the
other hand, we do not find statistically significant relationship between Geographic dispersion and
Log(# of Analysts). These findings indicate that while IPOs dominated by geographically isolated
institutions, compared to those dominated by geographically clustered institutions, are followed
by a similar number of analysts after they become public, the analysts covering the former tend to
produce earnings information that is of higher quality. The results are consistent with hypothesis
H7A, instead of hypothesis H7B, indicating that information asymmetry facing the IPO firm in the
secondary market is lower for IPO firms dominated by geographically isolated institutions.
The results presented in Table 3.9 also show that information asymmetry in the secondary
market is generally lower for older firms, high-tech firms, and financial firms. On the other hand,
information asymmetry in the secondary market is generally higher for firms with higher institutional
ownership concentration.
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3.6.2 Predictive Power of Institutional Trading
Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2010) show that institutional trading has predictive power for
long-run IPO performance. In this section, we study whether geographically isolated institutions
produce more accurate information about the intrinsic value and future performance of the IPO firm,
compared to geographically clustered institutions. Specifically, we first study whether trading by
geographically isolated institutions is a stronger predictor of future stock returns post-IPO. Second,
we study whether trading by geographically isolated institutions is a stronger predictor of earning
surprises post-IPO.
We measure institutional trading (Net Buy) as the change in the fractional ownership of the
IPO stock by institutional investors between the first and the second full quarter following the IPO.
For an institution in an IPO stock, we first calculate the average geographical distance between
the institution and all other institutional shareholders of the stock.13 We classify institutions with
the average distance below the median as “clustered" institutions and those above the median
as “isolated" institutions. To capture the aggregate information held by geographically clustered
institutions and geographically isolated institutions, we sum up trading by “clustered" institutions
(denoted as Net Buy Clustered) and that by “isolated" institutions (denoted as Net Buy Isolated)
separately. Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for Net Buy Clustered and Net Buy Isolated.
On average, geographically isolated (clustered) institutions sell approximately 1.1% (1.3%) of the
total number of shares outstanding of the IPO firm in the first full quarter post-IPO. We now turn
to examining the predictive power of trading by these two types of institutions for long-run stock
returns and earnings surprises.
13In untabulated results, we also rank the institutional shareholders according the number of “neighbors" each
institutions have and obtain quantitatively similar results. A pair of institutions are defined as “neighbor" when they are
headquartered within 50 miles of each other.
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3.6.2.1 Predictive Power of Institutional Trading For Subsequent Stock Returns
To examine the predictive power of institutional trading for subsequent returns, we regress
stock returns during the 12 months immediately following the first two full quarter post-IPO on
institutional trading during the second full quarter post-IPO.14 Similar to Section 3.5.2.6, we adjust
our raw holding period returns using contemporaneous market returns and the returns on Fama-
French 25 portfolios. Specifically, HPRAdjMM is the IPO firm’s one-year market-adjusted holding
period return, defined as the buy-and-hold returns of the stock during the 12 months minus the
buy-and-hold CRSP value-weighted market returns; HPRAdjFF25 is the IPO firm’s one-year size
and book-to-market adjusted holding period return, defined as the buy-and-hold returns of the stock
during the 12 months minus the buy-and-hold returns of the matched Fama-French 25 portfolios.
We regress HPRAdjMM and HPRAdjFF25 on Net Buy Clustered, Net Buy Isolated, and control
variables. We use the same set of controls as in Eq. (3.2). Table 3.10 presents the regression results.
The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is HPRAdjFF25, and that in models (3) and (4) is
HPRAdjMM. The coefficient for Net Buy Isolated is positive and statistically significant across four
models, while that for Net Buy Clustered is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In model (1),
the coefficient for Net Buy Isolated is 0.721, indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in
Net Buy Isolated is associated with an increase of approximately 2.9% in subsequent 12-month
size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal holding period returns. This finding is consistent with
hypothesis H8A, instead of hypothesis H8B, that geographically isolated institutions have more
accurate information collectively.
3.6.2.2 Predictive Power of Institutional Trading For Earnings Surprises
To examine the source of the return predictability of trading by geographical isolated institutions,
we test whether geographical isolated institutions possess superior ability to predict earnings
14We measure institutional trading as the change in the fractional ownership of the IPO stock by institutional
investors between the first and the second full quarter following the IPO.
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surprises of the IPO firm. Following Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), we define standardized
unexpected earning (SUE) as analyst forecast error scaled by stock price. More specifically,
SUE =
EPSA − EPSE
P0
(3.3)
where EPSA is the actual earnings per share (EPS) reported in the I/B/E/S database, and EPSE
is the median EPS forecast by analysts during the period from the IPO date to the end of the first
full calendar quarter post-IPO. If an analyst makes multiple forecasts during this period, we retain
only the last forecast. P0 is the stock price at the end of the first full calendar quarter post-IPO. We
regress SUE on Net Buy Clustered, Net Buy Isolated, and the same set of control variables used
in Eq. 3.2. It should be noted that institutional trading is measured before the release of quarterly
earnings, which typically occurs 30-40 days after a quarter-end.
The results, reported in Table 3.11, show that the coefficient for Net Buy Isolated is positive
and highly statistically significant, whereas that for Net Buy Clustered is negative and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. In terms of economic magnitudes, a one-standard-deviation increase
in Net Buy Isolated predicts an increase of 0.5% in standardized unexpected earnings. The result
suggests that, compared to geographically clustered institutions, geographically isolated institutions
possess superior information about IPO firms’ fundamentals. This finding is consistent with
hypothesis H9A, instead of hypothesis H9B, that geographically isolated institutions, collectively,
have more accurate information regarding the IPO firm’s fundamentals.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how the geographical locations of institutions affect their investments
in IPOs and various characteristics of the IPOs that they invest in. We argue that institutions
geographically close to each other may influence each other’s investment decisions in IPOs. Further,
they may also free-ride on each other’s information when evaluating IPOs, resulting in IPOs
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dominated by geographically clustered institutions reflecting less accurate information signals
compared to those dominated by geographically dispersed institutions.
We test the implications of the above hypotheses using a measure of institutions’ geographical
dispersion. Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, the equity holdings of
institutions in IPOs are influenced more by the investments made by neighboring institutions than
by those of distant institutions. Second, an increase in the geographical dispersion of the institutions
investing in an IPO is associated with higher IPO price revisions, higher IPO and immediate
secondary market firm valuations, larger IPO initial returns, and greater long-run post-IPO stock
returns. Further, consistent with an information channel driving the above results, we find that the
extent of information asymmetry facing an IPO firm is decreasing in the geographical dispersion of
institutions investing in its IPO. Finally, the predictive power of institutional trading post-IPO for
subsequent long-run stock returns and earnings surprises for the first fiscal-year end after the IPO is
greater for geographically isolated institutions compared to those that are geographically clustered.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the IPO Sample
This table reports the summary statitics of the characteristics of the IPO sample. The
sample consists of IPOs conducted in 1980-2012. Initial Return is the percentage dif-
ference between the first trading day closing price and IPO offer price. Revision is the
percentage difference between the IPO offer price and the midpoint of original filing range.
1YearHPR is the IPO firms’ one-year holding period return calculated by compounding
daily returns over 252 trading days after the IPO (excluding the first trading day’s return).
QOPAdj, QFTDAdj, and QFQAdj are the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio calculated
using the IPO offer price, the first trading day closing price, and the price at the end of
the first post-IPO fiscal quarter, respectively. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value
of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is equal to the
book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the number of shares
outstanding times the share price. Firm age is the number of years from IPO firm founding
year to the IPO issue year. Total proceeds is the total proceeds raised in the IPO in millions
(USD).
N Mean Std. Median 10th 90th
Initial Return 5590 0.196 0.424 0.075 -0.017 0.477
Price Revision 5156 0.011 0.250 0.000 -0.250 0.250
1YrHPR 5590 0.110 0.858 -0.043 -0.675 0.959
Firm age 5512 17 22 8 2 45
Total proceeds ($ mil) 5590 96.8 396.8 40.0 11.7 168.2
Total assets before IPO ($ mil) 4303 749.2 7878.3 46.5 7.7 675.1
QOPAdj 5558 0.96 2.75 0.46 -0.39 2.47
QFTDAdj 5558 1.65 4.20 0.65 -0.29 3.88
QFQAdj 5558 2.04 6.03 0.65 -0.35 4.68
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the Institutions’ Investments in IPOs
This table reports the summary statitics of the institutional shareholders charac-
teristics of the IPO firms. The sample consists of IPOs conducted in 1980-2012.
Number of institutions is the number of institutional shareholders in the first
fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings. Inst. geographic proximity is
the weighted-average geographic proximity among institutional shareholders in
the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings. Inst. ownership is the
fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership
concentration is calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership
concentration based on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F
institutions. For each IPO, we rank its institutional shareholders using their
average geographical distance to all other shareholders holding the same stock.
The institutional shareholders in the lower half rank are classified as clustered
institutions, while the institutional shareholders in the upper half rank are classi-
fied as isolated institutions. We aggregate the net buying (change of holdings as
a percentage of share outstanding) by clustered institutions and denote it as Net
Buy Clustered; we aggregate the net buying by isolated institutions and denote
it as Net Buy Isolated.
N Mean Std. Median 10th 90th
Number of institutions 5590 26 24 20 5 53
Geographical dispersion 5590 0.700 0.168 0.749 0.480 0.852
Inst. ownership 5590 0.230 0.195 0.181 0.053 0.460
Inst. ownership concentration 5590 0.188 0.152 0.138 0.064 0.389
Net Buy Isolated 5590 -0.011 0.041 -0.006 -0.047 0.020
Net Buy Clustered 5590 -0.013 0.041 -0.008 -0.048 0.016
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Neighboring Institutions on INstitutions’ Investment in IPOs
This table presents an institution-IPO level regressional analysis of the effect of neighbors on the participation of the institutions in
the IPO. The dependent variable is the institution’s holding as a percentange of total share outstanding reported in 13F filings the
first calendar quarter after the IPO. Neighbor Holdings is the total holdings of neighboring institutions as a percentange of total
share outstanding. Non-neighbor Holdings is the total holdings of non-neighboring institutions as a percentange of total share
outstanding. In columns (1) and (4), two institutional investors are defined as neighbor if they are headquartered within 50 miles
of each other. In columns (2) and (3), we vary the definition of neighbor using 100 miles and 200 miles as the cut-off boundary.
Local is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the particular institution is headquartered within 50 miles of IPO firm. Log(TNA) is
the natural logarithm of total net assets of the institution. All standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. We also report the p-value of the
Wald-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient for Neighbor Holdings equals to Non-neighbor Holdings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than 50 miles Less than 100 miles Less than 200 miles Excluding Institutions from NYC or Boston
Neighbor Holdings 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(9.43) (8.80) (13.59) (5.84)
Non-neighbor Holdings 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗
(10.32) (10.14) (8.29) (6.97)
Local 0.0003 0.0004∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(1.05) (2.21) (3.21) (3.02)
Log(TNA) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(12.27) (12.31) (12.29) (13.49)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 138,424 138,424 138,424 83,139
166
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.219
Wald-test p-value 0.001 0.049 0.000 0.001
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Table 3.4: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and Price Revision
This table presents a regressional analysis of IPO offer price revision on the geographical dispersion
of institutional shareholders. Revision is the percentage difference between the IPO offer price and
the midpoint of original filing range. Inst. geographic dispersion is the weighted-average geographic
dispersion among institutional shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings.
Inst. ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership
concentration is calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based
on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the natural
logarithm of the lead underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s
website.The maximum ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is
the natural logarithm of the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus company founding
year. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds. Prior market return is
the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 1 month period prior to the IPO. HighTech
equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals one if
the IPO firm is in the financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the IPO has
venture capital backing, and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision,
and zero otherwise. All standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Price Revision Price Revision
Geographical dispersion 0.111∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(4.03) (4.07)
Inst. ownership -0.111∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(3.51) (3.97)
Inst. ownership concentration -0.047 -0.056∗
(1.29) (1.71)
Log(Reputation) -0.011∗∗ -0.009∗
(2.18) (1.87)
Log(Proceeds) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(4.30) (4.32)
Log(Age+1) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(4.41) (3.49)
Prior market return 0.991∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗
(6.59) (7.77)
Lockup -0.019 -0.051∗∗∗
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(1.31) (4.32)
VC backed 0.031∗∗ 0.021
(2.16) (0.93)
HighTech 0.074∗∗∗
(3.32)
Financial 0.001
(0.07)
Bubble 0.079∗∗∗
(11.28)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 5096 5096
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.16
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Table 3.5: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and IPO Valuation
This table presents a regressional analysis of IPO valuation on the geographical dispersion of
institutional shareholders. QOPAdj is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio calculated using the
IPO offer price. Inst. geographic dispersion is the weighted-average geographic dispersion among
institutional shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings. Inst. ownership
is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership concentration is
calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages
of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead
underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum
ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of
the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is
the natural logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds. Prior market return is the return on the CRSP
value-weighted index over the 1 month period prior to the IPO. HighTech equals one if the IPO
firm is in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals one if the IPO firm is in the
financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing,
and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero otherwise. All
standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
QOPAdj QOPAdj
Geographical dispersion 1.270∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗
(6.28) (5.74)
Inst. ownership -2.933∗∗∗ -2.846∗∗∗
(9.82) (9.01)
Inst. ownership concentration 1.053∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗
(5.42) (5.39)
Log(Reputation) 0.069∗ 0.066∗∗
(1.81) (2.33)
Log(Proceeds) 0.207∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(3.90) (4.63)
Log(Age+1) -0.274∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(5.82) (4.76)
Prior market return -2.063∗∗∗ -2.214∗∗∗
(3.33) (3.07)
Lockup -0.213 -0.097
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(1.65) (1.11)
VC backed 0.328∗∗ 0.321∗∗
(2.61) (2.44)
HighTech 0.405∗∗∗
(4.02)
Financial -0.220∗
(1.88)
Bubble 0.250∗∗∗
(2.79)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 5481 5481
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07
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Table 3.6: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and Secondary Market Valuation
This table presents a regressional analysis of IPO valuation at offering and secondary market on
the geographical dispersion of institutional shareholders. QFTDAdj and QFQAdj are the industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio calculated using the first trading day closing price, and the price at the end
of the first post-IPO fiscal quarter, respectively. Inst. geographic dispersion is the weighted-average
geographic dispersion among institutional shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in
13F filings. Inst. ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst.
ownership concentration is calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration
based on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the
natural logarithm of the lead underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings are obtained from
Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters.
Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus
company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds.
High-Tech equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals
one if the IPO firm is in the financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the
IPO has venture capital backing, and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup
provision, and zero otherwise. All standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QFTDAdj QFTDAdj QFQAdj QFQAdj
Geographical dispersion 2.146∗∗∗ 2.371∗∗∗ 2.081∗∗∗ 2.509∗∗∗
(6.96) (6.62) (5.93) (5.18)
Inst. ownership -4.154∗∗∗ -4.085∗∗∗ -4.113∗∗∗ -4.062∗∗∗
(7.56) (6.93) (6.26) (5.78)
Inst. ownership concentration 1.798∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗
(3.64) (4.12) (2.99) (3.43)
Log(Reputation) 0.091∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(1.73) (2.37) (2.05) (2.32)
Log(Proceeds) 0.473∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(2.61) (3.34) (2.24) (3.07)
Log(Age+1) -0.497∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗
(4.69) (3.93) (3.65) (3.00)
Lockup -0.825∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗ -1.901∗∗ -0.864∗∗
(2.99) (2.46) (2.61) (2.11)
VC backed 0.771∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 0.708∗∗
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(3.14) (2.66) (2.51) (2.42)
HighTech 0.878∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗
(4.89) (5.72)
Financial -0.364∗∗ -0.404∗∗
(2.35) (2.42)
Bubble 2.442∗∗∗ 3.257∗∗∗
(9.55) (6.25)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 5481 5481 5481 5481
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.12
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Table 3.7: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and IPO Initial Return
This table presents a regressional analysis of IPO initial return on the geographical dispersion of
institutional shareholders. Initial Return is the percentage difference between the first trading day
closing price and IPO offer price. Inst. geographic dispersion is the weighted-average geographic
dispersion among institutional shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings.
Inst. ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership
concentration is calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based
on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Firm-institution distance is the
natural logarithm of weighted-average geographical distance between the institutional shareholders
and the IPO firm. Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead underwriter reputation
ranking. The rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum ranking is used when
there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of the IPO firm age plus
one, where age is IPO year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm
of the IPO offering proceeds. Prior market return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index
over the 1 month period prior to the IPO. High-Tech equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech
industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals one if the IPO firm is in the financials industry, and
zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing, and zero otherwise.
Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero otherwise. All standard errors are
clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Initial Return Initial Return
Geographical dispersion 0.106∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(2.50) (3.53)
Inst. ownership -0.086∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(4.18) (3.72)
Inst. ownership concentration -0.041 -0.030
(0.95) (0.79)
Log(Reputation) -0.002 0.002
(0.42) (0.46)
Log(Proceeds) 0.032∗ 0.034∗∗
(1.86) (2.39)
Log(Age+1) -0.041∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(3.91) (3.16)
Prior market return 1.464∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗∗
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(3.33) (3.40)
Lockup -0.098∗∗∗ -0.046∗
(3.12) (1.99)
VC backed 0.079∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(4.98) (2.87)
HighTech 0.099∗∗∗
(3.54)
Financial -0.009
(0.43)
Bubble 0.447∗∗∗
(9.33)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 5509 5509
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.24
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Table 3.8: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and Long-run Post-IPO Stock Perfor-
mance
This table presents a regressional analysis of post-IPO stock return performance on the geographical
dispersion of institutional shareholders. 1YrHPRAdjFF25 is the IPO firms’ one-year holding period
return calculated by compounding daily returns over 252 trading days after the IPO (excluding the
first trading day’s return) adjusted for (minus) the matched Fama/French 25 size and book-to-market
portfolio buy-and-hold value-weighted return. 1YrHPRAdjMM is the IPO firms’ one-year holding
period return calculated by compounding daily returns over 252 trading days after the IPO (ex-
cluding the first trading day’s return) adjusted for (minus) the CRSP value-weighted market return.
Inst. geographic dispersion is the weighted-average geographic dispersion among institutional
shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after IPO reported in 13F filings. Inst. ownership is the
fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership concentration is
calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages
of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead
underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum
ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of
the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is
the natural logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds. VC backed equals one if the IPO has venture
capital backing, and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero
otherwise. All standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1YrHPRAdjFF25 1YrHPRAdjFF25 1YrHPRAdjMM 1YrHPRAdjMM
Geographical dispersion 0.292∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.137∗
(3.57) (2.28) (3.27) (1.89)
Inst. ownership 0.016 0.026 0.060∗ 0.072∗
(0.40) (0.64) (1.67) (1.90)
Inst. ownership concentration -0.204∗∗ -0.217∗∗
(2.39) (2.42)
Log(Reputation) 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.005
(0.47) (0.29) (0.58) (0.39)
Log(Proceeds) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(3.08) (3.36) (2.33) (2.62)
Log(Age+1) 0.018 0.018 0.021∗ 0.021∗
(1.58) (1.57) (1.81) (1.79)
Initial Return -0.061∗ -0.061∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.077∗∗
176
(1.92) (1.90) (2.21) (2.18)
Lockup -0.112∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.135∗∗
(2.10) (2.11) (2.17) (2.18)
VC backed -0.026 -0.027 -0.030 -0.032
(0.52) (0.55) (0.62) (0.65)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5509 5509 5509 5509
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
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Table 3.9: Geographical Dispersion Among Institutions and Information Asymmetry
This table presents a regressional analysis of secondary-market information asymmetry measures on the geographical dispersion of
institutional shareholders. For each IPO sample, we retrieve analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S for the first fiscal year post-IPO.
Log(MSE) is the natural logarithm of mean-squared error in the earnings forecast. We measure forecast errors as the absolute
difference between the average forecasted earnings and the actual earnings per share divided by the price per share at the time of
the forecast. Log(Dispersion) is the natural logarithm of standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Log(# of Analysts) is the natural
logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm Log(COV) is the natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation (COV) of
analyst forecasts. COV is defined as the ratio of standard deviation to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. Inst.
geographic dispersion is the weighted-average geographic dispersion among institutional shareholders in the first fiscal quarter after
IPO reported in 13F filings. Inst. ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership
concentration is calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages of institutional
holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings
are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the
natural logarithm of the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is the natural
logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds. Prior market return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 1 month
period prior to the IPO. High-Tech equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals one if
the IPO firm is in the financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing, and zero
otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero otherwise. All standard erros are clustered at industry
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(MSE) Log(MSE) Log(Dispersion) Log(Dispersion) Log(COV) Log(COV) Log(# of Analysts) Log(# of Analysts)
Geographical dispersion -2.016∗∗∗ -2.952∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗ -1.192∗∗∗ -0.307 -0.664∗∗ 0.048 -0.003
(3.72) (7.14) (2.54) (4.41) (1.11) (2.17) (0.40) (0.02)
Inst. ownership 0.228 0.471 0.137 0.285 0.045 0.134 -0.035 -0.029
(0.72) (1.43) (0.83) (1.43) (0.23) (0.69) (0.49) (0.40)
Inst. ownership concentration 1.726∗∗∗ 2.296∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.033 0.027
(3.44) (5.12) (2.53) (3.21) (2.18) (2.82) (0.31) (0.25)
Log(Reputation) 0.094 -0.083 0.061 -0.010 0.104 -0.001 0.015 0.008
(0.74) (0.72) (1.07) (0.26) (1.48) (0.02) (0.77) (0.42)
Log(Proceeds) -0.250∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.018 0.168∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
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(2.33) (3.28) (3.26) (10.07) (0.39) (5.12) (17.69) (19.99)
Log(Age+1) -0.326∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.005
(5.11) (4.75) (2.99) (3.59) (3.09) (4.31) (0.54) (0.29)
Lockup 0.410 0.550∗∗ 0.069 0.116 0.086 0.049 -0.129∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(1.66) (2.57) (0.77) (1.34) (1.02) (0.94) (4.98) (4.76)
VC backed 0.236 0.567 0.142∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(1.20) (1.63) (1.89) (2.42) (4.86) (7.51) (3.57) (2.84)
HighTech -1.077∗∗ -0.392∗ -0.038 0.088∗∗
(2.21) (1.94) (0.34) (2.55)
Financial -0.816∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ 0.102∗
(2.66) (2.18) (4.73) (1.88)
Bubble 1.594∗∗∗ 0.376∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(4.25) (1.90) (3.34) (4.39)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 3724 3724 2314 2314 2311 2311 3898 3898
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.22
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Table 3.10: Predictive Power of Institutional Trading for Subsequent Long-run IPO Abnor-
mal Performance
This table presents the regressional analysis whether trading by geographically isolated institutions
have stronger predictive power for future IPO stock returns, compared to geographically clustered
institutions. The dependent variable is market-adjusted or book-to-market and size adjusted holding
period return during the 12 months immediately following the first two quarters post-IPO. For
each IPO, we rank its institutional shareholders using their average geographical distance to all
other shareholders holding the same stock. The institutional shareholders in the lower half rank are
classified as clustered institutions, while the institutional shareholders in the upper half rank are
classified as isolated institutions. We aggregate the net buying (change of holdings as a percentage
of share outstanding) between the first and the second quarter post-IPO by clustered institutions
and denote it as Net Buy Clustered; we aggregate the net buying by isolated institutions between
the first and the second quarter post-IPO and denote it as Net Buy Isolated. Inst. ownership is
the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Inst. ownership concentration is
calculated as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages
of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead
underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum
ranking is used when there are multiple lead underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of
the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is
the natural logarithm of the IPO offering proceeds. Prior market return is the return on the CRSP
value-weighted index over the 1 month period prior to the IPO. High-Tech equals one if the IPO
firm is in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. Financial equals one if the IPO firm is in the
financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing,
and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero otherwise. All
standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPRAdjFF25 HPRAdjFF25 HPRAdjMM HPRAdjMM
Net Buy Isolated 0.721∗∗ 0.751∗∗ 0.723∗∗ 0.766∗∗
(2.27) (2.47) (2.42) (2.55)
Net Buy Clustered 0.062 0.019 0.088 0.018
(0.15) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04)
Inst. ownership -0.007 -0.002 0.023 0.049
(0.14) (0.04) (0.43) (0.85)
Inst. ownership concentration -0.059 -0.048 -0.047 0.004
(0.95) (0.80) (0.72) (0.07)
Log(Reputation) -0.002 0.011∗ 0.001 0.010
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(0.21) (1.77) (0.13) (1.67)
Log(Proceeds) -0.009 -0.005 0.003 0.022∗
(0.62) (0.47) (0.19) (1.84)
Log(Age+1) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(2.72) (1.87) (3.14) (2.58)
Initial Return -0.077∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(2.84) (2.63) (3.10) (2.89)
Lockup -0.076∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.033∗
(2.99) (2.52) (3.25) (1.67)
VC backed -0.014 -0.002 -0.014 0.002
(0.45) (0.06) (0.46) (0.07)
HighTech 0.047 0.023
(1.66) (0.79)
Financial 0.020 0.058∗∗
(0.51) (2.01)
Bubble -0.332∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗
(4.29) (2.01)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 5324 5324 5324 5324
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
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Table 3.11: Predictive Power of Institutional Trading for Subsequent Earnings Surprises
This table presents the regressional analysis whether trading by geographically isolated institutions
have stronger predictive power for firms’ earnings surprises, compared to geographically clustered
institutions. The dependent variable is standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), defined as I/B/E/S
analyst forecast error scaled by stock price. For each IPO, we rank its institutional shareholders
using their average geographical distance to all other shareholders holding the same stock. The
institutional shareholders in the lower half rank are classified as clustered institutions, while the
institutional shareholders in the upper half rank are classified as isolated institutions. We aggregate
the net buying (change of holdings as a percentage of shares outstanding) by clustered institutions
and denote it as Net Buy Clustered; we aggregate the net buying by isolated institutions and denote
it as Net Buy Isolated. Inst. ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional
investors. Inst. ownership concentration is calculated as the Herfindahl Index of institutional
ownership concentration based on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions.
Log(Reputation) is the natural logarithm of the lead underwriter reputation ranking. The rankings
are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.The maximum ranking is used when there are multiple lead
underwriters. Log(Age+1) is the natural logarithm of the IPO firm age plus one, where age is IPO
year minus company founding year. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm of the IPO offering
proceeds. Prior market return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 1 month
period prior to the IPO. High-Tech equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech industries, and zero
otherwise. Financial equals one if the IPO firm is in the financials industry, and zero otherwise. VC
backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing, and zero otherwise. Lockup equals one if
the IPO has a lockup provision, and zero otherwise. All standard errors are clustered at industry
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
SUE SUE
Net Buy Isolated 0.134∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(4.52) (4.28)
Net Buy Clustered -0.005 -0.004
(0.21) (0.17)
Inst. ownership 0.010 0.011
(1.22) (1.41)
Inst. ownership concentration -0.026∗∗ -0.025∗∗
(2.20) (2.17)
Log(Reputation) 0.002 0.002
(0.93) (1.17)
Log(Proceeds) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002
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(3.16) (1.45)
Log(Age+1) 0.002 0.003∗∗
(1.39) (2.07)
Initial Return 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(4.50) (4.72)
Lockup -0.001 -0.002
(0.58) (1.11)
VC backed -0.001 -0.001
(0.41) (0.40)
HighTech 0.005∗∗
(2.26)
Financial 0.008∗
(1.94)
Bubble -0.009∗∗
(2.06)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 2986 2986
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02
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